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Increasing political tensions between nations, coupled with advancements in technology, 
have resulted in the need for a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system, specifically in 
the European theater where ally nations are particularly vulnerable. This report focuses 
on defending Turkey with a solution that could be fielded by FY18. It includes the 
following mature technologies: Patriot Advanced Capability-3, Terminal High Altitude 
Area Defense (THAAD), Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance (AN/TPY-2), 
and BMD capable Aegis ships. Compiling the anticipated needs of stakeholders and 
identifying the most prominent threat focuses the research efforts. To identify any 
functional gaps the analysis uses functional decomposition and flow block diagrams 
before entering modeling and simulation. By focusing on footprint area defense and 
testing multiple scenarios, performance gaps are revealed; generic parameters keep this 
report unclassified. The results from the simulations led to several alternatives. 
Alternative A places two BMD Aegis capable ships along the northern and southern 
coasts of Turkey; Alternative B specifies several THAAD batteries in various locations; 
and Alternative C dictates an Aegis Ashore in the eastern region of the country. 
Alternative C was determined to be the best choice, taking into account modeled 
performance and total life-cycle cost. 
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The proliferation of ballistic missile threats to the United States and its allies garners 
much attention in the Department of Defense. Ballistic missiles have become more 
accessible to hostile nations and more capable in recent years as missile technologies 
have matured. This problem is particularly worrisome for United States allies in Southern 
Europe, who must contend with ballistic missile threats from Iran. While the United 
States is actively countering such threats with rapidly maturing ballistic missile defense 
technologies, the problems are changing as fast as the solutions. The current threats are 
evolving with geographic and political alliances, advancing technical solutions, and the 
high costs of the solution components. The currently envisioned approach to defend 
Southern Europe against ballistic missile threats cannot adapt to evolving threats, does 
not address rapid advances in technology, nor does it provide an affordable solution. 
To understand the problem of ballistic missile defense in southern Europe, various 
stakeholders were determined and organized by type (resource stakeholders, policy 
stakeholders, operation stakeholders and acquisition stakeholders). Stakeholder needs 
were identified to construct a set of common needs and priorities that any solution must 
meet. From stakeholder analysis, it was identified that a system was needed that was cost 
effective, straightforward to procure, and available in the very near future. 
The ballistic missile threat and defense problem spaces were examined to acquire 
necessary information with respect to existing technologies and concepts that any 
solution must be cognizant of. In addition, the physical constraints specific to the field of 
ballistic missiles were examined. 
With the needs and constraints identified, the cohort formalized them into a set of 
requirements (such as “The EBMD system shall have a 97% probability of detection at a 
95% confidence level” and “The EBMD system shall be able to engage up to five 
ballistic missiles at a time”) that could be used to construct solution agnostic functional 
architectures and evaluate them. The requirements were categorized into functional and 
non-functional types and evaluation measures were defined to provide performance and 
 xviii 
cost targets that any solution could be compared against. Those evaluation measures 
included the ability of a system to defend the geographical footprint of Turkey, the 
probability of a system to successfully intercept a ballistic missile threat originating from 
Iran, and life cycle costs of a system over a 10-year period.  
Functional analysis was then performed to understand how any solution would 
need to operate in order to meet the needs of the stakeholders and to understand fully the 
hierarchical and architectural details that any solution must provide. Through the 
construction of functional hierarchies as well as functional flows, the critical system 
behaviors and priorities were identified and used to determine how a suitable solution 
should behave. 
Those critical system behaviors were then allocated into a series of alternative 
architectural definitions that were directly traceable to requirements and could be used 
when conducting simulations to further refine, understand and functionally validate how 
a solution may perform. Those architectures were varied combinations of BMD 
components (Aegis ships, Aegis Ashore, THAAD interceptors, PAC-3 interceptors, and 
the AN/TPY-2 radar system) in an operational or near-operational state, as well as a 
Baseline architecture that functionally represented what is currently used to defend 
against ballistic missile threats in Southern Europe. 
The Baseline and EBMD Alternative architectures were entered into a software 
suite of missile modeling tools called Systems Toolkit by AGI, Inc. Those tools 
simulated their performance using two evaluation methods. 
The first method, called “One Versus Many,” evaluated the ability of the various 
architectures to defend against specific incoming ballistic missile threats with a known 
target. In this simulation, it was clear that battle delay and target locations play a critical 
role in the ability of an alternative architecture to successfully intercept a ballistic missile 
threat. This insight shows that architectures where the interceptors are located closest to 
the threat are more effective. 
The second method, called “Defended Area Footprint,” evaluated the ability of 
the alternative architectures to defend a defined geographic area (for this project, the 
 xix 
borders of Turkey). This simulation demonstrated that having multiple interceptor 
systems covering the same geographic area significantly increases the probability of an 
area being defended. 
With the help of the software simulation tools, the cohort was able to further 
refine and evaluate the performance characteristics of various solution architectures 
(called Alternatives A, B.1, B.2, B.3 and C).  
The EBMD Alternative that performed best (highest Percent Footprint Defended 
and highest Probability of Intercept), labeled B.3, had two Aegis ships and three Terminal 
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) BMD interceptor batteries (the most THAADs of 
any alternative architecture). 
The life cycle costs over a 10-year period were then calculated for each EBMD 
Alternative. Using cost data from the MDA Fiscal Year 2013 Budget, component costs 
were identified for each BMD component in the alternative architectures, and their 
combined costs were calculated. These calculations showed that each EBMD Alternative 
was cheaper than the Baseline architecture. The highest cost drivers were production and 
construction and quantity of interceptors held by the system. The alternative architecture 
utilizing Aegis Ashore (Alternative C) was the least expensive alternative due to its reuse 
of technologies developed for Aegis ships. 
Equipped with performance and cost data for each EBMD Alternative, the 
alternative architectures were evaluated. It was determined that Alternative C provided 
the best balance between cost and performance. 
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Thirty-one countries currently possess operational ballistic missile systems with 
ranges varying from 120 km to 15,000 km (Arms Control Association 2012). At least 
three of these countries, Iran, North Korea, and Syria, are deemed overtly hostile to the 
United States (U.S.) or nations in the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO). Several 
other countries could reasonably become hostile in the next decade (Missile Defense 
Agency 2012c). 
Iran, North Korea, and Syria are capable of inflicting serious damage to the U.S. 
or its allies. To protect against ballistic missile threats, the U.S. and NATO have invested 
in a complex, global missile defense system. This defense system is overseen by the U.S. 
Department of Defense (DoD) Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and is termed the 
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) System. 
The BMD system employs regional and global networks of sensors that can detect 
missile launches or incoming threats and alert active-defense systems to neutralize the 
threats. BMD also employs defensive missile interceptor batteries afloat and ashore, as 
well as ground and airborne weapons systems that work to detect and destroy the threats. 
A large number of sensors and defense systems must be placed throughout the 
world to assess and neutralize incoming ballistic missile threats in near real-time. To 
address these threats to Europe and the Eastern U.S. seaboard, the U.S., in partnership 
with other NATO allies, is currently developing and deploying missile defense systems 
throughout Europe, identified throughout this report as European Ballistic Missile 
Defense (EBMD). 
The problems surrounding the EBMD domain are large and dynamic. The issue 
spans a long list of factors, all of which contribute significantly to the EBMD problem. 
Those factors include: 
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Geographic and Political Alliances 
Sources of funding and policies are often organized by regions or countries. 
EBMD solutions encompass many of these organizations, whose priorities widely vary. 
Technical Solutions and Components 
EBMD encompasses a wide variety of weapons systems, sensors, networks, and 
supporting organizations. None of these systems can operate effectively in a vacuum, and 
varying capabilities and costs serve to create a patchwork of related systems and 
capabilities. 
Technical Maturity Levels 
EBMD components are constantly developing and improving. Deployed EBMD 
systems must coexist with similar but enhanced versions being deployed elsewhere. 
These enhancements complicate capability assessments when studying EBMD 
components as a whole system of systems (SoS). 
A Solution Trade Space with Numerous Degrees of Freedom 
The threat is equally as dynamic as the solution, and this contributes a number of 
factors that must be analyzed in the solution space including locations, threat and 
interceptor capabilities, costs, weapon program maturities and conflicting stakeholder 
needs. The most effective tradeoffs and compromises vary as widely as the EBMD 
environment. 
1. Emerging Common Themes 
Careful evaluation of the issues in the EBMD domain eventually started to 
suggest three common themes that could be addressed from a systems engineering 
perspective. These problems were consistent, spanned many sources, and required 
solutions that could be reached using the tools and techniques available to a systems 
engineer. 
The key problems facing EBMD are evolving threats, changing technology, and 
budget constraints. 
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a. Evolving Threats 
The threats to U.S. allied entities within Europe are changing at a fast 
pace. The threats span numerous aggressor countries with varied advancement of 
technologies. While solutions try keep pace, they often leapfrog and then fall behind new 
threat developments. The Iranian threat in particular shows a continued advancement that 
must be matched with maturing short and medium range EBMD solutions.  
As Cappaccio (Cappacio 2012) explains, Iran has been improving its 
accuracy with respect to missiles. Cappaccio cites a Congressional Research Service 
analyst, Kenneth Katzman, who observed of a report discussing an assessment of Iran’s 
military power: 
There was a theme that Iran is improving the accuracy and lethality of its 
missiles […] U. S. government reports have previously always 
downplayed the accuracy and effectiveness of Iran’s missile forces. […] 
The report seemed pretty sober and respectful of Iran’s capabilities, 
crediting Iran with improving survivability. (Katzman, quoted in Cappacio 
2012, para. 7–8). 
The current methods of addressing ballistic missile threats have significant 
lead times. Those lead times are often dependent on varying political, technical and 
developmental constraints. Such constraints serve to hamper the abilities to address 
EBMD threats. Those threats in turn, are often given the opportunity to advance faster 
than the solutions. Effective containment of ballistic missile threats requires a solution 
that can answer to an adaptable and dynamic threat environment. 
b. Changing Technology 
EBMD technology is developing at a significant pace from both sides of 
the problem. The MDA releases news on a regular basis (Missile Defense Agency 2013e) 
capturing the aggressive and expensive pace of BMD system solutions development (as 
seen in Figure 1). Several interceptor tests have also occurred since the European Phased 
Adaptive Approach (EPAA) was announced in 2009. 
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Figure 1.  MDA Development Goals for BMD System Solutions in Europe (From 
Missile Defense Agency 2012a) 
While the current EBMD solutions are by no means static, they often occur as 
standalone solutions and do not holistically address the developmental pace of the 
constituent components. EPAA in particular, which is the presidentially-directed policy 
for missile defense in Europe, has been criticized by the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) for its decision to view various missile defense capabilities as “tool kits” 
for the regional commands, and for not requiring an integrated missile defense 
architecture but instead relying on proven solutions (GAO 2010). In December 2010, the 
GAO noted: 
DoD has not yet determined the full set of BMDS system elements that 
will participate in EPAA [….] Although DoD has begun to plan and 
implement EPAA, it has not yet established architectures with systems and 
quantities for the phases [….] DoD’s decisions to manufacture, produce, 
and field missile defense systems are outpacing testing, modeling, and 
validation, resulting in decisions being made with limited understanding of 
system effectiveness.[…] As efforts to meet near-term commitments 
unfold, the schedule for delivering capabilities may be difficult to achieve 
and resources needed may grow. (GAO 2010, 13–24) 
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The pace of changing technology must be addressed more effectively in any 
overarching EBMD solution. 
c. Budget Constraints 
In January 2011, the GAO made it abundantly clear to the DoD that life cycle 
costs estimates and cost containment are not being earnestly addressed for dollars spent 
on EBMD. 
Although DoD reported that the acquisition cost estimates and annual 
BMD budget request for individual elements include EPAA costs, we 
found that such information does not include full life cycle costs. Further, 
this budgeting method is fragmented and so does not provide decision 
makers with a transparent and holistic view of EPAA. (GAO 2011, 13) 
This makes it difficult for decision makers to determine if the current approach is 
affordable or properly funded. 
2. The Problem 
The currently envisioned approach to defend Europe against ballistic missile 
threats cannot adapt to evolving threats, does not address rapid advances in technology, 
nor does it provide an affordable solution. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The cohort evaluated the EBMD problem from the perspective of cost control, 
technical flexibility, and effective use of existing component capabilities. The solution 
needed to be able to contain the immediate threat to Europe posed by Iran and do it with 
those central issues as the top priority. During that evaluation, the following research 
questions were explored: 
1. What Are the Primary Regional Threats? 
The DoD has acknowledged that technological advances in materials, propulsion, 
warheads, and sensors have resulted in ballistic missile systems that “are becoming more 
flexible, mobile, survivable, reliable, and accurate, while also increasing in range” 
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(Secretary of Defense 2010). How do we quantify those changes? What other potential 
adversaries could evolve? 
2. What Are the Needs of the Stakeholders? 
How do NATO, our European allies, and DoD stakeholders expect an EBMD 
solution to best serve their priorities? How can we ensure that the stakeholders remain 
free of a ballistic missile threat? 
3. What Are the Existing Solutions? 
The MDA is currently operating an EBMD system that will protect NATO, our 
European allies, and our interests. There are assertions that the current system has holes 
in its ability to cover the entire region as required. What are the existing approaches to 
ballistic missile defense in Europe? 
4. What Are the Existing System Limitations? 
There are many limitations to countering the ballistic missile threats. The GAO 
indicates that performance gaps in the European ballistic umbrella have not been fully 
quantified or understood. 
The system’s desired performance is not yet defined using operationally 
relevant quantifiable metrics, such as how long and how well it can 
defend. The combatant commands are attempting to define operational 
performance metrics to enable credible assessment of operational 
performance gaps. However, these metrics have yet to be finalized and 
implemented. Without a more complete understanding of BMD 
operational capabilities and limitations, the combatant commands face 
potential risk in EPAA operational planning. (GAO 2011, 2) 
How can these limitations be quantified and how can those quantifications be 
leveraged to ensure an effective solution?  
5. What Viable Solutions Can Be Formulated? 
Currently, one solution being sought by the DoD is the increased production and 
procurement of proven technologies such as THAAD, the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) 
interceptor, and the AN/TPY-2 radar (Secretary of Defense 2010). This solution has 
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become increasingly more difficult to realize due to DoD fiscal constraints. What are the 
most effective methods of defending Europe against a ballistic missile threat?  
C. ASSUMPTIONS 
The issues surrounding EBMD are sensitive (both technical and political). All 
research and analysis for this project was unclassified, and based on publically available 
information. Without privileged access or knowledge of more protected information 
sources, it was assumed that the information from trusted and reputable unclassified 
public sources was accurate, factual and current. The insights formulated by the cohort 
were dependent on such assumptions and may not suggest a solution that reflects the 
insights that would be available with access to classified information. However, the 
process to reach such conclusions drawn in this paper is valid based on the sources the 
cohort did have available to them, and can be leveraged against more protected sources to 
aid in solving the problem at hand. 
D. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS 
The cohort focused on the processes from stakeholder needs through alternatives 
analysis presented in the classic Vee model (Blanchard 2011, 34), and did not create any 
components or products that would be testable or deployable. A more detailed description 
of the decomposition and definition side of the Vee was created and the integration and 
verification sequence was removed. This new tailored systems engineering process also 
had a few adaptations to better use the available analysis personnel in the cohort.  
The systems engineering process (Figure 2) divided the cohort into functional 
groups that were responsible for owning the various sub processes and contributions to 
the report. Those major sub processes included: 
The problem space exploration process, whose functional group explored the 
needs of the stakeholders, understood the mission and missile concepts, and identified the 
threats and existing BMD components to be used in formulating a quantifiable problem. 
The requirements analysis process, whose functional group compiled the BMD 
needs specific to the project problem and converted them into a set of Functional 
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Requirements, Non-Functional Requirements and Evaluation Measures (EM) that could 
be used for detailed functional analysis and identifying alternatives. 
The functional analysis process, whose functional group decomposed the problem 
space into a functional hierarchy and defined the functions and flows of missile defense 
into a system definition that could be traced to requirements. 
The alternatives generation process converted the functional architecture 
generated during functional analysis into a set of initial alternative architectures that 
could be modeled and simulated to identify performance trends and architecture 
behaviors. 
The modeling and simulation (M&S) process, whose functional group took the 
initial alternative architectures and converted them into system models that could be 
evaluated and explored. Those models were tested in simulation software to validate their 
ability to meet the needs of the stakeholders. 
The alternatives refinement process, whose functional group took the insights 
gained during M&S and used them to create a new set refined alternatives that better met 
the needs of the stakeholders than the initial alternative architectures. 
The life cycle cost analysis process, whose functional group identified the costs of 
the alternatives. Those costs were used to evaluate and compare the alternatives and 
identify the ones that were the most economical. 
The alternatives analysis process, whose functional group combined the 
performance results of the refined alternatives learned during M&S, the Evaluation 
Measures created by the requirements analysis process, and the life cycle costs to 
recommend an EBMD system architecture that is affordable and effective. 
A program and document management process was also introduced, whose 
functional group centrally directed all the other functional groups as well as managed the 
project. This functional group was responsible for leading and organizing meetings, 
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Figure 2.  Tailored SE Process Model (After Blanchard 2011, 34) 
Classic Vee models assume that the initial processes are static and can be 
addressed serially. However, it was anticipated this project would require revisiting and 
revising artifacts based on uncovering information and learning more about the problem 
at hand, so explicitly including feedback loops between all processes was necessary. 
Processes are described in detail in subsequent chapters of the report. 
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II. PROBLEM SPACE EXPLORATION 
A. PROBLEM SPACE EXPLORATION PROCESS 
Before formalized requirements could be created, the cohort needed to fully 
understand exactly what the problem was, and how that problem needed to be addressed. 
The problem space exploration process needed to explore the factors that drive BMD 
solutions, and catalog them in a manner that could be readily and easily interpreted 
during requirements analysis. 
Problem space exploration (Figure 3) was divided into two efforts. Stakeholder 
analysis was used to identify the needs and wants of organizations that deal with BMD 
issues. The mission needs analysis was used to fully understand the BMD concepts and 
components that would constrain the architecture of our system, including the physical 
aspects of how BMD works, the actual threats to BMD and the existing components and 
systems environment that our solution needed to work with. The results of the problem 
space exploration process drove the requirement analysis, and helped inform the cohort 
of architectural and functional factors that impacted the EBMD solution. 
Program & Document Management














Figure 3.  Problem Space Exploration Process 
B. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
Many parties have a stake or interest in EBMD. Their roles range from research 
and design to military organizations implementing the solutions. Conversely, other states 
and organizations posing a threat to European security have an interest in overwhelming 
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or subverting the capabilities of any EBMD system. These parties, largely from the 
Middle East, pose a capable and serious threat, and create the need for a comprehensive 
EBMD system. A detailed analysis was conducted to understand these stakeholders. 
1. Stakeholder Analysis Process 
Obtaining information from the EBMD stakeholders, including priorities and 
requirements, is key to engineering a successful system. To obtain that information, the 
cohort created and followed the stakeholder analysis process shown in Figure 4. The 
cohort identified stakeholders by researching publically available government 
documentation to understand the varying needs and issues related to EBMD. After the 
stakeholders were identified, the cohort separated the stakeholders into Resource, Policy, 
Operations and Acquisition categories. 
The cohort originally intended to collect detailed information on these 
stakeholders and their needs through various research avenues and by soliciting specific 
stakeholders with specific questions. Despite repeated attempts however, the cohort was 
unable to obtain any individual responses from those contacted. Subsequent research was 
solely conducted using openly available government produced reports and third party 
websites. This research was then analyzed to infer stakeholder needs. 
The analysis began with the organization of stakeholder types. It continued with 
the research phase which was intended to complement direct feedback from stakeholders, 
but eventually served as the sole source to understand stakeholder priorities, 
requirements, and other needs. Without input from actual stakeholders, the cohort used 
the questions as guidance to further research and the cohort’s interpretation of the 
problem. Once detailed stakeholder information was compiled, the cohort analyzed the 














Figure 4.  Understanding the Stakeholders 
2. Stakeholder Details 
The organizations that have a stake or interest in the EBMD systems, as well as 
what we learned about them and what they want from the systems, were then organized 
(Research Question 2). 
a. Resource Stakeholders 
Resource stakeholders provide the necessary resources to develop, deploy, 
and operate an EBMD system. They are responsible for evaluating competing programs 
against warfighter needs and providing the actual budget and schedule expectations to 
acquisition entities. 
(1) Missile Defense Agency. The MDA is the key decision 
maker in U.S.-affiliated EBMD arenas. This role is defined by their mission to develop, 
test, and field an integrated, layered, EBMD system to defend the U.S., its deployed 
forces, allies, and friends against all ranges of enemy ballistic missile threats in all phases 
of flight. In addition, they test and evaluate alternatives for the BMD systems.  
The defense of Europe is complicated by the fact that it requires 
the MDA to manage an acknowledged system-of-systems (SoS) architecture (Office of 
the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, DoD 2010). This SoS architecture 
combines the individual capabilities of ships, radar systems, ground missile batteries, and 
other command and control (C2) systems. Because these various systems are owned and 
operated by different commands and services, the MDA works closely with the various 
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DoD parties and those not managed by the U.S. For example, the MDA is presently 
working with U.S. allies to integrate U.S. EBMD technology with NATO members’ 
missile defense capabilities and NATO’s C2 systems. The MDA will continue to work 
with NATO to plan and deploy elements in Northern and Southern Europe as well as 
consult on specific deployment options and the overarching EBMD system architecture 
(White House Office of the Press Secretary 2009). This multi-national integration is vital 
to the successful operation of EBMD systems. Failure by the MDA to use the geopolitical 
environment to guide system constraints on the EBMD solution will likely result in the 
failing to defend Europe. 
As a guideline, Lt. Gen. O’Reilly of the MDA states that the 
missile defenses need to “be adaptable (mobile or transportable, able to rapidly expand 
deployed interceptor inventories and readily upgradable)” (O’Reilly 2011, 3). 
Furthermore, the system’s capabilities must be economically sustainable over the long 
term (Missile Defense Agency 2011). 
The MDA also lists several objectives to develop a system that will 
assist with the defense of Europe. The system must defend the U.S. homeland against 
long-range ballistic missile threats. It must speed the protection of U.S. deployed forces, 
civilian personnel, and their accompanying families against a near term European threat. 
Additionally, the system must ensure and enhance protection of the territory and 
population of NATO allies per presidential directives, and do so by deploying proven 
capabilities and technologies that meet the current threats while providing flexibility to 
upgrade and enhance the architecture (Missile Defense Agency 2012c). 
b. Policy Stakeholders 
Policy stakeholders develop DoD policy and doctrine to be followed for 
the acquisition and operation of missile defense systems. These organizations may or 




(1) Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD) sponsors the MDA and the U.S. EBMD system effort. The 
OSD and several offices underneath have each made statements regarding their 
understanding and goals of defending Europe. For instance, the Secretary of Defense 
(SECDEF) stated that the system needs to be able to negate every deployable missile in 
an enemy’s inventory (Secretary of Defense 2010, 27). The SECDEF added that these 
capabilities “must undergo testing that enables assessment under realistic operational 
conditions” (Secretary of Defense 2010, iii). 
The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD-P) develops and 
integrates U.S. missile defense policy within the broader framework of national security 
strategy and ensures consistency between missile defense policy, development and 
acquisition plans, and approaches (Deputy Secretary of Defense 2009, 7). The USD-P is 
also responsible for the coordination of the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) 
(Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 2012).  
The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics (OUSD-AT&L) provides acquisition policy direction, 
program guidelines, and overall management oversight of the MDA as chair of the 
Missile Defense Executive (Deputy Secretary of Defense 2009, 2). Additionally, the 
USD-ATL makes recommendations to the Deputy Secretary of Defense on missile 
defense issues. As the manager of MDA, OUSD-AT&L must oversee acquisitions, 
including procurement of goods and services, research and development, developmental 
testing, and contract administration for all elements of the MDA.  
According to the USD-P, the Joint Staff, and the MDA, regional 
combatant commands are responsible for translating policies to defend Europe into 
specific requirements to allow military forces to execute the policy (GAO 2011, 10). The 
primary geographic command planning and implementing the defense of Europe is the 
U.S. European Command (United States European Command 2012b). 
(2) Office of the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State is 
responsible for international relations. The Secretary negotiates and interprets 
international treaties including membership in NATO. BMD not only affects 
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relationships with NATO allies, but also those with nations and alliances such as Russia 
and the Russian Federation. The U.S. is constantly considering the strategic stability 
between the U.S, NATO, the European Union (EU), and Russia. As already seen through 
delicate U.S. – Russia discussions on placement of missile defense equipment, BMD has 
a profound impact on international relationships. 
c. Operations Stakeholders 
Operations stakeholders are the operational users of the system. These 
stakeholders directly interact with the system and can provide valuable feedback 
regarding EBMD system design and functionalities. 
(1) U.S. European Command. USEUCOM is a geographic 
combatant command whose area of responsibility includes all of Europe (including 
Russia and Turkey), Greenland, Israel, and surrounding waters. It assists in the defense of 
Europe through efforts by its service components, principally U.S. Naval Forces Europe, 
U.S. Army Europe, and U.S. Air Forces Europe. The USEUCOM mission is to conduct 
military operations, international military engagement, and interagency partnering to 
enhance transatlantic security and defend the U.S. forward (United States European 
Command 2012a). With regards to missile defense, EUCOM’s objective is to “advance 
NATO European ballistic missile defense through an integrated approach built on 
balanced contributions” (United States European Command 2012b). 
According to the USEUCOM 2012 Posture Statement, the Navy 
has deployed two Aegis ships already to the European theater. These versatile, multi-
mission platforms will perform EBMD functions, but also a myriad of other tasks 
including maritime security operations, humanitarian missions, and bilateral and 
multilateral exercises. Meanwhile, the U.S. Air Forces in Europe also must share their 
resources between providing C2 for U.S. EBMD forces, coordinating with NATO Air 
Command, and their traditional non-EBMD duties across the continent (United States 
European Command 2012b). 
As the regional command operating and maintaining the EBMD 
system, as well as the responsible party for protecting U.S. assets in the area, USEUCOM 
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must ensure the EBMD system meets their requirements. They must ensure they can 
procure the system in sufficient quantities and in a timely manner, and that the system 
performs as expected. 
(2) U.S. Strategic Command. The U.S. Strategic Command 
(STRATCOM) is a functional combatant command that must integrate global missions 
and capabilities across the geographic combatant commands. Such duties include 
planning, integrating, and coordinating global missile defense, including missile dense 
advocacy for the combatant commands. According to their mission statement, 
“STRATCOM conducts global operations in coordination with other Combatant 
Commands, Services, and appropriate U.S. Government agencies to deter and detect 
strategic attacks against the U.S. and its allies, and is prepared to defend the nation as 
directed” (United States Strategic Command 2011). 
The STRATCOM provides unique requirements that pertain to 
long-range or global threats and must ensure that these requirements are met in order to 
protect the U.S. mainland and assets threatened by ballistic missiles not covered by 
USEUCOM.  
(3) Army Air and Missile Defense Command. The Army Air 
and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC) conducts joint and multinational operations 
and planning in support of BMD and provides mission command for Army air defense 
units. The 10th AAMDC operates the AN/TPY-2 radar and PAC-3 in the European 
theater. The 32nd AAMDC currently operates the THAAD system and is based in Fort 
Bliss, Texas. 
(4) Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated 
Missile Defense. The Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile 
Defense (JFCC IMD) recommends the global allocation of low-density, high-demand 
assets, including force rotations, and force sufficiency. The JFCC IMD is burdened with 
making the best use of limited resources (Senate Committee on Armed Services 2012). 
This task also increases interoperability with existing C2 systems. The JFCC IMD 
ensures that the EBMD system is operable and supportable by the various multinational 
organizations involved. 
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d. Acquisition Stakeholders 
Acquisition stakeholders use available resources to procure the needed 
systems. The acquisition process usually involves a wide range of personnel ranging from 
systems engineering to resource managers. Not all the organizations in this stakeholder 
grouping interact directly with the system, but they are crucial to EBMD execution and 
life cycle decisions. 
(1) Program Executive Office for Integrated Warfare Systems. 
The Program Executive Office for Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO-IWS) manages 
surface ship and submarine combat technologies and systems. They also coordinate the 
Navy Open Architecture across ship platforms. The PEO-IWS is responsible for 
acquiring, developing, delivering and sustaining integrated weapons systems for ships, 
submarines, carriers and aircraft with 155 programs and a $5.8 billion annual budget 
(NAVSEA 2012a). PEO-IWS is also responsible for managing the development and 
procurement of the Standard Missiles (SM) and Aegis ships which are available for rapid 
deployment to protect European nations from Iranian ballistic missile threats. 
(2) Aegis Technical Representative. The Aegis Technical 
Representative (TECHREP) is a shore activity of the Naval Sea Systems Command 
(NAVSEA). They report to the PEO IWS. The Aegis TECHREP provides on-site 
technical oversight of the Aegis system contractor and contributes to all phases of combat 
system research, development, production, acceptance, delivery, modernization and in-
service support. The Aegis TECHREP exercises decision authority trade-offs affecting 
performance, cost, schedule, design, and reliability (NAVSEA 2012a, 20). 
(3) Program Executive Office – Ships. The Program Executive 
Office – Ships (PEO-Ships) manages acquisitions for all current and future non-nuclear 
U.S. Navy surface ships. As one of the Defense Department’s largest acquisition 
organizations, the PEO-Ships is responsible for managing the development and 
procurement of a diverse array of major shipbuilding programs ranging from complex 
warships (such as frontline surface combatants and amphibious assault ships), to special 
mission and support ships (such as air-cushioned landing craft, oceanographic research 
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ships and special warfare craft). The PEO-Ships is committed to delivering affordable 
ships to the U.S. Navy fleet (NAVSEA 2012b). 
PEO-Ships manages the development and construction of 10 major 
ship classes and a wide range of small boats and craft. Three of these classes (CG-47, 
DDG-51 and DD-1000) are Aegis-equipped ships that compose part of the existing 
EBMD. These Aegis-equipped ship classes are key components to EBMD. 
As acquisition-related stakeholders, PEO-IWS, Aegis TECHREP, 
and PEO-Ships all strive to maximize fleet commonality and current fleet inventory. 
They manage modifications to existing systems through disciplined policies, processes 
and procurements. They also aim to use established contract vehicles to achieve their 
goals whenever possible. These goals place aggressive cost and efficiency constraints on 
the EBMD solution. 
C. MISSION NEED ANALYSIS 
In a speech made by U.S. president Barack Obama on 17 Sep, 2009, regarding 
strengthening missile defense in Europe, the president called for a new missile defense 
architecture in Europe that would provide stronger, smarter and swifter defense of 
American forces and America’s allies (Postol 2009). Shortly after the presidential speech, 
NATO leaders of the 2010 Lisbon Summit adopted a strategic concept that committed 
NATO to meeting the security challenges of the 21st century. These challenges ranged 
from terrorism to ballistic missile and cyber-attacks to nuclear proliferation (White House 
2012). NATO leaders also decided to expand the Theatre Missile Defense Program to 
include the protection of NATO European populations and territories. 
In response to these security concerns, the cohort conducted a mission need 
analysis for this report, to identify possible capability needs for a ballistic missile defense 
system, with the primary mission being to protect U.S. forces, allies, and other countries 
within the European region from ballistic missile threats. 
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1. Threat 
The primary missile threat to European NATO countries is based on regionally-
launched ballistic missiles. A limited number of threat nations have such capabilities. 
Iran specifically maintains operational ballistic missile weapon systems capable 
of short and medium range distances, with the potential to develop intermediate range 
capabilities in the near future (Missile Defense Agency 2013d). Due to its proximity to 
Turkey, all of these weapons are a threat. The addition of the ‘Sejil’ missile class gives 
Iran the ability to strike not only the entire country of Turkey, but also other European 
nations as well. Table 1 provides a list of ballistic missiles types and their associated 
ranges. 
 
Full Name Acronym Range (km) 
Battlefield Short Range Ballistic Missile BSRBM <150 
Short Range Ballistic Missile SRBM 150 to <1,000 
Medium Range Ballistic Missile MRBM 1000 to <2,750 
Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile IRBM 2750 to <5,000 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile ICBM ≥ 5,000 
Table 1.   Ballistic Missile Threat Classification By Range (After George C. 
Marshall and Claremont Institutes 2012d) 
a. Regional Threat 
Iran’s current ballistic weapons arsenal contains an assortment of relevant 
threats as well as increased numbers of mobile regional ballistic missiles with claims of 
incorporated anti-missile-defense tactics and capabilities, including greater accuracy in 
guidance systems and new propellant applications. Recent developments in Iranian 
capabilities also include the launch of a solid-fuel, 2000 km MRBM (Missile Defense 
Agency 2012b). While other countries may possess missiles capable of long ranges, Iran 
has the potential to reach all of Turkey as well as parts of Eastern and Southern Europe 
when launching from the Iranian city Tabriz (the northernmost launch location in Iran, 



















Figure 5.  Ranges of Various Iranian Ballistic Missiles as Fired from Tabriz, Iran 
Towards Turkey and Europe (After Google 2013). Radius Geometry Provided by 
FreeMapTools.com. 
b. Operational Threats 
Iran has an extensive missile development program and has received 
support in the past from such countries as Russia, China, and North Korea. Iran is 
believed to be in possession of components from Chinese designed CSS-7 and CSS-8 
SRBMs and launch systems, as well as having developed their own short range 
capabilities with the Fateh A-110. Much of the ballistic missile technology available to 
Iran is dependent upon outside sources for raw materials and components (Hildreth 
2012). Current Iranian MRBM platforms are based on the North Korean No-Dong 1 
ballistic missile. This technology has been improved upon with subsequent iterations 
resulting in operational Iranian MRBM capabilities of up to 1280 km in the case of the 
Shahab-3. 
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The Iranian Sejil ballistic missile series represents the newest and most 
dangerous threat from Iran. Achieving over 2000 km in tests, it extends Iran’s ability to 
engage targets farther away such as the Greek capitol Athens (Shirzad Bozorgmehr 
2009). This represents a significant increase in capability due to the range and the use of 
solid fuel instead of liquid. The importance of this is seen in the missile preparation time 
before launch. If the fuel resides in the missile at all times, as is the case with the Sejil, 
then once it is moved into position and given guidance information, it can be launched. 
With liquid fuel, the missile has to additionally be fueled before it can be launched, thus 
giving some warning of impending launch. A detailed matrix of ballistic missile threat 
characteristics is in Appendix A: Problem Space Exploration Data. 
Within the current arsenal of ballistic missiles, the Shahab-3 and Sejil-2 
make up the greatest threat to European NATO countries, allies, and regional U.S. forces 
by exhibiting the largest payload capabilities and range (White House 2012). Iran was 
identified as the primary regional threat (Research Question 1). The maximum ranges of 
these operational missiles vary from 200 km to 2000 km, as shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6.  The Maximum Range of Iranian and North Korean Operational Threat 
Missiles 





















Although Iran has exhibited continual development for longer range ballistic 
missile capabilities, the accuracy of current ballistic missile designs is limited due to 
immature sensor technology. As Elleman observed: 
A large inventory of missiles would be expected for use if the desired 
outcome of the threat nation was to destroy a specific fixed target. Due to 
a current lack of nuclear warhead technology, conventional attacks are 
expected to result in lower casualty levels, with a smaller amount of 
affected areas. (Elleman 2012) 
The relation of payload weight to maximum range should be considered when 
determining the threat to possible NATO European targets. “With an increased payload 
weight on a given missile, the effective strike range  of that missile is decreased 
accordingly” (Vick 2012). 
Thus, while maximum claimed strike ranges are known, placing a large 
conventional or even nuclear warhead could potentially reduce those claimed distances, 
increasing the importance of focusing on Turkey. 
c. Developmental Threats 
Iran is seen as pursuing longer-range ballistic missiles by developing 
additional variations of the Shahab and Sejil platforms. These developmental efforts 
would provide Iran with IRBM range and ICBM capabilities. Iran was reported to have 
launched an Omid satellite via a Safir-2 rocket, or Space Launch Vehicle (SLV) in early 
February 2009, raising concerns based on dual-use capabilities applied toward long range 
missile development (Hildreth 2009). In addition to attempts to increase its threat range, 
Iran continues to develop SRBM and MRBM technologies with new solid-propellant 
designs and accuracy improvements based on sensor development (Cappacio 2012). 
d. Threat Refinement 
Several factors led to the selection of Iran as the threat country of focus. 
One reason is its close proximity to a member of NATO, Turkey. By sharing a border, it 
is able to bring to bear its entire missile arsenal in a conflict as even the shortest range 
will still hit Turkey. As discussed, the Sejil series missiles have demonstrated in testing 
 24 
that it has a maximum range of 2000 km, providing the ability to strike past Turkey and 
into other European countries. Also, the rhetoric from the government indicates that Iran 
is also ready and willing to launch its weapons. For these reasons it was selected as the 
focus. 
e. Future Uncertainty 
Technology does not stand still, and as a corollary, nations continually 
strive to update their defensive and offensive capabilities. Thus, ballistic missile threats 
are going to increase both in quantity and quality as more and more countries pursue 
these technologies (Secretary of Defense 2010). These developments will also serve to 
increase flexibility, mobility, survivability, and reliability of these threats. The research 
efforts of threat nations will also help them improve distance, warhead, and sensor array 
capabilities (including navigation technology). All of these uncertainties place an 
increasing number of NATO and European areas at risk. 
2. Missile Defense System Concepts 
To aid in understanding the basic concepts of missile defense, this section 
provides an overview of the missile defense process and basic functions the systems must 
perform to intercept a ballistic missile. In addition, the phases of the ballistic missile 
flight are defined. 
All elements of the EBMD system work together to respond to a limited ballistic 
missile attack directed against NATO, our European allies and interests. The early 
warning system detects the launch of ballistic missile threats and tracks them continually 
providing data to the Battle Command Network (BCN). This function of exchanging 
information along the network is outside the system context, however, there will be data 
exchange between the EBMD system and the BCN system while ground-based radars 
acquire and track the incoming missile. The BCN system uses this information to make 
an engage decision and assigns the targets to individual interceptor systems. The BCN 
provides the engage decision to the interceptor systems; the interceptor systems engage 
the targets and provide notification the engagement is underway. The BCN continues to 
process system data to provide more information to the interceptor and the interceptor 
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uses this data to aid discrimination between debris, false objects, and real warheads. The 
interceptor uses its sensors to acquire the ballistic missile threat, select the target, and 
guide itself to the target. During and after the engagement, the radars continue to collect 
data during the intercept to provide damage assessment and provide the data to the BCN 
that evaluates the interceptor’s success or failure (U.S. Department of Defense 2004). 
Many types of interceptors and countermeasures for missiles exist, but the cohort 
limited their analysis to kinetic interceptors, i.e., those interceptors that eliminate threats 
on collision through their kinetic energy. For examples of non-kinetic missile defense 
systems, the MK-36 Super Rapid Bloom Offboard Countermeasures Chaff (SRBOC) 
system launches chaff to create false signals to disorient threat missiles (Federation of 
American Scientists 1999a), and the AN/SLQ-32 shipboard electronic warfare system 
attacks the missile electronically (Federation of American Scientists 1999b). These 
technologies were targeted against radar-guided cruise missiles; however, this report 
focuses on ballistic missiles which use stellar or inertial guidance systems which are not 
subject to electromagnetic interference (Federation of American Scientists, 2000a). With 
the focus on ballistic missiles, the cohort found kinetic interceptors to be effective and 
relevant to current threats. 
The early warning system provides an awareness that an incident of concern has 
occurred. The early warning system then determines whether the incident is really 
something that the defense must address (Mantle 2004). Space-based, early warning 
satellites, which use heat-sensing detectors to detect missile launches while still in the 
boost phase, have been deployed by the U.S. for many years. The U.S. has committed to 
an upgraded version of these sensors (Gansler 2010). 
The BCN collects and integrates threat information from Global BMD assets. 
During an engagement, the individual EBMD component systems constantly 
communicate with the BCN providing updated threat information to the BCN as well as 
receiving situational awareness outside the system boundaries from the BCN. By 
integrating the individual EBMD component systems, the BCN provides status across the 
overall EBMD system and provides an integrated ballistic missile defense picture 
(Missile Defense Agency 2013a). The BCN functions can be performed by systems such 
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as the U.S. Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communication (C2BMC) 
system or the NATO equivalent Air Command and Control System (ACCS). 
Once the early warning system provides awareness to an incident of concern, the 
detection system determines whether the incident is truly a ballistic missile launch and if 
the threat is something the system should track. Detection can be queued by the early 
warning system (through the BCN) or independently by the detection system. The 
question that this detection system must answer is: “Is this a ballistic missile threat of 
certain speed and range, and is it headed in the direction of the defense system such that it 
will be able to engage it?” (Mantle 2004). 
The control system refines the threat information and determines a fire control 
solution while continuing to track the ballistic missile threat. The system function 
discriminates the actual threat warhead from any accompanying countermeasures 
deployed to confuse and defeat the defense (Mantle 2004). When a threat leaves the 
atmosphere, aerodynamic drag becomes negligible and objects will tend to continue on 
the same ballistic path until they reenter the atmosphere. The control system 
discriminates the warhead from any items traveling along the same trajectory, whether 
these items are purpose-based countermeasures or merely missile debris. Once the system 
performs the functions through discrimination, performance analysis based on the 
characteristics of the threat is performed. The system continually updates these 
parameters through tracking. As a result of the control system’s determinations and 
performance analysis, a defense strategy is calculated and individual defense interceptors 
are identified. 
The engagement systems perform interception of the threat, performance of battle 
damage assessment, and readiness of the BMD system for continued engagement. Within 
the engagement system, individual systems initiate necessary actions after direction and 
notification of such actions for the purpose of neutralizing the threat. Interceptors can be 
launched in salvos or in shoot-look-shoot firing doctrine. Launching interceptors in a 
salvo consists of a simultaneous launch of multiple interceptors. The shoot-look-shoot 
firing doctrine represents a consecutive launch pattern. After a first shot (a shot defined 
by either a single interceptor or a salvo of interceptors) is fired, the defense system 
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determines whether the incoming missile was hit or missed before the decision to launch 
a second shot is made. Such a technique allows the defense system to analyze the need 
for a follow-on shot, thus providing the ability to economize the inventory of interceptors 
(Mantle 2004). 
Since ballistic missiles threats, and the interceptors designed to defeat the threats, 
have different ranges, speeds, size and performance characteristics, BMD is normally 
performed in a layered approach providing multiple opportunities to destroy threats 
before they reach their targets (Missile Defense Agency 2013a). The first definition of 
layered centers on the ranges and locations of the interceptors. Mantle describes these 
layers as “a lower-layer system to provide point defense around key assets; an upper-
layer system to defend a wide area encompassing the key assets; a forward-based system 
to intercept the threat early in its flight.” (Mantle 2004, 55) 
 In another definition of layered defense, the threat engagement occurs at any of 
the three phases of flight along a ballistic trajectory. Intercept occurs in three phases: 
boost, midcourse, and terminal. All three phases require the similar characteristics for 
successful intercept, accurate threat tracking, appropriate reaction times relative to 
engagement phase, and advanced interceptors with reliable communications and 
advanced sensors (Cepak 2005). 
a. Boost Phase 
The boost phase of a ballistic missile deployment represents the earliest 
point of engagement, providing the most amount of time for reengagement should the 
interceptor miss. In the boost phase, the engine of the ballistic missile threat provides 
thrust to send the ballistic missile into and out of the atmosphere. Early detection is 
possible in the boost phase because the missile engine exhaust allows infrared sensors to 
detect the heat signatures (Cepak 2005). Fast detection is also possible with dedicated 
radar systems such as the AN/TPY-2 forward stationed (Missile Defense Agency 2013a). 
Another early action consideration applicable to the boost phase is 
interception/destruction. By intercepting the target or destroying through non-kinetic 
means it would provide the ability to neutralize a ballistic missile threat prior to 
 28 
deployment of any countermeasure technology. This may result in a reduction of 
necessary interceptor inventories as no response to countermeasures (decoys) would be 
required. Due to the boost phase being defined as prior to apogee, within a given 
trajectory, the amount of potential debris and location of the debris field may also be 
minimized (Missile Defense Agency 2013a). The defense by early interception is limited 
by the availability of capable systems, however possible elements include Airborne Laser 
(ABL) and Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) technology (Missile Defense Agency 2007). 
Other potential technologies include the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) being 
employed for local detection in over-the horizon sensor netting capabilities. 
b. Midcourse Phase 
The midcourse phase begins upon missile booster burnout and occurs 
outside the earth’s atmosphere. This is typically the longest phase of ballistic missile 
flight with the flight path determined by the initial trajectory at booster burnout and the 
pull of gravity. During midcourse phase, a ballistic missile threat may deploy decoys and 
it is likely booster debris will surround the ballistic missile requiring the BMD system to 
discriminate the threat (Cepak 2005). Both the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense and 
Aegis ship elements are available and capable of defense against ballistic missile threats 
ranging from short to long-range ballistic missiles. The BCN provides detection and 
tracking of missile threats and associated countermeasures across various assets. (Missile 
Defense Agency 2013e). This phase offers the BMD system several possible 
opportunities to engage ballistic missile threats. 
c. Terminal Phase 
The terminal phase defense is often characterized by lower altitude, rapid 
response systems. The characteristic intercept range of these systems is defined as short- 
to medium-range. The terminal phase begins when the threat renters the atmosphere and 
is the last opportunity to intercept the ballistic missile’s flight prior to reaching the target. 
The ballistic missile threat may conduct final maneuvers during the terminal phase. 
(Cepak 2005). 
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3. Existing BMD System Components 
Threat mitigation may require a mix of land, air, sea, and space capabilities. 
Solutions may require closely coordinated, joint and combined efforts. These efforts may 
need to build on existing systems and doctrine, and when appropriate, incorporate the 
newest technologies and concepts. Decisions regarding acquisition of unique EBMD 
systems must be weighed carefully against resource constraints and mission needs. The 
following identifies the existing components and identifies existing solutions (Research 
Question 3) that might be considered in BMD planning. These systems may be compared 
to the functional needs and, if functional needs are met, included in the functional 
architecture of the solution. The following identifies some existing components that 
currently accomplish global ballistic defense. The list provided aids in understanding the 
concepts and is not intended to provide specific solutions to the EBMD problem. 
a. Ground-Based Interceptor Systems 
Ground based intercept systems currently in theater are placed near troop 
deployments, command centers, and civilian population centers, providing the first 
approach to engage ballistic missile threats in theatre. The PAC-3 and THAAD use this 
approach for BMD (Gansler 2010). The PAC-3 provides simultaneous air and terminal 
phase missile defense capabilities and is currently deployed by the U.S. Army (Missile 
Defense Agency 2013f). THAAD provides a terminal phase intercept capability that is 
rapidly deployable and operates in both the endo/exo-atmospheric regions. THAAD 
received Conditional Material Release and is transitioning operations to the U.S. Army 
(Missile Defense Agency 2013g). 
b. Sea Based Interceptor Systems 
The sea is another possible deployment location for BMD systems and 
sea-based interceptor systems work well for defense of the fleet. In addition, sea-based 
interceptors can be expanded to protect ground-based assets as a mobile launch platform 
readily deployed for use in boost phase interception of ballistic missile threats when in 
close proximity to the threat launch site. Depending upon the characteristics of a ballistic 
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missile threat, a sea-based system could also be used against any of the phases of an 
ICBM (Gansler 2010). 
Aegis ships are the sea-based component of BMDS and provides the capability to 
defeat short and intermediate range ballistic missile threats with the Standard Missile-3 
(SM-3). As of November 2012, there are 26 Aegis combatants with 16 assigned to the 
Pacific Fleet and 10 assigned to the Atlantic Fleet (Missile Defense Agency 2013h). 
c. Detection Systems 
The AN/TPY-2, the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS), the 
Sea-Based X-Band (SBX) Radar, and Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWR) 
currently conduct ballistic missile threat detection.  
The AN/TPY-2 is an X-band, high-resolution, phased-array radar designed 
to detect and track all classes of ballistic missiles and is transportable by air, ship, truck 
and rail. The AN/TPY-2 provides detection, tracking and fire control support functions 
for the THAAD weapon system (Missile Defense Agency 2013i). 
The MDA operates the STSS, which consists of two satellites orbiting at 
1350 km with a 120-minute orbital period, and serves as the experimental space layer of 
the BMD system. The STSS carries sensor capable of detection in the shortwave IR band 
and can provide early warning detection in the boost phase. Other sensors allow the STSS 
to track threats in the midcourse phase of ballistic flight (Missile Defense Agency 2013j). 
The SBX is an advanced X-band radar mounted on an ocean-going, semi-
submersible platform that detects and tracks ballistic missiles. The SBX provides tracking 
information while an incoming ballistic missile threat is in flight. The SBX is capable of 
discriminating the threat from debris and decoys that accompany a ballistic missile 
warhead. The SBX system then provides that information to a battle command function 
or interceptor system to intercept the ballistic missile threat before reaching its intended 
target. Mounting the SBX on an ocean-going platform, allows global coverage by 
repositioning the platform (Missile Defense Agency 2013k). 
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The UEWR provides early warning, detection, classification, and tracking 
of ballistic missiles. The UEWR are solid-state, phased array, all weather, long range 
radars that operate in the Ultra High Frequency Band to provide detection of objects out 
to 3000 miles. There are currently three UEWR systems. The UEWR system in 
Flyingdales, United Kingdom (Missile Defense Agency 2013l) is capable of detecting 
ballistic missile threats to Europe. 
While each of these components is highly capable and important to 
ballistic missile defense, none can accomplish all the functions of an effective ballistic 
missile defense system. Effective ballistic missile defense must utilize these various 
capabilities in concert, and the architecture of that system is much more difficult to 
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III. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 
A. THE REQUIREMENTS PROCESS 
There existed a need to identify a clear set of requirements in order to successfully 
arrive at a solution. With the needs of the stakeholders clearly identified, the cohort 
performed a requirements analysis to provide an in-depth view of the capabilities that 
would drive potential solutions. The cohort implemented a process of iterative 
requirements generation and analysis in concert with the initial functional analysis, 
modeling and simulation analysis, life cycle cost analysis, and analysis of alternatives 
(Figure 7). 
The cohort used input from the problem space exploration process to capture the 
top level requirements. The top level requirements were decomposed into lower level 
requirements. Iteration was built into the model to allow for requirements refinement. 
The refined requirements then served as input for the functional analysis. The iteration 
was not confined to only the requirements analysis, but rather continued on into the 
functional analysis. 
  
Figure 7.  The Requirements Analysis Process 
B. FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
The EBMD functional requirements defined the capabilities that the EBMD 
system must be able to accomplish. The functional requirements consisted of six high 
level requirements that the EBMD system must perform to successfully counter a ballistic 
missile threat. These six high level requirements were decomposed into lower level 
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support requirements that more clearly defined the capability the EBMD system must 
perform. The detect requirements in Table 2 originated from the need to detect a ballistic 
missile threat. It is paramount that the system be able to detect multiple ballistic missile 
threats simultaneously and discriminate between friend and foe to satisfy any subsequent 
requirements. This was due to the fact that the ballistic missile threats may be a salvo of 
ballistic missiles that must be detected and eventually controlled and engaged 
simultaneously. 
The detect requirements came from the cohort’s mission needs analysis as well as 
A Technical Assessment of Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program (Postol 2009). The speeds 





1 The EBMD system shall detect potential ballistic missile threats. This 
requirement is further refined by: 
1.1 The EBMD system shall allow no more than 10% undetected potential 
ballistic missile threats at a 90% confidence level. 
1.2 The EBMD system’s simultaneous detection capability shall be able to 
discriminate between multiple threats 98% of the time at a 90% 
confidence level. 
1.3 The EBMD system shall have a 97% probability of detection at a 95% 
confidence level. 
1.4 The EBMD system shall have a 99% probability of friend/foe distinction 
with 90% confidence level that a friendly is not mistaken for a foe. 
1.5 The EBMD system shall have a false alarm probability of 0.005 
𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 or less. 
1.6 The EBMD system shall be able to detect up to five ballistic missiles at a 
time. 
2 The EBMD system shall detect potential ballistic missile threats of 
varying sizes and speeds. This requirement is further refined by: 
2.1 The EBMD system shall be able to detect ballistic missile threats as 
small as 8.8m length and 0.6m width. 
2.2 The EBMD system shall be able to detect ballistic missile threats at 
speeds of 2.0–2.5 km/s. 
2.3 The EBMD system shall be able to detect potential ballistic missile 
threats early enough to make a firing decision before maximum intercept 
range has been met. 
Table 2.   Detect Function Requirements 
The control function requirements in Table 3 determined the physical 
characteristics of possible ballistic missile threats. These requirements allowed the 
system to identify the specific ballistic missile threats and provide the appropriate means 
necessary to counter that threat. These requirements also originated from the need for 




3 The EBMD system shall be able to determine the threat profile in a 
timely manner. This requirement is further refined by: 
3.1 The EBMD system shall be able to determine the size of the potential 
ballistic missile threats with an accuracy of 5% the actual size. 
3.2 The EBMD system shall be able to determine the speed of the potential 
ballistic missile threats with an accuracy of 5% the actual speed. 
3.3 The EBMD system shall be able to determine the anticipated impact 
location with an accuracy of +/-100m the actual impact location. 
Table 3.   Control Function Requirements 
The rationale for the engage requirements in Table 4 came from both the Mission 
Need Analysis and the Missile Threat Matrix described in Marshall and Claremont 
Institutes (George C. Marshall and Claremont Institutes 2013a). According to Iran’s 
Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Programs, Iran has multiple missile silos and 




4 The EBMD system shall be able to engage a threat. This requirement is 
further refined by: 
4.1 The EBMD system shall be able to engage no less than 90% of the 
incoming ballistic missile threats at a 90% confidence level. 
4.2 The EBMD system shall provide the capability to abort the target 
engagement. 
4.3 The EBMD system shall be able to engage up to five ballistic missiles at 
a time. 
Table 4.   Engage Function Requirements 
The assess requirements of the engage function in Table 5 originated from the 
need for accurate battle damage assessment, and is necessary to the protection of the 
defended footprint. The EBMD system must be able to discern whether or not a follow-
on engagement is necessary, and if so, it must be able to engage in a timely manner. The 






5 The EBMD system shall be able to assess the battle damage to ascertain 
whether or not another defensive engagement is necessary. This 
requirement is further refined by: 
5.1 The EBMD system shall report whether or not the threat(s) has been 
completely eradicated. 
5.2 The EBMD system shall be able to discern if a follow on engagement is 
possible after previous attempt. 
5.3 The EBMD system shall evaluate whether or not a defensive engagement 
was successful with 90% confidence. 
Table 5.   Assess Function Requirements 
The communication requirements in Table 6 were essentially the glue that held 
the various EBMD assets together. Continuous, reliable, and secure communication 
among the EBMD system, the Battle Command, and the interceptor missile is critical. 
Although the Battle Command and BCN were outside the context of our system, it was 
important enough to develop requirements that would allow the EBMD system to 




6 The EBMD system shall be able to maintain communication with assets 
necessary to carry out its BMD mission. This requirement is further 
refined by: 
6.1 The EBMD system shall maintain communication links with the missile 
and battle command network at least 99% of the time. 
6.2 The EBMD system shall maintain communication links between the 
battle command network and early warning system at least 95% of the 
time. 
Table 6.   Communication Function Requirements 
C. NON-FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
The non-functional requirements in Table 7 are the quality attributes that helped 
define the EBMD system. Unlike the functional requirements, the non-functional 
requirements were not taken into consideration during modeling and simulation (M&S). 
These requirements are often referred to as the “-ilities.” Other non-functional 





7 The EBMD system shall be reliable, available, and maintainable in order 
to perform BMD missions. This requirement is further refined by: 
7.1 The EBMD system shall have an operational availability of no less than 
the operational availability of existing BMD architectures which 
comprise the integrated EBMD system. This operational availability is 
for the overall system including missiles, sensors, C2 centers, and 
associated electronics and support equipment. 
7.2 The EBMD system shall have a Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) of 
no less than the MTBF of existing BMD architectures which comprise 
the integrated EBMD system. 
7.3 The EBMD system shall have a Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) no 
greater than the MTTR of existing BMD architectures which comprise 
the integrated EBMD system. 
8 The EBMD system shall have minimal impact on manpower. This 
requirement is further refined by: 
8.1 The EBMD system shall have no more than a 10% increase in manpower 
over the current manpower level. 
8.2 Training shall be provided on the EBMD system. 
9 The acquisition of the EBMD system shall be within the appropriated 
budget for EBMD. This requirement is further refined by: 
9.1 The EBMD system shall leverage, to the maximum extent possible, 
technology that will decrease acquisition cost while maintaining or 
increasing operational mission capability. 
9.2 The EBMD system shall minimize the number of personnel required for 
system operation. 
10 The EBMD system shall comply with the latest revision of MIL-STD-
810. 
10.1 The EBMD system shall be able to withstand vibration by complying 
with the latest revision of MIL-STD 810. 
10.2 The EBMD system shall be able to withstand shock by complying with 
the latest revision of MIL-STD 810. 
10.3 The EBMD system shall be able to withstand rain and blowing rain by 
complying with the latest revision of MIL-STD 810. 
10.4 The EBMD system shall be able to withstand icing and freezing rain by 
complying with the latest revision of MIL-STD 810. 
11 The EBMD system shall incorporate mobility. 
Table 7.   Non-Functional Requirements 
The interoperability requirements in Table 8 originated from the need to ensure 
that EBMD systems, when collocated with each other or with other forms of friendly 
communication systems, undergo no degradation in performance. The EBMD systems 
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cannot have capabilities that are compromised due to communication delays or 
interference. Unlike the communication requirements that are concerned with the 
communication necessary among the various EBMD assets within a single system, the 
interoperability requirements are concerned with communication among multiple EBMD 
systems as well as joint service friendly C4ISR systems while maintaining the 
effectiveness of said systems. The interoperability requirements are in place to ensure we 





12 The EBMD system shall be operable in the presence of EMI, friendly 
missile defense systems, and friendly communication systems. This 
requirement is further refined by: 
12.1 The EBMD system shall be interoperable with neighboring EBMD 
systems. 
12.2 The EBMD system shall be interoperable with current and projected 
service, joint, NATO, and combined missile defense and C4ISR systems. 
12.3 The EBMD system shall interoperate with all collocated friendly 
communication systems. 
12.4 The EBMD system shall comply with the latest revision of MIL-STD 
461. 
Table 8.   Non-Functional - Interoperability Requirements 
The information assurance requirements (Table 9) originated from the need to 
safeguard critical system information from inadvertent or malicious technology transfer 
to unauthorized users. The need to ensure information integrity as well as denying 




13 The EBMD system shall possess physical security, operational security, 
and information assurance measures. This requirement is further refined 
by: 
13.1 The EBMD system shall comply with DoD physical security policies and 
procedures. 
13.2 The EBMD systems shall use standard DoD cryptographic equipment 
rather than require unique designs. 
13.3 The EBMD system shall comply with the latest revision of the National 
Information Assurance Policy on the Use of Public Standards for the 
Secure Sharing of Information Among National Security Systems of the 
Committee on National Security Systems Policy, CNSSP-15. 
Table 9.   Non-Functional - Information Assurance Requirements 
D. VALUE SYSTEM 
The EBMD value system defined and organized the Evaluation Measures (EMs) 
upon which alternative analysis was based. The value system defined the most important 
aspects of the system based on the Stakeholder Analysis and the Mission Need Analysis. 
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Those processes along with the EMs provided our cohort with a means to measure the 
ability of the alternatives to meet the operational needs of the overall EBMD system. 
Of primary concern to our stakeholders, and thus our cohort, was the ability of the 
EBMD system to engage and neutralize threats. At its simplest, the ability of the EBMD 
system to successfully perform its mission was a combination of the overall effectiveness 
of the system to detect, control, and engage potential ballistic missile threats, and being 
able to communicate among the various elements of the EBMD system. This evaluation 
measure was evaluated through the Probability of Intercept, 𝑃𝑖 . The probability of 
intercept for the baseline and each EBMD Alternative came from both the calculations in 
Chapter VI, Section B: Determining the Probability of Intercept, and the simulations in 
Chapter VI, Section C: Scenario Based Simulation. 
Following the probability of intercept in our value system was Percent Footprint 
Defended, 𝑃𝑓𝑑. The EBMD system must be able to defend Turkey. The extent to which 
the EBMD Alternatives defend the whole of Turkey was a basis for analysis: the greater 
the area of Turkey that was defended by at least one layer of protection the better. This 
evaluation measure was evaluated through the Percent Footprint Defended, 𝑃𝑓𝑑. The 
percent footprint defended for the baseline and each EBMD Alternative came from 
Scenario Based Simulations. 
The ability to engage and neutralize threats as represented by 𝑃𝑖, and 𝑃𝑓𝑑, 
comprised the EMs that were used to compare the EBMD Alternatives in Chapter IX. 
The metric of 𝑃𝑖 was the best way to quantitatively measure, through modeling and 
simulation, the ability of the EBMD system to engage and neutralize a potential ballistic 
missile threat. M&S also quantitatively measured and provided metrics for the second 
EM of 𝑃𝑓𝑑. 
The Evaluation Measures are as follows: 
EM Description 
𝑃𝑖 Probability of Intercept 
𝑃𝑓𝑑 Percent Footprint Defended 
Table 10.   Evaluation Measures 
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Probability of Intercept, 𝑃𝑖, is defined as the probability of the EBMD system to 
successfully engage a threat. Percent Footprint Defended, 𝑃𝑓𝑑, is defined as the ratio of 
defended area to the area intended to be defended. The final aspect of the EBMD top 
level requirements is the Life Cycle Cost (LCC). During Analysis of Alternatives in 
Chapter IX, the LCC of the Baseline and EBMD Alternative systems were ultimately 
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IV. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
A. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS PROCESS 
After the requirements were compared to the high level stakeholder needs, a 
functional hierarchy was laid out to ensure all functional requirements were captured. 
The functional requirements then fed into the functional analysis approach (Figure 8). 











Figure 8.  Functional Analysis Process 
The functional analysis provided the basis for the initial alternatives generation 
process that later supported the M&S process. 
B. MODELING THE FUNCTIONS 
Vitech Corporation’s CORE software was used for EBMD top level function 
development, including the functional hierarchy and enhanced functional flow block 
diagrams (EFFBD) (Vitech Corporation 2013). Both model views are provided in the 
report so the reader can take advantage of visualization differences to have a better 
understanding of the system. 
CORE was chosen as the software tool because of its comprehensive modeling 
environment designed for complex systems engineering problems. Model-based systems 
engineering tools like CORE provide some advantages over simple drawing tools like 
Microsoft’s Visio. The greatest advantage was the ability to change one portion or view 
of the model, and see that change propagate throughout the entire model. With a little 
practice, when making changes, the cohort was able to switch through multiple views to 
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better understand the impacts of changes. This was advantageous while developing the 
functional hierarchy and EFFBDs. If a particular view was required to develop specific 
concepts, that view was used and compared against the other dynamic views for possible 
impacts to the overall system. 
While traceability is considered an advantage of CORE (all requirements and 
functions are linked), the cohort found it easier to use Microsoft Excel spreadsheets to 
show traceability between the functions and the requirements. This adaptation would 
most likely not scale though, and CORE may have an advantage in such situations. 
CORE also provided the cohort with preferred methods to communicate the 
results. Instead of having multiple files, all the information is contained in one “model” 
that could be analyzed in many different views simply by a few mouse clicks. In addition, 
the specific views could be easily edited for communication purposes without changing 
the actual details of the model. This cannot be done in Microsoft’s Visio or similar 
products. 
The top level requirements were laid out in CORE and used as the basis for the 
development of the top level functions. The top level functions were further refined by 
lower level functions that directly support the realization of the functional hierarchy.  
C. LEVERAGING THE FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE VIEWS 
Linking of the functions’ inputs, outputs, and triggers was performed in CORE 
and is listed in subsequent descriptions to provide an overview of the functional 
architecture. The EFFBD displays the order that these transformations occur by providing 
the flow of each function. This order is necessary to create the final functional output. 
The EFFBD also includes the information that is passed between each of the functions. 
CORE allowed the cohort to populate the same database between both the function 
hierarchy and EFFBD view types. This allowed the cohort to flip between models to 
check both the logic of data exchange and sequencing with just a click of a tab. This 
visual representation provided significant insight into the decisions, actions, and activities 
of our system. 
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D. SYSTEM CONTEXT 
The BMD system employs local and global networks of sensors that can detect 
missile launches or incoming ballistic missile threats and alert active-defense systems to 
neutralize the ballistic missile threats. A large number of sensors and defense systems 
must be placed throughout the world to assess and neutralize incoming ballistic missile 
threats in near real-time. To address these threats to Turkey, the EBMD system uses a 
sub-set of these systems. 
The global BMD system assets and the EBMD system are always active and are 
connected to the BCN. Through the BCN, information can be consolidated and provided 
to the EBMD system providing greater situational awareness than a stand-alone EBMD 
system. This does not preclude the EBMD system from acting independently; in a 
multiple ballistic missile threat scenario, it is expected the BCN would provide 
information and priorities based on the greater situational awareness that would enhance 
EBMD system effectiveness. Figure 9 provides the EBMD system context within the 
larger BMD system. 
 
Figure 9.  EBMD System Context 
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E. FUNCTIONAL HIERARCHY 
The functional hierarchy (Figure 10) displays the decomposition of functions 
from higher levels to lower levels on a single diagram, and the functional hierarchies are 












1. Defend High Value Areas 
Figure 11 illustrates the functional decomposition of the stakeholders’ highest 
priority function, defend high value areas, into four primary second-level functions, 
which are detect, control, engage, and communicate information about possible ballistic 
missile threats. 
 
Figure 11.  Defend High Value Areas Functional Hierarchy 
Figure 12 shows the EFFBD for the primary high level stakeholder need to 
defend high value areas. This functional flow is complicated and difficult to show in a 
standard EFFBD. This EFFBD represents the importance of the primary functions of 
detect (1.0 Detect), control (2.0 Control), engage (3.0 Engage), and communicate (4.0 
Communicate) to achieving the primary goal of defending a high value area (0.0 Defend 
High Value Areas) against ballistic missile threats. For the purposes of this paper, the 
cohort looked at the top level functions to determine if a system could perform the 
functions required to neutralize a single ballistic missile threat. A determination if a 
system could be integrated into a SoS through the BCN and provide sufficient BMD 






Figure 12.  Defend High Value Areas EFFBD 
 
The detect function is triggered by either a threat signature, the environmental 
signature created by a possible ballistic missile, or an early warning signal, delivered by 
the BCN to the communicate function, to the detect function. The classify threat function 
determines the speed and size of the object and determines if it is a threat. If determined 
to be a threat, the threat characteristics are passed to the control function. The control 
function establishes the ballistic missile track and develops a coarse fire control solution. 
The control function passes both items to the engage and communicate functions. 
The coarse fire control solution triggers the engage function. The engage function 
then causes damage to the incoming ballistic missile threat. Once the engage function 
engages the ballistic missile threat, it reloads and provides a ready signal to the 
communicate function. The BCN can provide an abort signal through the communicate 
function, the engage function aborts the engagement. As a result of greater situational 
awareness, the BCN can provide an engage signal, along with engage information, 




ballistic missile threat the same as the coarse fire control trigger except the engage 
function uses the data provided by the communicate function. 
The communicate function creates a bridge to the BCN. The communicate 
function passes the detect items (threat speed and threat size), the control items (tracking 
and coarse fire control), the engage items (launch confirmation, damage assessment, and 
ready signal) to the BCN. The communicate function then passes the data from the lower 
level functions through the BCN to the battle command. The BCN is in contact with 
global ballistic missile defense assets and has a greater situational awareness than the 
standalone EBMD system. The BCN can pass additional detect, control, engage items to 
the communicate function and the communicate function then passes this data to the 
respective EBMD system functions. The respective detect, control, and engage functions 
then processes this data providing greater situational awareness for the EBMD system. 
2. Detect System Functional Hierarchy 
Figure 13 is a depiction of the detect function. This function applies criteria that 
determines to some level of acceptance that the target detected is or is not a ballistic 





Figure 13.  Detect Functional Hierarchy 
The system can be alerted to a ballistic missile threat in two ways, each way 
having its own timing aspects. The first way is an early warning system that 
communicates through the BCN warning that a possible ballistic missile threat has been 
detected. The EBMD system then slews to the correct location and scans that area until 
the ballistic missile threat enters the local detection range. The second way consists of the 
EBMD system performing routine scans of the designated area until a possible ballistic 
missile threat is detected. Both ways lead to an eventual EMBD system detection and 
classification of the ballistic missile threat. Classification is the determination that the 
object detected is indeed a ballistic missile threat of concern and not a satellite launch or 
other benign event. A more detailed description for the detect functional hierarchy is 






Function Function Description 
1.1 Scan The scan function is required in the case that the early warning 
detectors do not detect the ballistic missile threat; the EMBD system 
will perform normal duties, such as continual scans of designated 
areas of the sky for possible ballistic missile threats. 
1.2 EBMD 
System Detect 
The EBMD system detect function consists of the local system 
detecting possible ballistic threats by the local system scanning. 
1.3 Classify 
Threat 
The classify threat function requires that the EBMD system determine 
if the ballistic missile detected is a threat that the defense system 
should be concerned about.  
1.3.1 Determine 
Size 
The determine size function establishes the size of all the objects 
detected in the detection system’s assigned scan sector. 
1.3.2 Determine 
Speed 
The determine speed function establishes the speed of all the objects 
detected in the detection system’s assigned scan sector. 
Table 11.   Detect Functions 
The first overarching function is 1.0 Detect (Figure 14). This function is to 
determine that the anomaly “detected” is or is not a ballistic missile launch  (Mantle 
2004). The detect function is initiated in one of two ways, locally or through the early 
warning system notification from the BCN. 
 




In the first path, the local sensors scan (1.1 Scan) the surrounding area in a 
predetermined path best suited to detect anomalies from any suspected direction. The 
environmental signature from the ballistic missile threat creates an anomaly that then 
triggers the EBMD system to determine if the anomaly is a ballistic missile (1.2 EBMD 
System Detect). In the second approach, an early warning system detects a ballistic 
missile and passes the information to the Battle Command through the BCN. The EBMD 
system then skips the scanning process and starts the detect function (1.2 EBMD Detect). 
The detect function passes the detection information to the classifying threat function (1.3 
Classify Threat) to determine if the anomaly is an object of concern. If the object is 
considered to be a ballistic missile threat, the classifying threat function will then 
determine the ballistic missile threat size (1.3.1 Determine Size) and speed (1.3.2 
Determine Speed). At this point, it has been determined that the anomaly is of sufficient 
concern to be considered a ballistic missile threat detection and the primary detect 
function has been completed. 
3. Control System Functional Hierarchy 
Figure 15 depicts the 2.0 Control function. The control function refines the 
ballistic missile threat information, determines engagement options, and tracks the 





Figure 15.  Control Functional Hierarchy 
The control function (Table 12) begins once the anomaly has been classified as a 
threat. The EBMD system discriminates the ballistic missile threat from accompanying 
objects meant to counter and defeat the EBMD system (Mantle 2004). This is 
accomplished at the local level and then the information is passed to the BCN to provide 
the Battle Command greater situational awareness. The control function can be 
completed with many systems and consolidated at the Battle Command. The Battle 
Command will then determine the appropriate response and transmit the required 












Function Function Description 
2.1 Discriminate The discriminate function differentiates the ballistic missile threat 





The determine engagement options function calculates what 




The determine flight stage function determines at which stage the 
ballistic missile threat is in; boost, midcourse, or terminal, and at 
which layer; exo, end-exo, or endo atmospheric. 
2.2.2 Determine 
Time to Target 
The determine time to target function determines how long it will 
take the ballistic missile threat to reach its estimated target. 
2.2.3 Determine 
Potential Damage to 
Defend Asset 
The determine potential damage to defend asset function estimates 
the amount of damage that the ballistic missile threat could inflict 
to the high value area. This information is then transmitted to the 





At the local level, the determine defense mechanism function 





The determine fire control solution function consists of developing 
the fire control solution for each ballistic missile threat location 
involved in the engagement. This will be at the resolution of the 
detection sensor carrying out the function.  
2.3 Track The track function establishes the path of the threat to predict the 
future position at a given time and continuing this until the object 
is defeated or is no longer considered a threat. 
Table 12.   Control Functions 
Figure 16 is the EFFBD for the 2.0 Control function. In the control 
function, the ballistic missile threat is understood well enough to predict its future path 





Figure 16.  Control Function EFFBD 
The Control function (2.0 Control) begins when the detect function provides the 
ballistic missile threat classification data. The Discriminate function (2.1 Discriminate) 
then differentiates the ballistic missile warhead from the surrounding materials such as 
shrouds or decoys. The tracking function (2.3 Track) ensures that the data received is 
valid and repeatable enough so that the data can be used to predict the future path of the 
ballistic missile threat. Simultaneously, available engagement options are determined by 






Figure 17.  Determine Engagement Options Function EFFBD 
This is accomplished by determining the stage the threat is in, such as boost, 
midcourse, or terminal (2.2.1 Determine Flight Stage), the time left until the ballistic 
missile threat impacts the target (2.2.2 Determine Time to Target), and the damage that 
can be caused (2.2.3 Determine Potential Damage). Once these parameters are defined, 
the Determine Defense Mechanisms function (2.2.4 Determine Defense Mechanism) 
determines the best defense mechanism and a fire control solution (2.2.5 Determine Fire 
Control Solution) is calculated. All the information determined during the control phase 
is passed to the communicate function and then to the Battle Command through the BCN 
for compilation with other components and further processing. The Battle Command can 
also pass data to the EBMD system through the BCN and to the EBMD system 
communicate function. This ensures that the global BMD system maintains real-time 
situational awareness. 
4. Engage System Functional Hierarchy 
The Engage Function (3.0 Engage) is depicted in Figure 18. As discussed earlier, 
the Battle Command receives information from several sources and determines the best 
course of action. The Battle Command triggers the engage function by transmitting a 
coarse fire control signal and tracking information. The EBMD system then engages and 





Figure 18.  Engage Functional Hierarchy 
The engage function (Table 13) will occur once an object is detected and verified 
to be a ballistic missile threat. The Battle Command will then make the determination to 





Function Function Description 
3.1 Intercept The intercept function launches an interceptor at the 
determined ballistic missile threat. 
3.1.1 Local Detect and 
Control 
The local detect and control function refines the fire control 
solution provided by the BCN or the local system. 
3.1.2 Launch Interceptor  The launch interceptor function loads the fire control 
solution into the interceptor, confirms the solution is loaded, 
and launches the interceptor. 
3.1.3 Abort The abort function aborts the launch sequence. 
3.1.4 Fly-out The fly-out function determines if the interceptor is clear of 
the launcher and is on course to engage the ballistic missile 
threat. 
3.2 Assess Damage The assess damage function performs a battle damage 
assessment and that information is passed to the 
communicate function and then provides that information to 
the Battle Command through the BCN for greater situational 
awareness. 
3.3 Reload The reload function prepares the system for another 
engagement after an interceptor launch and alerts the 
intercept function that the system is ready for another 
engagement. 
Table 13.   Engage Functions 
Figure 19 is the EFFBD for the engage function (3.0 Engage). The intercept 
function is triggered by either the control function passing the coarse fire control solution 
or by the communicate function providing an engage signal. If the communicate function 
triggers the intercept, the intercept function uses the control data provided by the 
communicate function to engage the ballistic missile threat. Regardless of triggering 
method, the intercept function creates a launch confirmation signal that triggers the 
reload function. Once reload is complete, the reload function sends a ready signal back to 





Figure 19.  Engage Function EFFBD 
Once the interception function has begun, the EBMD system receives the control 
information and performs all the functions necessary to perform the detect and control 
functions at the local level if it has not already occurred. It should be noted, this could 
have already occurred if the BCN does not provide any additional information. Once the 
EBMD system algorithms provide a refined fire control solution (3.1.1 Local Detect and 
Control), an interceptor launches (3.1.2 Launch Interceptor). Once the interceptor is 
launched, the Battle Command is notified through the BCN, and has the option to abort 
the launch (3.1.3 Abort) or continue with the engagement (3.1.4 Fly-out). These functions 





Figure 20.  Intercept Function EFFBD 
After the interceptor reaches the ballistic missile threat and some level of damage 
is inflicted, the damage assessment function (3.2 Assess Damage) calculates the amount 
of damage the ballistic missile threat received and, if necessary, a reload occurs (3.3 
Reload). At this point the reload function provides a ready signal back to the intercept 
function. 
5. Communicate System Functional Hierarchy 
Figure 21 is a depiction of the 4.0 Communicate function. The communicate 
function consists of all the communication functions that occur between the system 
components and the Battle Command through the BCN. 
 




Since the Battle Command and the BCN are outside the context of the EBMD 
system, the individual EBMD system components will communicate (Table 14) to Battle 
Command throughout an engagement to ensure the Battle Command maintains 
situational awareness. The communicate function captures all communications occurring 
continuously from start to finish. 
 
Function Function Description 
4.1 Communicate 
Detection Data with 
Battle Command 
The communicate detection data with Battle Command 
function alerts the Battle Command during the detect 
functions. 
4.2 Communicate Control 
Information with Battle 
Command 
The communicate control information with Battle Command 




with Battle Command 
The communicate intercept information with Battle 
Command function is the communications that occur during 
the intercept functions. 
Table 14.   Communicate Functions 
The communication function (4.0 Communicate), shown in Figure 22, occurs 
throughout the EBMD system components. This is shown at high levels as the 
communication of detection data (4.1 Communicate Detection Data), communication of 
control information (4.2 Communicate Control Information), and communication of 





Figure 22.  Communicate Function EFFBD 
All this data is handled by the three main communication functions (4.1 
Communicate Detection Data with Battle Command, 4.2 Communicate Control 
Information with Battle Command, and 4.3 Communicate Intercept Information with 
Battle Command). This process allows the Battle Command to maintain real-time 
situational awareness of any detected anomalies that may be a threat of concern. 
F. REQUIREMENTS TO FUNCTIONS TRACEABILITY 
A top level requirements mapping to functions is provided in Table 15. This 
mapping shows that each requirement is addressed by at least one function in the 
functional hierarchy. Each function in the functional decomposition does not necessarily 
map to a specific requirement, however each function is required for system operation. 
The mapping of requirements to functions ensures that each requirement is at least 





Requirement Requirement Description Function 
1 The EBMD system shall detect potential ballistic 
missile threats. 
1.0 Detect 
1.1 The EBMD system shall allow no more than 10% 
undetected potential ballistic missile threats at a 90% 
confidence level. 
1.0 Detect 
1.2 The EBMD system’s simultaneous detection capability 
shall be able to discriminate between multiple threats 
98% of the time at a 90% confidence level. 
2.1 
Discriminate 
1.3 The EBMD system shall have a 97% probability of 
detection at a 95% confidence level. 
1.0 Detect 
1.4 The EBMD system shall have a 99% probability of 
friend/foe distinction with 90% confidence level that a 




1.5 The EBMD system shall have a false alarm probability 
of 0.005 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 or less. 1.0 Detect 
1.6 The EBMD system shall be able to detect up to five 





2 The EBMD system shall detect potential ballistic 
missile threats of varying sizes and speeds. 
1.0 Detect 
2.1 The EBMD system shall be able to detect ballistic 




2.2 The EBMD system shall be able to detect ballistic 




2.3 The EBMD system shall be able to detect potential 
ballistic missile threats early enough to make a firing 
decision before maximum intercept range has been met. 
1.0 Detect 
3 The EBMD system shall be able to determine the threat 
profile in a timely manner. 
1.3 Classify 
Threat 
3.1 The EBMD system shall be able to determine the size of 
the potential ballistic missile threats with an accuracy of 




3.2 The EBMD system shall be able to determine the speed 
of the potential ballistic missile threats with an accuracy 







Requirement Requirement Description Function 
3.3 The EBMD system shall be able to determine the 
anticipated impact location with an accuracy of +/-100m 







4 The EBMD system shall be able to engage a threat. 3.0 Engage 
4.1 The EBMD system shall be able to engage no less than 
90% of the incoming ballistic missile threats at a 90% 
confidence level. 
3.0 Engage 
4.2 The EBMD system shall provide the capability to abort 
the target engagement. 
3.1.3 Abort 
4.3 The EBMD system shall be able to engage up to five 
ballistic missiles at a time. 
3.0 Engage 
5 The EBMD system shall be able to evaluate battle 
damage assessment in order to ascertain whether or not 
another defensive launch is necessary.  
3.2 Assess 
Damage 
5.1 The EBMD system shall report whether or not the 







5.2 The EBMD system shall be able to discern if a follow 
on engagement is possible after previous attempt. 
3.2 Assess 
Damage 
5.3 The EBMD system shall evaluate whether or not a 




6 The EBMD system shall be able to maintain 




6.1 The EBMD system shall maintain communication links 
with the missile and battle command network at least 
99% of the time. 
4.0 
Communicate 
6.2 The EBMD system shall maintain communication links 
between the battle command network and early warning 
system at least 95% of the time. 
4.0 
Communicate 









V. ALTERNATIVES GENERATION 
A. ALTERNATIVES GENERATION PROCESS 
Due to the current budget constraints in the DoD, it was assumed that neither the 
Army nor the Navy has the resources to develop new systems needed to support this 
mission. Therefore, this report addresses alternatives using existing weapon systems that 
are currently under development and planned for fielding within the project timeframe. 
As described in Chapter II, Section C: Mission Need Analysis, interceptors were limited 
to kinetic-kill versions. The cohort selected systems currently fielded or envisioned by 
the U.S. to defend Europe: Aegis ships, THAAD, PAC-3, and AN/TPY2. The planned 
Aegis Ashore system was also examined. A mapping of the high-level functions to 
components is provided in Table 16. Performing a mapping of the functions to 
components during the alternatives generation process (Figure 23) provided a viable set 
of components for use in M&S, and alternatives refinement, and ensured that the 
components used in the simulation could perform the necessary functions for BMD. 











Figure 23.  Alternatives Generation Process 
For example, the THAAD system uses the AN/TPY-2 in order to perform the 






Detect Control Engage Communicate 
Aegis Ship X X X X 
THAAD   X X 
PAC-3 X X X X 
AN/TPY-2 X X  X 
Aegis Ashore X X X X 
Table 16.   Functional Mapping to Components 
B. COVERAGE OF ALTERNATIVES 
By acting together as a SoS, the various defense systems can achieve broader 
coverage and more appropriate responses by coordinating information through the BCN, 
which resides outside the scope of this analysis. As an example, Lewis and Postol 
calculate the AN/TPY-2 radar to have a detection range of approximately 870 km and 
calculate the Aegis AN/SPY-1 radar’s detection range at a shorter 550 km. (Lewis and 
Postol 2012b). The detection range of the PAC-3’s AN/MPQ-65 radar is stated to go up 
to 170 km (Army Recognition 2013). The AN/TPY-2’s broader range allows for wider 
coverage and earlier detection, allowing the most appropriate interceptor battery to 
engage the threat. 
The EBMD Baseline represents the currently fielded ballistic missile defense 
capabilities. At the time of this report, EUCOM had two BMD capable Aegis ships in the 
Mediterranean, an AN/TPY-2 Radar and six PAC-3 batteries in Turkey (United States 
European Command 2012b; Defense Industry Daily 2013b; North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization 2013). Modeling and simulation feedback on the Baseline system provided 
two important conclusions: the Baseline system does not meet the requirements and the 
PAC-3 is so limited in range and performance that, for the sake of this analysis, it was not 
capable of intercepting a ballistic missile. Therefore, alternatives to this Baseline system 
needed to be more capable in order to meet the requirements and the PAC-3 was omitted 
in the alternatives. 
Alternatives were generated by identifying which components were capable of 




determine the performance of the configuration. Based on the alternative system 
performance in M&S, components were moved, added or removed to meet the 
requirements while trying to keep the total number of systems, and in turn the total cost, 
to a minimum. The quantities and placements of components were categorized into three 
alternatives and a general approach for each alternative is provided in Table 17. The 
general approach for each alternative was provided to M&S for further analysis to 




A Vary the number and placement of Aegis ships 
B Vary the number and placement of Aegis ships and THAAD to meet the 
requirements 
C Explore the use of an Aegis Ashore alone, and with Aegis ships and/or 
THAAD if necessary to meet the requirements 










VI. MODELING AND SIMULATION ANALYSIS 
A. MODELING AND SIMULATION ANALYSIS PROCESS 
During the M&S process (Figure 24), the results of the problem space exploration 
process, including threat components, BMD components, BMD concepts and technical 
details, were incorporated into the construction of models. These models operated 
functionally identical to the functional hierarchies and flows (as close as practically 
possible within the confines of the modeling tools) identified during functional analysis. 
The models were also constructed to ensure they could meet the evaluation measures 
from the requirements analysis process and match the component architectures identified 
during alternatives generation. The initial analysis determined the probability of 
intercepting a threat missile, 𝑃𝑖 , which was used in the analysis of the various alternatives 
that followed the M&S effort. The scenario-based simulation process then simulated 
those alternatives and generated data to further refine alternatives that were used to 
evaluate performance parameters. 
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Figure 24.  Modeling And Simulation Analysis Process 
B. DETERMINING THE PROBABILITY OF INTERCEPT 
The probability of intercept is the key effectiveness measure identified during 
requirements analysis, but the functional analysis lacks the quantitative data necessary to 
directly derive its value. The cohort determined it by examining the interaction of 




for individual BMD component systems. Although high confidence values for the 
probabilities of intercept of the component systems are understandably classified, there is 
an abundance of unclassified test data available to develop a reasonable set of 
approximations. 
The cohort used Aegis component system test data from as far back as 2008 
(O’Rourke 2013) to determine probability of intercept. The number of fully successful 
tests (no misses), divided by the total number of tests (10/14), yields a calculated 
probability of intercept of 0.713 (O’Rourke 2010; Defense Industry Daily 2013a). The 
ratio of successes to failures looks like it may be increasing with newer versions (Under 
Secretary of Defense 2010). Battlefield values are expected to be lower than controlled 
test data. 
The PAC-3 is the latest version of the Patriot anti-missile system. Earlier versions 
of the Patriot missile system are the only U.S. ballistic missile defense systems with 
intercept estimates based on combat use (Jeremiah D. Sullivano 1999). Initial estimates 
of probabilities of intercept for earlier versions of the Patriot anti-missile system (not the 
PAC-3) after the Gulf War gave the system very high probabilities of intercept (Simon 
1996). Within ten years after an initial positive assessment, the DoD issued a report in 
1992 that stated, “We have found no convincing evidence in the video that any Scud 
warhead was destroyed by a Patriot” (Lewis and Postol 1992, 12). It is difficult to 
generate much confidence from such a large range of estimates. 
The cohort used intercept test data to draw an initial probability of intercept and 
chose a standard value for all of the three component interceptor systems (Aegis, 
THAAD and PAC-3). The initial value for component system probability of intercept is 
0.713. This initial value is the source probability used in the following scenario-based 
M&S. 
This probability of intercept scales with increased depth of coverage. With one 
layer of coverage, the system’s probability of intercept equaled the initial probability of 




missile threat with multiple interceptors from a single component system achieved 
increased depth.  
However, the layering depth is achieved, the increased effectiveness, as measured 
by an increased probability of intercept, will scale according to a simple binomial 
distribution. When the system is engaging a single missile the binomial distribution 
reduces to a simple product of probabilities. The probability of a “leaker” for a layer is 
one minus the probability of intercept for that layer (where a leaker is considered an 
undetected ballistic missile threat). The probability of leakers for a multi-layered system 
is the product of the probability of leakers for all the layers. Since all the layers in this 
situation have the same probability of leakers, the probability of leakers for a multi-
layered example is simply the probability of leakers for a single layer raised to the power 
of the number of layers. The probability of intercept for the multi-layered system is one 
minus the probability of leakers for the multi-layered system. 
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In equation 1.1, 𝑃𝑖 𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 is the probability of intercepting the missile by the 
system, 𝑃𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 is the probability of leakage (missing the missile) for a component, 
and 𝑃𝑖 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 is the probability of a component intercepting the missile. The value for 
𝐿𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑠 in this case is the number of components as each component system comprises a 
layer. Table 18 shows the probabilities of intercept given different layer depths. 
 










C. SCENARIO BASED SIMULATION 
In addition to the discrete element simulation, the cohort performed scenario-
based M&S using an integrated M&S software package called Systems Tool Kit (STK) 
from Analytical Graphics, Inc (AGI). A scenario is a project a user has set up to model, 
or, as defined by STK, “an instance of an analytical or operational task that you are 
modeling with STK” (Analytical Graphics Incorporated 2013). The scenario-based M&S 
effort was facilitated by use of the Missile Modeling Toolkit (MMT) STK plugin, also 
provided by AGI.  
STK and MMT were used to provide a relatively rapid time to determination of 
ballistic missile trajectories and interception capabilities. The equations to calculate 
trajectories with a rotating planet can be very difficult. Further complicating the 
mathematics are moving interceptor batteries such as those found on Aegis ships. STK 
allowed relatively easy setup, modeling, and animation of scenarios and performed all 
requisite calculations automatically to determine flight trajectories and intercepts. 
1. Systems Tool Kit (STK) 
STK was chosen for its mission modeling, visualization and its ability to accept 
plugins that enhance the BMD related functionality of the software. This helped to 
simplify the assessment of the EBMD system. 
STK “scenarios” allow for creation and placement of many types of objects on 
two-dimensional (2D) or three dimensional (3D) models of the Earth such as facilities, 
satellites, ships, missiles, etc. Numerous properties and relationships are assigned to these 
objects. These objects can also be assigned activities such as routes or orbits that allow 
them to interact where appropriate. Once defined, the scenario is animated to show the 
modeled movements and interaction among the components if defined. 
STK also computes “access” between objects, enabling the modeler to determine 
timing and location of interaction between objects. For example, the access between 
incoming threat missiles and radar coverage can be computed to determine when the 




be used to determine if sufficient time exists between the first detection of a threat missile 
and the launch of an interceptor. 
2. Missile Modeling Tools (MMT) 
STK also provides a back end platform to extend functionalities to dozens of 
plugins and modules. Through the use of plugins, missile flight and intercept capabilities 
were simulated and analyzed, which was critical for analysis of the EBMD system. 
MMT, developed by Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) and supplied 
by AGI, provided the ability to analyze missile flight and intercept capabilities.  
The MMT plugin is a suite of four related applications to model missile-related 
activities. These applications are the Missile Design Tool (MDT), Missile Flight Tool 
(MFT), Interceptor Flight Tool (IFT), and the Missile Conversion Tool (MCT). The MCT 
was not necessary for modeling and analysis of the EBMD system. The four applications 
are depicted in Figure 25. The MMT workflow is as follows: 
1. Create missiles or interceptors with MDT. 
2. Test the missile’s flight in MFT and test the interceptor’s ability to engage 
the threat missiles in IFT. 





Figure 25.  MMT Workflow  
a. Missile Design Tool (MDT) 
MDT was used to create new missile models when generic models built in 
to the MMT applications were not representative of the real-life missile type. These 
custom models were then exported to IFT and MFT. Custom interceptors were created by 
adding or removing components and defining the characteristics. A software wizard 
assisted in creating the missiles or interceptors. Even when using the wizard, it was often 
necessary to refine the properties such as the dimensions and masses of the missile 
stages, the amount of propellant, and the propellant burn rate and specific impulse (listed 
in Appendix A: Problem Space Exploration Data). 
Built-in real-time error checking helps guide the missile creations. After 
creating a missile, data is exported to MFT to determine if the missile can be successfully 
launched and impact its target location. For interceptors, the data can be exported to IFT, 
which includes information such as “fan-out” diagrams that shows the available 




b. Missile Flight Tool (MFT) 
MFT is used to model a missile’s trajectory and export the trajectory file, 
including missile stage impact locations, to STK for further analysis. MFT can be used 
with preloaded generic ballistic missile models with varying ranges and performance 
characteristics or with imported missiles from MFT. Basic inputs such as launch and 
target locations, missile types and quantities, trajectory and launch timing can all be 
varied in MFT. Additionally, constant values such as minimum and maximum range can 
be shown. Each missile flight scenario was simulated in MFT. If the simulation showed 
the simulated missiles could launch and fly to their intended destination, the scenario was 
exported to STK for animation and further analysis. 
Custom missiles were designed in MDT and exported to MFT for 
trajectory analysis. However, custom missiles often produced inconclusive or unexpected 
results and after consulting with the AGI technical support staff it was discovered that 
there could be possible coding errors in the software package. Those errors would be 
addressed in the next release of the software.  
Whenever feasible, missiles were chosen from the generic missile library 
that most closely represented the performance characteristics of the threat missiles. When 
a threat missile did not have a generic missile equivalent, custom missiles were designed 
and used in the simulation. 
c. Interceptor Flight Tool (IFT) 
IFT models ballistic missile defense intercept capabilities. Given the 
trajectory of a threat missile and the geographical location of an interceptor battery, IFT 
analyzes and provides an engagement summary that can be exported to STK. The results 
of a given configuration are deterministic, meaning they have the same results each time. 
Those results are provided on a per-missile basis. The IFT files are saved in an XML 
format that can be imported into other software packages for further analysis. The cohort 
took advantage of the XML format to parse the IFT results with BASH shell (Free 




DAF Scenario Results. Engagements are determined based on the physical properties and 
performance of the components, such as: threat missiles, interceptors, geographical 
distances, etc. If IFT determined an intercept was physically possible, the analysis 
showed a successful engagement (intercept of a threat missile). The intercept result is 
provided as a deterministic, binary (True or False) result, not a probabilistic distribution. 
By dividing a defended area into a grid (DAF analysis) and evaluating the binary 
engagement results, the cohort was able to determine whether that area (the political 
borders of Turkey in this analysis) was protected. Additionally, by assigning a probability 
of intercept for each interceptor battery and evaluating the effects of multiple defensive 
layers, i.e., how many interceptor batteries were able to engage a threat, the cohort 
determined the probability of intercepting a specific threat missile.  
The IFT modeling engine provides several intercept modeling scenarios, 
each with a wizard to guide the user through the requisite steps of setting up and running 
the scenario. The two methods used by the cohort to analyze the EBMD system were 
“One Versus Many” (1VM) and “Defended Area Footprint” (DAF). In each IFT scenario, 
the AN/TPY-2 radar was used for the radar sensor since it was deployed at the time and 
thus part of the Baseline system. The interceptors were set to fire as soon as a threat 
missile was detected by the radar sensor – the earliest time possible. For DAF scenarios, 
the cohort used a grid resolution of one degree in latitude by one degree in longitude. 
(1) One Versus Many (1VM) Method. In a 1VM scenario, an 
interceptor battery and one or more threat missiles are defined for analysis. One or more 
sensors are also defined to detect those threat missiles. When the 1VM simulation is run, 
IFT calculates the trajectory of each missile and, based on user defined parameters 
defining when to engage, determines if an interceptor from the battery can successfully 
intercept that specific missile. 
The 1VM scenario type is useful when a specific ballistic missile 
threat is known, e.g., when a particular missile type with specific launch and target 
locations is known. In this case, 1VM provides a relatively accurate and precise model of 




area, a 1VM test case requires setting up many individual missiles targeting that area and 
a DAF scenario type is more appropriate. 
(2) Defended Area Footprint (DAF) Method. In a DAF 
scenario, both an interceptor battery and a geographical region or footprint to defend are 
defined. After the footprint is defined, IFT generates a target grid for the footprint based 
on the launch location and range of the threat missiles and the level of grid resolution 
desired. Using a given interceptor battery, threat missile trajectories and target grid, IFT 
analyzes each grid point to see if an interceptor can successfully engage the missile 
targeting that point. When the simulation finishes, IFT exports the results to STK by 
coloring each square of the target grid. The exported grid is colored coded as red, yellow 
and green. Red and green grid squares are grid points that were indefensible or defensible 
by the interceptor battery, respectively. Yellow grid squares are areas that are not 
reachable by the threat missile due to minimum or maximum range constraints. 
The DAF scenario is advantageous for modeling regional defense 
as IFT performs the work to test multiple missiles targeting an area. IFT only models a 
single missile per grid point area, however, so modeling a threat on a specific trajectory 
would not be precise. 
D. BASELINE SCENARIO MODELING 
The cohort created scenarios in STK for both the Baseline and EBMD Alternative 
solutions, as described in the following sections. The Baseline scenarios represent the 
system currently deployed while the EBMD Alternatives were designed to cover 
capability gaps evident in the Baseline, as shown through M&S. 
1. Baseline System Model 
The Baseline system represented defense systems deployed in the Turkey region 
at the time of the analysis. The Baseline system consisted of one AN/TPY-2 tracking 
radar system, six Patriot Advance Capability (PAC-3) interceptor batteries, and two 
Aegis BMD-capable ships in the Mediterranean Sea (O’Reilly 2011, 6). A series of threat 




system in the model to determine its capabilities and limitations and to evaluate the initial 
assumptions used in generation of the model. Five threat scenarios used in a 1VM 
analysis of the Baseline system are provided below and summarized in Table 19 and 
detailed in Table 20. 
In all threat scenarios, the ballistic missile threats were launched from the Tabriz 
Missile Base in northwestern Iran. The two ballistic missile threat types used in the 
scenarios are the Shahab-3 and the Sejil-2. The Shahab-3 is an MRBM with an 
approximate range of 1280 km (Federation of American Scientists 2008) and the Sejil-2 
is an IRBM with a speculated range of more than 2000 km (George C. Marshall and 





1 Launch of one Shahab-3 missile from the Tabriz Missile Base in northwestern 
Iran with a target of Kürecik, Turkey, where the AN/TPY-2 radar is stationed. 
2 Launch of two Shahab-3 missiles with a target of Kürecik, Turkey with a 
delay of 60 seconds between launches. 
3 The simultaneous launches of two Shahab-3 missiles with a target of Kürecik, 
Turkey. 
4 Launch of ten Shahab-3 missiles. The missiles are launched sequentially with 
a delay of 60s between launches. Every other missile is targeted towards 
Kürecik, Turkey, with the other five missiles targeted at Incirlik Air Base in 
Incirlik, Turkey. 
5 Launch of one Shahab-3 missile with a target of Kürecik, Turkey; one 
simultaneous launch of a Sejil-2 missile with a target of Ankara, Turkey; and 
one additional Sejil-2 missile with a target of Istanbul, Turkey. 







Missile No. Launch 
Timing (sec) 
Missile Type Target 
Location 
1 1 Initial Shahab-3 Kürecik 
2 1 Initial Shahab-3 Kürecik 
2 T+60 Shahab-3 Kürecik 
3 1 Initial Shahab-3 Kürecik 
2 Initial Shahab-3 Kürecik 
4 1 Initial Shahab-3 Kürecik 
2 T+60 Shahab-3 Incirlik  
3 T+120 Shahab-3 Kürecik 
4 T+180 Shahab-3 Incirlik  
5 T+240 Shahab-3 Kürecik 
6 T+300 Shahab-3 Incirlik  
7 T+360 Shahab-3 Kürecik 
8 T+420 Shahab-3 Incirlik  
9 T+480 Shahab-3 Kürecik 
10 T+540 Shahab-3 Incirlik  
5 1 Initial Shahab-3 Kürecik 
2 Initial Sejil Ankara 
3 Initial Sejil Istanbul 
Table 20.   Baseline IVM Threat Scenarios Detailed Summary 
2. STK Objects 
Although STK supports many types of objects, only the following STK specific 
object types were used to model the EBMD system: area targets, facilities, sensors, ships, 
and missiles or interceptors with their major components. Basic missile objects and 
trajectories were provided with STK natively; however, the MMT plug-in provided 
increased customization and flexibility for missiles and interceptors. MMT’s added 
usability proved necessary to evaluate the performance of specific threat missiles and 
interceptors. Generic missiles provided with MMT and some custom designed missiles 
from MDT were used in the model. 
a. Area Targets 
Area targets are geographical areas defined and displayed in the STK 
scenario map. The area targets can be custom defined with latitude and longitude 




comprehensive STK database. Despite having the word “target” in the object type name, 
these objects are useful to show a country’s borders even when not used as a target. 
Consequently, the countries of Turkey, Syria, and Iran were defined as area targets and 
outlined in STK. The definition of Turkey as an area was necessary for performing DAF 
analyses in IFT; Iran and Syria were defined to provide context for the region. 
b. Facilities 
Facilities are general objects that may represent a building, a compound, a 
city, or any type of facility. STK can define a facility as a specific city through its built-in 
city database, though facilities may also be defined manually through latitude, longitude, 
and other measures including elevation, population, and political region. Facilities also 
support the association of certain other objects. For instance, a sensor object can be 
assigned to a facility, correlating its placement and usage.  
For this project, specific cities, missile bases and radar stations were 
defined as facilities. The majority of the cities were available in the built-in database; the 
remaining cities were manually defined by longitude and latitude. Facilities were 
established at Tabriz, Iran; Kürecik, Turkey; and Incirlik, Turkey to represent the missile 
launch site and targets, respectively, with Kürecik also being a radar station.  
c. Sensors 
A sensor detects other objects or activities. For this project, radar systems 
were represented by sensors and were assigned to facilities and ships as appropriate, to 
detect objects within a defined field of view. Lateral and vertical ranges and azimuth 
angle were defined for each sensor to represent existing radar systems. 
A sensor object representing the AN/TPY2 phased-array radar at the Kürecik 
facility was defined with a 120 degree aperture and a range of 1000 km (Defense Industry 
Daily 2013b). The sensor was set to point towards Iran and scan from 11° to 131° in the 
azimuth angle to cover Western Iran, Syria and the Eastern end of Turkey. This is 




Figure 26 was produced using the STK software by AGI (Analytical Graphics 
Incorporated 2013). 
A sensor was attached to each Aegis-BMD ship representing the AN/SPY-1D 
radar system, providing 360° coverage with a detection range of 550 km (Lewis and 
Postol 2012a). These sensors are displayed in Figure 26 as the purple hemispheres 
surrounding each Aegis ship. 
Each PAC battery included a sensor representing a 360 degree AN/MPQ-65 radar 
system with a range of 170km (Army Recognition 2013). 
d. Ships 
Ships are objects similar to facilities that are placed in marine areas. Ships 
can travel between a defined set of waypoints. Like a facility, sensors can be assigned to 
ships, as can missiles and an array of other objects. As an example, each Aegis ship in the 
project’s scenarios is assigned a sensor representing the AN/SPY-1D radar system as 
mentioned earlier. 
e. Missiles and Interceptors 
Missiles are a unique object type in STK that are associated with a 
trajectory including launch data, apogee, and target.  
Interceptors are missile objects as well and recognized separately in IFT in 
order to distinguish between ballistic missile threats and the missiles used to intercept 
them. MFT and IFT automatically calculate and export all trajectory information to STK 
based on the missile’s characteristics like mass and propulsion. Various missile stages 
and their individual trajectories are also exported. 
The cohort used generic missile and interceptor models provided with 
MMT (when they approximated the characteristics of real missiles) as well as custom 
missiles designed in MDT. Missiles were “flown” in MFT and then exported into STK. 
Interceptors were modeled first in IFT and then exported to STK. Although missiles are 




generating the missiles’ trajectories and calculating when an interceptor can successfully 
engage a ballistic missile threat. 
 
Figure 26.  Baseline Objects 
3. Launch Locations 
As described in Chapter VI, Section D: Baseline Scenario Modeling, launch 
locations were based on known, or suspected, sites in Iran that possessed the missile 
capabilities to launch a Shahab-3 and Sejil-2 type missiles. The possible launch locations 
considered for modeling were taken from The Nuclear Threat Initiative (The Nuclear 
Threat Initiative 2011a; The Nuclear Threat Initiative 2011b; The Nuclear Threat 
Initiative 2013). Those locations of possible launch sites are provided in Table 21. The 
Tabriz Missile Base was chosen for modeling because of its close geographical proximity 
to Turkey. Tabriz’s closer proximity makes it the highest threat since missiles launched 





Launch Location City Coordinates Usage  
Tabriz Missile Base Tabriz 38.0833° N, 46.2833° E Silo Launcher 
Imam Ali Missile Base Khorramabad 33.4667° N, 48.3500° E Silo Launcher 
Qom Space Center Qom 34.65000°N 50.90000°E Space Testing 
Emamshahr Space Center Shahrud 36.42000°N 55.02000°E Space Testing 
Semnan Missile Complex Semnan 36.00000°N 54.00000°E Usage  
Table 21.   Launch Locations 
4. Target Locations 
Target locations for IVM scenarios were divided into two categories: populated 
cities and military installations. Target locations were further refined to only include 
those located within range of the threat missiles from a launch facility located at Tabriz, 
Iran. Populated cities were limited to cities with greater than 300,000 people. The target 
locations were then sorted by distance from the Tabriz Missile Base. Target locations that 
were used in M&S are shown in Table 22. Target locations were established at Incirlik, 
Kürecik, Ankara and Istanbul, with the AN/TPY-2 radar in Kürecik being a critical target 
location because of the radar facility. A complete list of target locations considered for 
M&S are provided in Appendix A: Problem Space Exploration Data. 
 
City Distance From Tabriz (km) Coordinates 
Incirlik 470 37.0019° N, 35.4258° E 
Kürecik  750 38.0667° N, 38.0167° E 
Ankara 1178 39.9272° N, 32.8644° E 
Istanbul 1518 41.0408° N, 28.9861° E 
Table 22.   Modeling And Simulation Target Locations For 1VM Scenarios 
5. Interceptor Batteries 
Batteries of interceptors were placed at various locations to model what was 
already deployed or to find the places of maximum coverage from the battery. Three 




a. Patriot Advanced Capacity 3 (PAC-3) 
Three PAC-3 interceptor batteries were placed in southern Turkey at 
Adana, Gaziantep, and Kahramanmaras, owned by the NATO contingents of the U.S., the 
Netherlands, and Germany, respectively (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2013). 
Although at the time of the modeling there were two PAC-3 batteries deployed to each of 
these three locations (for a total of six PAC-3 batteries) the redundancy of the batteries 
had no effect in the model and, for the sake of simplicity, only one battery was defined 
per location. PAC-3 batteries are truck-based and use the MIM-104 Patriot M901 launch 
station, each holding 16 interceptors (IHS Janes 2013). 
b. Aegis-based Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) 
The Aegis missile defense system consists of detection and tracking radar, 
information processing, and missile interceptor components (IHS Jane’s website, under 
“AEGIS weapon system MK-7,” 2001, accessed 2013). As of November, 2012, Aegis 
had been integrated onto 26 Navy cruisers or destroyers (Missile Defense Agency 2013c) 
with future plans for a ground-based “Aegis Ashore” system. These Aegis BMD systems 
use the SM-3 interceptor with capacities up to 128 interceptors, configured in groups of 
eight (DDC-I 2013). 
The ships used in the STK model were given a starting position and a 
simple straight line route to patrol. Representing the Aegis-BMD ships, one ship was 
positioned in the Northeastern Mediterranean, North of Cyprus, and the second Aegis 
ship was placed outside the area of engagement in the central Mediterranean. The second 
Aegis-BMD ship was initially placed outside of the range of engagement given the 
cohort’s assumption it would be patrolling or performing other non-BMD functions 
elsewhere in the Mediterranean Sea. This assumption arose due to the fact only two 
Aegis-BMD ships were deployed for the entire Mediterranean Sea and would not be 




c. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) 
The THAAD system consists of a mobile command station and interceptor 
batteries. THAAD uses the AN/TPY-2 radar for detection and tracking. THAAD 
interceptor batteries are truck-mounted and each vehicle has a capacity of ten interceptors 
(Encyclopedia Astronautica website, under “THAAD,” 2011, accessed 2013). THAAD 
offers higher mobility and a much larger intercept range than PAC-3. The THAAD 
interceptor has a maximum range of 200 km (Encyclopedia Astronautica 2011) whereas 
the MIM-104F (the PAC-3 interceptor) has a maximum range of 15 km (IHS Janes 
2013).  
6. Interceptors 
The interceptor used by the Aegis missile defense system is the SM-3. The 
modeling used the Block 1A version of the SM-3 with a payload mass of 23 kg and 
horizontal range of 1200 km (IHS Jane’s website, under “Standard Missile 1/2/3/5/6 
(RIM-66/67/156/161/165/174),” 2012, accessed 2013). A conflict was encountered 
regarding the range of the SM-3. As cited earlier in this paragraph, the cohort consulted 
IHS Janes to obtain range of 1200 km; however, numerous other sources were found that 
provided a range between 500 km (Encyclopedia Astronautic website, under “Standard 
SM-3,” 2011, accessed 2013) and 600 km (Guide to Military Equipment and Civil 
Aviation website, under “Standard SM-3 Block IA,” 2013). The cohort used the IHS 
Janes reference.  
The cohort created a custom interceptor in MDT that approximated the same 
specifications; however, the results in IFT were inconsistent when simulated. To ensure 
consistent results, the cohort instead used IFT’s generic medium-range interceptor 
(MRI_1–1100) with a payload mass of 65 kg and maximum horizontal range of 1100 km 
to represent the SM-3 Block 1A. The PAC-3 interceptors, which have a reported range of 
15 km (IHS Janes 2013) were represented by the SRI_1–20 generic interceptor in IFT 
with a horizontal range of 20 km (Federation of American Scientists website, under 




interceptor showed its limited range severely restricted its effectiveness in the model to 
intercept the threat missiles. As a result, the cohort included the PAC-3 in modeling the 
Baseline system, but did not use the PAC-3 when modeling EBMD Alternatives. . 
7. Threat Missiles 
Two threat missiles, the Shahab-3 and Sejil-2, were exported from MFT and 
MDT to STK, respectively. To represent the Shahab-3 missile the generic short-range 
missile 3 (SRM-3) with a similar range of 200 km (min)-1500 km (max) (Federation of 
American Scientists 2008) was used. A custom missile was created to represent the Sejil-
2 since no generic missile had similar performance characteristics. A two-stage missile 
with a range of 290 km (min)–2,300 km (max) (George C. Marshall and Claremont 
Institutes 2013c) was modeled to represent the Sejil-2. The detailed characteristics of the 
two threat missiles modeled are provided in Table 23 (George C. Marshall and Claremont 
Institutes 2013b; George C. Marshall and Claremont Institutes 2013c). Selection of these 
missiles was based on their operational status and ability to strike key cities in Turkey. 
 
Name Shahab-3 Sejjil-2 
Class MRBM IRBM 
Range (km) 1,280 2,000 - 2,500 
Payload (kg) 760 - 1,158 650 - 1,000 
Stages 1 2 
Propellant Liquid Solid 
Speed (km/s) 2.0–2.4 Unknown 
Height (m) 15.5 17.6 
Width (m) 1.25 1.25 
Table 23.   Operational Threat Missile Characteristics (After George C. Marshall and 
Claremont Institutes 2013b; George C. Marshall and Claremont Institutes 2013c) 
8. IFT Parameters 
IFT allows configuration of numerous parameters to define the model; these 
parameters differ somewhat depending on the type of scenario being modeled (1VM, 




the target, along with its launch location and type; and various delays between when a 
target is detected by a sensor and when and interceptor can launch. The IFT parameters 
modified for this project are listed in Table 24. 
 




SM-3 on Aegis1 An interceptor battery is defined by specifying 
an interceptor type from a list of those built in 
to IFT or imported from MDT. The location of 
the battery can be custom defined or selected 




delay time (battle 
delay) 
10 seconds This is the time in seconds between the sensor 
detecting a missile and the interceptor battery 




Tabriz This can be defined with custom coordinates or 
selected from a list of objects defined in STK. 
It represents where the target missile is 
launched, which determines which grid points 





This parameter defines what type of footprint 
is defended – whether a custom-defined square 
or a political boundary, etc. The STK/Area 
target can be selected from a list of areas 
defined in STK. 
Grid density 1, 1 These numbers represent the number of 
degrees latitude and longitude included in each 
grid point. Larger numbers mean larger 
(coarser) grid points. 
Target type (DAF 
ONLY) 
SRM_3 The target type is the type of threat missile 
used to generate the grid points the interceptors 
must defend against. The target type is selected 
from a list of missiles known to MFT: either 
built-in or imported from MDT. The missile 
type will determine minimum and maximum 
range which determines which grid points can 
be hit. 
Targets (IVM) or 
Target Grids 
(DAF) 
Shahab_1_l2i IFT presents the user with a list of possible 




Parameter Example Explanation 
Sensors Kürecik / 
AN_TPY2 
IFT allows the user to select one or more 
sensors from a list of sensors that have been 
defined in STK. The sensor will be shown with 
the location it is associated with in STK. 
Sensor 
requirements 
Any one detection 
prior to launch 
The user can select whether an interceptor can 
be launched as soon as a target is detected by 
any sensor, if it needs to be covered by sensors 
at time of launch or if multiple sensors are 
required for tracking before launch. The battle 




Earliest Time This parameter tells the modeling engine when 
to attempt to incept the target. Options include: 
earliest time, latest time, maximum altitude 
and minimum altitude. 
Table 24.   IFT Parameters 
E. BASELINE 1VM SCENARIO RESULTS 
This section contains the results of the IFT simulations of the five Baseline 
scenarios as listed in Table 19 and Table 20. These scenarios are “1VM” scenarios where 
one interceptor battery defends against one or more threat missiles. The scenario results 
are shown in Table 25. The percentage of the targets intercepted varies with changes in 
the battle delay; longer battle delays may prevent an interceptor from reaching the 
incoming threat missile before it hits its target. As mentioned in Chapter VI, Section D: 
Baseline Scenario Modeling, there were actually two Aegis ships deployed in the 
Mediterranean Sea; however, because only one ship would be in the vicinity of Turkey in 
a typical patrol, only one ship was used in each Baseline scenario, as shown in Table 25. 
According to a conversation with Professor John Green (in 2013) of the NPS 
Systems Engineering department, a typical battle delay (per the previous section, the time 
between threat detection and interceptor launch) for an interceptor would range between 
8–20 seconds, with 4–8 seconds to process the threat, 2–4 seconds to transmit the data 




apparent battle delay time is reduced somewhat from the sum of these numbers by 
performing some of the tasks in parallel. 
PAC-3 batteries were tested in the original Baseline scenario, but their short range 
of 15 km prevented any successful intercepts since the Shahab-3 and Sejil-2 missiles fly 
as high as 200 km as modeled in MFT. Due to their inability to defend against the threats, 












(%) at Battle Delay (s) 
Min Max % Hit Delay (s) 
1 1 0 1 8 14 100 8 0 9 
2 2 0 1 8 9 100 8 0 9 
3 2 0 1 8 9 100 8 0 9 





5 1 2 1 8 16 100 8 66 9–16 
Table 25.   Summary Results of the Baseline System for 1VM Scenarios 
1. Scenario 1 
In the first scenario, a battery of SM-3 missiles aboard an Aegis ship in the 
Mediterranean Sea defended against a single Shahab-3 missile from Tabriz, Iran targeting 
Kürecik, Turkey. The significance of Kürecik as a target is the powerful AN/TPY-2 
tracking radar system deployed there that a hostile force would want to disable. 
To test the scenario, the interceptor battle delay was varied between eight and 
sixteen seconds; battle delay times beyond sixteen seconds did not make a difference in 
the results and are thus not displayed. An eight second battle delay signifies near-ideal 




interceptor for launch. While eight seconds is an optimistic battle delay, it provides 
important capability data given the position of the ship. As shown in Table 25, a battle 
delay of more than eight seconds results in the inability to defend against the threat 
missile. A delay of eight seconds or less results in a successful engagement. Were the 
Aegis ship closer, a longer battle delay could be used while maintaining a successful 
engagement, signifying the missile threat was neutralized. 
A picture of Scenario 1 is shown in Figure 27, produced using the STK software 
by AGI. This picture shows the coverage of the AN/TPY-2 radar system in magenta. 
Each Aegis ship is depicted inside the blue radar dome produced by the AN/SPY-1D 
radar onboard the ships. A white trajectory above the yellow arrow on the right is the 
Shahab-3 missile fired from Tabriz. The light blue trajectory pointed to by the yellow 
arrow on the left is the SM-3 interceptor’s flight path en route to intercepting the Shahab-
3. In all cases, the threat missile is detected first and tracked by the AN/TPY-2 radar. 
That tracking information is sent through the BCN to the Aegis ships, allowing launch of 
an interceptor. 
 




2. Scenario 2 
Scenario 2 is similar to the first scenario in that Shahab-3 missiles were launched 
from Tabriz, Iran towards Kürecik, Turkey. Scenario 2 differs in that two missiles were 
launched instead of one, with a sixty second delay between launches. Because an Aegis 
SM-3 battery can hold dozens of SM-3 interceptors (DDC-I 2013), multiple missile 
interceptions are not a problem as long as the target missiles are in range with enough 
time for each interceptor to travel to an intercept point with the incoming threat missile 
after waiting the mandated battle delay. Per the IFT results, these missiles were in range 
(time and distance) as long as the battle delay was less than or equal to eight seconds, just 
as in Scenario 1. When the battle delay was greater than eight seconds, the intercept was 
unsuccessful. 
3. Scenario 3 
Scenario 3 also consists of two Shahab-3 missiles fired from Tabriz, but differs in 
that the missiles were launched simultaneously instead of with a sixty second delay. As in 
Scenario 2, a successful engagement of all missiles is possible as long as they are within 
range. All engagements failed when the battle delay was greater than eight seconds, while 
they were successful with a battle delay of eight or fewer seconds. 
4. Scenario 4 
Scenario 4 is more complicated than the other scenarios and represents a large 
salvo of threat missiles. This scenario models the capability to intercept multiple threat 
missiles on different trajectories. Five missiles are launched from Tabriz, Iran to Kürecik, 
Turkey and another five are launched towards Incirlik Air Base. The missiles are 
staggered both in their launch times and destinations. The first threat missile targets 
Kürecik. The second launches sixty seconds later and targets Incirlik. The third launches 
sixty seconds after the second and targets Kürecik, and so on. 
Unlike the previous scenarios, the Aegis SM-3 battery had a more difficult time 
hitting all the targets with an eight second battle delay. As shown in Table 25, the battle 




of the missiles. Only six of the ten missiles were hit when incorporating an eight second 
battle delay; with a delay of ten to sixteen seconds, four missiles were hit (all targeting 
Incirlik). 
5. Scenario 5 
This scenario differs from the first four scenarios by including the medium-range 
ballistic missile: the Sejil-2. Whereas the Shahab-3 is a single-stage short-range missile, 
the Sejil-2 has two stages, allowing it to reach over 2,000 km (George C. Marshall and 
Claremont Institutes 2013c). This range allows Iran to target Western Turkey, including 
the key metropolis of Istanbul. This scenario demonstrates defensibility against multiple 
missile types and across most of Turkey. 
With the single Aegis ship engaging the threat missiles as in the previous 
scenarios, the interceptors were able to successfully engage the threat 100% of the time 
when the battle delay was eight seconds or less. When the delay was increased to 
between nine and sixteen seconds, only two of the threat missiles were intercepted (a 
66% intercept rate). The two threat missiles that were intercepted were the Sejil-2, which 
was due to the time of flight being much  
6. Summary of Baseline One-Versus-Many Simulation 
The Baseline scenarios show that the battle delay and target location is 
critical to defending against incoming threat missiles from Tabriz to Kürecik. The 
Baseline 1VM scenario results assisted in determining the existing system limitations 
(Research Question 4). An Aegis ship north of Cyprus must have a battle delay of eight 
or fewer seconds to defend Kürecik, Turkey and that number may very well be unrealistic 
when factoring in the time it takes to transmit tracking data from the AN/TPY-2 radar to 
a ship-based Aegis interceptor battery. Positioning the Aegis ship as close to the target 
(Kürecik in this case) allows for a longer battle delay. However, it is not financially 
practical to station a sophisticated Aegis warship in a relatively stationary position to 
defend a small target al.so, as demonstrated in Scenario 4 with the missiles targeting 




F. BASELINE DAF SCENARIO RESULTS 
A DAF analysis was performed on the Baseline scenario with each missile type to 
determine the ability to defend Turkey. The 1VM model simulated the ability to intercept 
specific threat missiles, whereas the DAF scenarios simulated whether an entire region 
was defensible.  
To perform a DAF analysis, a target grid was established. The political border of 
Turkey was defined as the perimeter of the area to be defended. A target grid was 
generated with a latitude/longitude resolution of one-degree (The finest resolution the 
software was capable of) and bounded by the Turkey’s borders. Due to limitations in IFT, 
only one interceptor battery location and missile type could be chosen for each analysis. 
To compensate for that limitation, multiple interceptor batteries and threat missile types 
were saved in the same IFT file and run as individual simulations. Additional parameters 
for each DAF analysis were defined such as battle management delay, sensor 
requirements, engagement window and export options. The battle management delay was 
varied between 8 and 14 seconds for incoming threat missiles. Sensor requirements were 
defined by choosing available sensors from the linked STK scenario file, and the number 
of sensors required to acquire tracking data before launching an interceptor. The 
AN/TPY-2 sensor was chosen for each DAF analysis and the engagement window was 
set to the earliest time possible in the threat missile trajectory. 
After defining the interceptor, target grid and evaluation options, the DAF 
analysis was performed. The results of the DAF analysis were exported to STK for 
viewing. The DAF grid that is exported to STK is color-coded as red, yellow and green. 
Red and green grids are areas that were indefensible or defensible by the interceptor 
battery, respectively. Yellow grids are areas that are not reachable by the incoming threat 
missile. A DAF analysis was performed for each threat missile type and different 




1. Sejil-2 DAF 
The Sejil-2 DAF for the Baseline scenario is shown in Figure 28 produced using 
the STK software by AGI. The grid in Eastern Turkey is yellow as those points are less 
than the Sejil-2’s minimum range and therefore unreachable. Grid points in Western 
Turkey are green and are defensible by the Aegis-BMD ship north of Cyprus. Central 
Turkey, however, is largely red, signifying failure to intercept the threat missiles 
targeting those grid points. Red grid points can stem from two possibilities. Either the 
interceptor does not have the range to reach the grid point, or the interceptor cannot reach 
the grid point before the incoming threat missile impacts the target. The time to intercept 
is a function of the sensor detection time, battle management delay and the time of flight 
of the interceptor. 
 
Figure 28.  Sejil-2 DAF Results 
Using the DAF grid output, the percentage of the high-value footprint defended (𝑃𝑓𝑑) was determined by dividing the number of defensible (green) grid points (NDefended) 
by the total number of grid points that were defensible (green) and indefensible (red) 












The percentage of area defended for this DAF scenario was 63.5%. 
2. Shahab-3 DAF 
A DAF analysis of the Baseline scenario with a Shahab-3 threat missile was also 
performed and the grid output is shown in Figure 29 produced using the STK software by 
AGI. The defensible and indefensible areas are different than the Sejil-2 DAF due to the 
performance capability of the Shahab-3 threat missile. Grid points in Western Turkey are 
unreachable by the Shahab-3. Eastern Turkey is largely indefensible because the 
interceptor cannot reach that area before the Shahab-3 impacts the target grid point. The 
percent footprint defended for the Shahab-3 DAF analysis was 65.8%. 
 
Figure 29.  Shahab-3 DAF Results 
3. DAF Comparison 
The individual DAF output results that were saved in the IFT file were combined 




threat missile types. This was also performed during alternative analysis to simulate using 
multiple interceptor batteries against multiple threat missile types. The scripts were 
written in BASH and provided data on the percentage of the grid covered by one or more 
interceptor batteries and how many levels of protection a grid point had (Free Software 
Foundation, Inc., website, “Bash Reference Manual,” 2011). The scripts are shown in 
Appendix C: Modeling And Simulation Script Details. 
To analyze the Baseline system against multiple missile types, two DAF analyses 
were combined and analyzed. Each DAF analysis exported a summary result for each 
grid point. The DAF analyses were combined, sorted and filtered to determine at each 
result point if the threat missile was intercepted (defensible). This filtering was also used 
for multiple systems and missile types to determine if two systems can defend the same 
grid point. 
4. Summary of Baseline DAF Scenario Results 
A summary of the DAF analysis for the Baseline system against each missile type 
is provided in Table 26. The combined output of multiple threat missile types was 
determined by counting all of the unique result points between the Sejil-2 and Shahab-3 
DAF analyses for the Baseline system. The total percent footprint defended (𝑃𝑓𝑑) by the 
Baseline system against the Sejil-2 and Shahab-3 threat missile types was 70.1%. The 
probability of intercept (𝑃𝑖) was calculated for the defended area footprint by multiplying 
each grid point by the probability of intercept, at that grid point, and then averaged over 
the entire footprint. For one system, the probability of intercept was 0.713 (taken from 
Chapter VI, Section B: Determining the Probability of Intercept). If the grid point could 
not be defended, the probability was zero. The probability of intercept was assumed to be 
the same for each type of interceptor. For the total percent footprint defended, the 
probability of intercept for the footprint was calculated for each threat missile type and as 
a single overall value. The percent footprint defended with the Baseline components was 
























Sejil-2 63 40 23 63.5% 0.635 
Shahab-3 76 50 26 65.8% 0.587 
Combined 87 61 26 70.1% 0.614 
Table 26.   Baseline DAF Results Summary 
 










VII. ALTERNATIVES REFINEMENT 
A. ALTERNATIVES REFINEMENT PROCESS 
The general approaches to alternatives, defined in Alternatives Generation 
(Chapter V), were refined during the alternatives refinement process (Figure 31). Each 
approach was simulated and the resulting performance of those EBMD Alternatives was 
recorded using evaluation measures from the requirements analysis process. The 
evaluation measures of each EBMD Alternative were used to inform the analysis of 
alternatives. 











Simulation Analysis  
Figure 31.  Alternatives Refinement Process 
B. A NEED FOR NEW ALTERNATIVES 
The Baseline system represented defense systems deployed in the Turkey region 
at the time of the analysis. Based on the results of the 1VM and DAF analyses, 
performance gaps were identified, illustrating the need for alternative systems. Specific 
EBMD Alternatives were derived from general guidance provided during the alternatives 
generation process. The goal of M&S was to take the general guidance provided for each 
alternative and iteratively add, move and remove components in each alternative based 
on the performance results of each iteration. This iterative process continued until the 
addition or movement of additional systems did not result in a significant performance 
increase over the previous iteration or the system achieved full coverage of the high value 




Table 27. For example, the general approach for Alternative B was to alter the quantity 
and location of THAAD batteries. Alternatives B.1 through B.3 correspond to the number 










Baseline 1 1 0 6 0 
A 1 2 0 0 0 
B.1 1 2 1 0 0 
B.2 1 2 2 0 0 
B.3 1 2 3 0 0 
C 1 0 0 0 1 
Table 27.   Component List for Alternative Analysis  
C. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON 
A DAF analysis was performed for each EBMD Alternative to assess its ability to 
defend the high-value footprint against the Sejil-2 and Shahab-3 missile types. Primary 
performance measures used were percent footprint defended (𝑃𝑓𝑑) and probability of 
intercept (𝑃𝑖) for the total area defended.  
When multiple systems were present and could defend the same grid point, then 
the number of layers for that grid point was increased to represent layers of coverage. The 
probability of intercept for the total defended footprint was calculated by multiplying 
each coordinate’s number of defense layers by the corresponding probability of intercept 
for the respective number of defense layers and performing a weighted average of each 
grid point’s probability of intercept over the entire area. The probability of intercept by 
number of defense layers is provided in Chapter VI. Section B: Determining the 
Probability of Intercept. The probability of intercept was assumed to be the same between 
different interceptor types. For example, assume that a particular system had no coverage 




57 grid points, for a total of 88 grid points analyzed. The probability of intercept would 
be calculated as shown in Equation 1.3. 
(1.3) 
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D. EBMD ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS PERFORMANCE RESULTS 
1. Alternative A 
The general approach to Alternative A was to vary the number and placement of 
Aegis ships. For Alternative A, two Aegis ships were used in the simulation, whereas the 
Baseline had one active Aegis ship performing BMD. One Aegis ship was set in the same 
location as the Baseline system (35.6° N, 32.5° E) while the other was placed north of 
Turkey in the Black Sea (41.5° N, 38.1° E). Each Aegis ship was simulated to defend 
against the same missile types and set of grid points. The combined performance is 
summarized in Table 28 and shown in Figure 32. 
 
Parameter Result 
Total Grid Points 88 
Total Defended Grid Points 67 
Total Missed Grid Points 21 
Total Grid Points with Two Layers 57 
Total Grid Points with One Layer 10 
Total Percent Footprint Defended (𝑃𝑓𝑑) 76.1% 
Probability of Intercept (𝑃𝑖)  0.676 





Figure 32.  Alternative A DAF Coverage 
2. Alternative B 
To determine its effectiveness on overall coverage, between one and three 
THAAD batteries were added to Alternative A and designated as Alternative B.1, B.2 
and B.3 corresponding to the number of THAAD interceptor batteries. Depending on the 
number of THAAD batteries, the position of each THAAD battery was changed to 
increase the defended area footprint. The positions of the THAAD batteries for 
Alternative B are provided in Table 29. 
 
Alternative THAAD Batteries Location 
B.1 1 39.347° N, 41.4° E 
B.2 1 39.25°N, 42.4°E  
2 38.0°N, 39.2°E 
B.3 1 40.211°N, 41.4°E 
2 38.222°N, 41.4°E  
3 37.0°N, 37.9°E 
Table 29.   Alternative B THAAD Battery Locations 
The performance summary for Alternative B is provided in Table 30 and shown 






B.1 B.2 B.3 
Total Grid Points 88 88 88 
Total Defended Grid Points 79 85 88 
Total Missed Grid Points 9 3 0 
Total Grid Points with Four Layers 0 0 14 
Total Grid Points with Three Layers 0 8 32 
Total Grid Points with Two Layers 60 67 22 
Total Grid Points with One Layer 19 10 20 
Total Percent Footprint Defended (𝑃𝑓𝑑) 89.8% 96.6% 100.0% 
Probability of Intercept (𝑃𝑖)  0.780 0.869 0.905 
Table 30.   Alternative B DAF Performance Summary 
 





Figure 34.  Alternative B.2 DAF Coverage 
 
Figure 35.  Alternative B.3 DAF Coverage 
3. Alternative C 
An Aegis Ashore system using the same interceptors as the Aegis ships used in 
the simulation was placed in Eastern Turkey (38.35°N, 41.3°E). A summary of the DAF 






Total Grid Points 86 
Total Defended Grid Points 86 
Total Missed Grid Points 0 
Total Grid Points with One Layer 86 
Total Percent Footprint Defended (𝑃𝑓𝑑) 100.0% 
Probability of Intercept (𝑃𝑖)  0.714 
Table 31.   Alternative C DAF Performance Summary 
 
Figure 36.  Alternative C DAF coverage 
E. SUMMARY OF ALTERNATIVES REFINEMENT 
A DAF performance summary of the Baseline system and each EBMD 
Alternative system is provided in Table 32. The placement, number and capability of 
each system had a significant impact on the percentage of footprint defended and the 
probability of intercept. When multiple systems were able to defend the same grid point, 
the probability of intercept for the area defended increased significantly as shown with 
Alternative B. One highly capable and strategically placed system, such as the Aegis 
Ashore system represented in Alternative C, could defend the entire area; however, with 
only one defense layer the probability of intercept was lower than some other EBMD 







BL A B.1 B.2 B.3 C 
Total Grid Points 87 88 88 88 88 86 
Total Defended Grid Points 61 67 79 85 88 86 
Total Missed Grid Points 26 21 9 3 0 0 
Total Grid Points with Four Layers 0 0 0 0 14 0 
Total Grid Points with Three Layers 0 0 0 8 32 0 
Total Grid Points with Two Layers 0 57 60 67 22 0 
Total Grid Points with One Layer 61 10 19 10 20 86 
Total Percent Footprint Defended (𝑃𝑓𝑑) 70.1% 76.1% 89.8% 96.6% 100.0% 100.0% 
Probability of Intercept (𝑃𝑖)  0.614 0.676 0.780 0.869 0.905 0.714 





VIII. LIFE CYCLE COST (LCC) ANALYSIS 
A. LIFE CYCLE COST ANALYSIS PROCESS 
The life cycle cost (LCC) provided insight to the fiscal requirements for fielding 
the EBMD Alternatives. The LCC analysis process (Figure 37) evaluated various 
component systems identified during the alternatives generation process, to include Aegis 
ship, Aegis Ashore, THAAD, AN/TPY-2, and PAC-3. These life cycle costs include the 
associated costs to perform research and development (R&D), production and 
construction (P&C), operation and support (O&S), and disposal. Those costs were used 
to inform the decision making process during the analysis of alternatives. 
Program & Document Management
Life Cycle Cost Analysis
Alternatives 
Refinement






Figure 37.  LCC Analysis Process 
To assist in the derivation of the individual cost activities related to a system life 
cycle, the cost breakdown structure (CBS) was used (Blanchard 2011, 577–612). The 
CBS incorporates a top level costing effort across respective activities to account for the 
procurement, operation, sustainment, and disposal of each EBMD Alternative. The high-
level CBS elements were broken down by the following life-cycle phases. 
B. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COSTS 
The R&D phase consists of costs realized early in the life cycle process. These 
costs focused primarily on the research of what capabilities exist and what capabilities 




investment for the EBMD components was required as these are technologies with 
proven records. The R&D costs attributed to the EBMD Alternatives are the following: 
• System Management 
• Systems Engineering 
• Systems Planning, Research, and Development 
• Systems Test and Evaluation 
• System Documentation 
C. PRODUCTION AND CONSTRUCTION COSTS 
The production and construction costs are the expenses associated with the 
management, manufacturing, construction, quality control, and initial logistics support 
used to develop a system. The production and construction costs were included in the 
LCC to evaluate the different EBMD Alternative architectures. This phase takes into 
consideration the recurring costs, nonrecurring costs, and inventory costs of a given 
component. It also includes the costs required for the support equipment and procedural 
manuals in conjunction with new equipment training. 
D. OPERATION AND SUPPORT COSTS 
The operation and support costs are the highest expenses for the majority of the 
components. The O&S costs constitute the required expenses associated with the 
operation and maintenance of the components. Personnel, training, and facilities make up 
the costs for the operations of the components. 
For the EBMD Alternatives, most of the components are mobile having a 
requirement for fuel and maintenance. The Aegis Ashore, being land-based, is the only 
component requiring an operations facility. 
An O&S cost required for continuous operation of each component over time was 
calculated. This expense included storage, supply, maintenance, and training to carry the 
EBMD system through a 10-year life cycle. 
Technological advancement over time will cause significant risk in our system if 
chosen technologies cannot meet performance objectives or become obsolete. The current 




year life cycle, the cohort felt it could mitigate a performance shortfall or the onset of 
obsolescence. The technology in the EMBD components must meet the fast-paced 
development of threat capabilities during this 10-year period. The 10-year life cycle costs 
for the EBMD Alternatives include technical/maintenance support that may be required 
such as upgrades, refurbishments, and/or system troubleshooting. 
E. DISPOSAL COST  
Disposal costs will be incurred when the EBMD system reaches the end of its 
operational life. The equipment and components that reach a non-repairable state will be 
disposed of in accordance with DoD regulations and with environmental considerations. 
The remaining components that are operational and repairable will be stripped down and 
repurposed to another project with a similar objective. 
F. COST ANALYSIS 
The figures used to get the cost estimates for the components came from the 
MDA Budget for Fiscal Year 2013 (FY13) procurement budget (Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense 2012). To develop the costs for each EBMD Alternative the cohort 
extrapolated the budgeted expenses from the MDA FY13 budget al.though not explicitly 
found during research, the estimated O&S costs were derived using the Operations and 
Maintenance Costs from the MDA Budget for FY13. The disposal costs were not readily 
available either, but the cohort was able to establish them through estimations and 
assumptions made between professional experience and the labor needed for the 
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6 PAC-3  1 THAAD 2 THAADs 3 THAADs  
Table 33.   EBMD Alternatives 
Since the EBMD system comprises several large components, the first step in the 
cost analyses was to find the single item costs of each component. The costs associated 
with the individual components can be found in Appendix D: Life Cycle Cost Analysis 
Data. Figure 38 displays the 10-year program costs (in billions) for the various 
components that make up the EMBD Alternatives. 
 
Figure 38.  EBMD Component 10 Year Costs in Billions (Disposal Costs Not Shown 
Due to Being Too Low to Show on Graph), 
The THAAD accounted for the greatest expense of all the EBMD Alternative 
components. Its total cost was approximately $6.88 billion. The production and 






Total R&D Costs Total P&C Costs Total O&S Costs TOTALS
PAC-3 $0.07 $1.04 $2.53 $3.63
THAAD $0.03 $2.15 $4.70 $6.88
AN/TPY-2 $0.71 $0.33 $0.09 $1.12
Aegis Ashore $0.11 $1.32 $2.93 $4.37




construction, and operation and support activities were the major cost contributors for the 
THAAD. Driving the expense of the THAAD was its missile requirement. The second 
most expensive component was actually the Aegis ship and its Aegis Ashore variant. 
Like the THAAD, the cost driver for the Aegis components was the SM-3 missile 
requirement. Much like the Aegis variants and THAAD, the PAC-3 also required a vast 
number of missiles to be effective. Unlike the rest of the components, R&D and 
production costs were the main drivers for the AN/TPY-2 Radar.  
The Aegis Ashore is a new land-based capability that will incorporate the same 
BMD components as the ship variant (Missile Defense Agency 2013b). The Aegis 
Ashore had comparable costs to the Aegis ship with the exception of the full ship crew 
requirement and the fuel costs. 
With the component costs established, the cohort was able to create a time-phased 
graphic, Figure 39, to display cost per EBMD Alternative per year for 10 years. The time-
phased costs graph presents the costs from initiation of the EBMD system development 





Figure 39.  EBMD Alternative Time-Phased Costs 
Lastly, the cohort was able to derive the LCC values for the EBMD Alternatives 
from the estimated total costs generated from Figure 38. The estimated total costs for 
each EBMD Alternative were achieved by adding all the associated costs amongst the 
varying components with respect to each EBMD Alternative’s configuration, which can 
be found in Table 33. Table 34 depicts these totals for each of the EBMD Alternatives. 
 
Cost EBMD Alternative 
Baseline A B.1 B.2 B.3 C 
Total R&D Costs $1.24 $0.93 $0.97 $1.00 $1.03 $0.82 
Total P&C Costs $7.88 $2.97 $5.12 $7.27 $9.42 $1.65 
Total O&S Costs $18.25 $6.10 $10.80 $15.50 $20.19 $3.02 
Total Disposal Costs $0.0050 $0.0021 $0.0027 $0.0033 $0.0039 $0.0012 
TOTALS $27.37 $10.01 $16.89 $23.77 $30.65 $5.49 
Table 34.   EBMD Alternative 10-Year Costs in Billions 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year10
Baseline $0.61 $3.46 $2.60 $2.69 $2.69 $2.80 $2.91 $3.03 $3.15 $3.28
Alternative A $0.46 $1.77 $0.83 $0.94 $0.88 $0.92 $0.96 $0.99 $1.04 $1.08
Alternative  B.1 $0.47 $2.52 $1.59 $1.61 $1.59 $1.65 $1.72 $1.79 $1.86 $1.93
Alternative  B.2 $0.49 $3.27 $2.36 $2.29 $2.29 $2.38 $2.48 $2.58 $2.69 $2.79
Alternative  B.3 $0.51 $4.02 $3.12 $2.97 $3.00 $3.11 $3.24 $3.37 $3.51 $3.65



















G. SUMMARY OF LCC ANALYSIS 
Alternative B.3 was the most expensive option with a cost of approximately 
$30.65 billion. Alternative B.2 was the median option of all the EBMD Alternatives with 
a cost of $23.77 billion. Alternative C had the smallest cost ($5.49 billion) because of the 
single requirement of an Aegis Ashore and an AN/TPY-2 radar. 
Alternative C had a similar configuration to Alternative A, the difference being 
the ship and ashore variants. Alternative A contained the ship variant, and was double the 
cost, while Alternative C included the future capability of the Aegis Ashore. They both 
had an AN/TPY-2 Radar. Aegis Ashore seemed to be a high cost effort at first, yet it is 
comprised of the same proven weapon system, sensors, and combat control technology as 
an Aegis ship, mitigating any increased cost risks. As for the production and construction 
costs for the Aegis Ashore, the cohort is less confident in the estimates because one has 
never been built. 
Overall, operation and support exhibited a larger expenditure in comparison to the 
remaining cost activities, representing 55% to 66% of the total cost for each of the 
applicable EBMD Alternatives. These expenditures were more evident with components 










IX. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
A. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES PROCESS 
This analysis of alternatives process (Figure 40) made use of a set of evaluation 
measures defined during the requirements analysis that were reflective of stakeholder 
objectives. Values for each EBMD Alternative’s evaluation measures were populated 
from metrics generated during the alternative refinement process. These metrics were 
then used to compare each EBMD Alternative to one another relative to associated life 
cycle cost values. A decision evaluation display provided a visual tool to analyze 
disparities between EBMD Alternatives and select a path forward for system acquisition 
(Blanchard 2011). 
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Figure 40.  Analysis of Alternatives Process 
B. CRITERIA SELECTION 
The criteria selected for evaluation of the EBMD Alternatives was based on a 
defined set of evaluation measures established during requirements analysis. The 
evaluation measures were outlined in the value system discussion of Chapter III. The 
measures included probability of intercept (𝑃𝑖) and percent footprint defended (𝑃𝑓𝑑). The 
evaluation measures were established as a response to the high level stakeholder needs. 
These needs included the abilities to: defend against ballistic missile threats; adapt to 
changing technologies; and recognize current budget constraints. The consideration of 




EBMD Alternative to successfully engage a threat, thereby providing a systematic 
defense against ballistic missile threats. Percent footprint defended accounted for the 
effect of changing technologies on range capability of ballistic missile threats. Finally, 
the consideration of system life cycle cost (LCC) for each EBMD Alternative was 
incorporated to help ensure the EBMD Alternatives provide an economically sustainable 
solution. 
C. EVALUATION MEASURES 
Data sets from each EBMD Alternative were collected based on outputs from the 
Discrete Element Simulation and Scenario Based Simulation results. Table 35 shows a 
summary of evaluation measure values determined from Chapter VII. Each evaluation 
measure is plotted with its corresponding Baseline value in Figure 41 and Figure 42. 
 
Evaluation Measure EBMD Alternative 
Baseline A B.1 B.2 B.3 C 
Probability of Intercept 𝑃𝑖 0.614 0.676 0.780 0.869 0.905 0.714 
Percent Footprint Defended 𝑃𝑓𝑑 70.1% 76.1% 89.8% 96.6% 100% 100% 
Table 35.   Comparison of Evaluation Measures 
 





























Figure 42.  Comparison of Percent Footprint Defended 
D. DECISION EVALUATION DISPLAY 
The decision evaluation display provides a means to present disparities evident in 
the set of multiple alternatives (Blanchard 2011). The collected data for each EBMD 
Alternative relative to measures for system evaluation were plotted against an objective 
measure for analysis (Figure 43). In this case, the objective measure used was the life 
cycle cost of each EBMD Alternative. 
Each EBMD Alternative is represented by a column in the display tool. The main 
x-axis of the decision evaluation display represents the life cycle cost as an objective 
measure. The life cycle cost is displayed as increasing cost from left to right. The y-axes 
toward the left of the plot represent the multiple evaluation measures for analysis. The x-
axis of this plot does not intersect the y-axes at zero. Each y-axis is representative of 
zoomed scaling. Baseline values have been included for a complete comparison. These 
Baseline values are represented as horizontal dotted lines connecting to specific 
evaluation measures. Finally, the specific values for each of the alternative measures, as 
determined through M&S, are plotted as triangles and circles placed accordingly along 


































E. VALUE ANALYSIS 
EBMD Alternatives were compared relative to their associated values for all 
evaluation measures (Research Question 5). Alternative A exhibited the lowest values for 
each evaluation measure. Alternative C exhibited varying performance levels dependent 
on the evaluation measure chosen. Alternative C maintained the second lowest 
probability of intercept, yet the highest percentage of footprint defended. The three 
variations of Alternative B (B.1 through B.3) performed with increasing capability as 
components were added for each variation. 
1. Probability of Intercept 
All EBMD Alternatives performed better than the Baseline system, with 
Alternatives C and A exhibiting the lowest probabilities of intercept relative to the 
Baseline system. All variants of Alternative B performed better than the Baseline system 
with increasing performance evident as components were added for each variation. 
2. Percentage of Footprint Defended 
All EBMD Alternatives performed better than the Baseline system value with 
Alternatives B.3 and C achieving full coverage of the footprint defended. 
3. Decision Evaluation Display Analysis 
This analysis allowed for the consideration of evaluation measures relative to the 
associated life cycle cost for each EBMD Alternative. In addition to the inclusion of 
evaluation measure values of the Baseline system, a separate axis was added to the 
display tool to represent the cost of the Baseline system. In comparison to Alternatives A 
through C, the Baseline system exhibited the second highest life cycle cost. Alternative 
B.3 maintained the highest life cycle cost of all EBMD Alternatives, including the 
Baseline system. Alternative C exhibited the lowest life cycle cost with associated values 
for both evaluation measures exceeding the Baseline system. Alternative A was also 
identified at the lower end of the life cycle cost spectrum; however the probability of 




the levels exhibited in Alternative C. Both performance and cost of Alternatives B.1 
through B.3 increased in each iterative variation with the introduction of multiple 
THAAD interceptor batteries. Alternatives B.1 through B.3 were characterized by 
probability of intercept and percentage of footprint defended values exceeding those 
attained by the Baseline system. The life cycle costs of Alternatives B.1 and B.2 were 
lower than the Baseline system, while Alternative B.3 exhibited a cost 12% higher than 





A. EBMD ARCHITECTURE RECOMMENDATION 
To protect European Nations and their allies, it is critical to design a BMD system 
that adapts to evolving threats, changing technology, and budget constraints. A European 
BMD system solution cannot depend on an approach that locks into technology for a 
fixed term but is interoperable with the changing environment. Adopting this strategy 
will result in improved ballistic missiles reaching assets that should be protected by aging 
systems. Although there is a diversity of improved ballistic missile defense systems 
today, the challenge is producing and fielding them within a limited timeframe. To satisfy 
the needs of the stakeholders, the EBMD system had to use existing systems with mature 
technology readiness to combat threats to Europe. 
Displaying system performance and life cycle cost in a single analysis tool aided 
in visualizing differences between solutions as well as consideration of system trade-offs. 
Alternative B.3 exhibited the greatest system effectiveness independent of cost, while 
Alternative C presented the most cost-effective solution, independent of system 
performance. Although Alternative B.3 exhibited the highest probability of intercept with 
a fully defended footprint, this alternative also required the highest life cycle cost, 
exceeding the cost of the Baseline system. Alternatives A and C provided system 
effectiveness exceeding the baseline system as well, but at life cycle costs 20.2% to 
36.2% of the Baseline system. However, Alternative C exhibited greater effectiveness of 
both probability of intercept and percent footprint defended at a lower cost than 
Alternative A. Alternatives B.1 and B.2 provided increased performance in probability of 
intercept in comparison to Alternatives A and C, but at an increased life cycle cost. As 
the lowest cost solution while maintaining system effectiveness values exceeding those of 




B. RESEARCH RESULTS 
In Chapter I of this report, five questions were generated to evaluate the EBMD 
problem. The following summarizes answers that were substantiated in the body of the 
report. 
1. What Are The Primary Regional Threats? 
The primary regional threats are Iran and North Korea, which are capable of 
inflicting serious damage to the U.S. or its allies. (Missile Defense Agency 2012c). 
2. What Are The Needs Of The Stakeholders? 
The primary needs of the stakeholders are the ability to engage and neutralize 
threats, and maximize footprint defended while keeping life-cycle cost to a minimum. 
The needs were incorporated into evaluation measures as follows: 
• Probability of intercept, 𝑃𝑖, is the probability of the EBMD system to 
successfully engage a threat.  
• Life Cycle Cost, LCC, is the sum of all recurring and non-recurring costs 
over the full life cycle of the system. 
• Percent Footprint Defended, 𝑃𝑓𝑑, is the ratio of footprint defended area to 
the area intended to be defended. 
3. What Are The Available Solutions? 
Available existing solutions to protect European nations are: Aegis ships, 
THAAD, PAC-3, and AN/TPY2. These are existing systems that fulfill some required 
functionality for BMD. However, none of these are complete solutions to the problem, 
and none can successfully address all of European BMD as standalone systems. 
4. What Are The Existing System Limitations? 
Careful evaluation of the issues in the EBMD domain eventually started to 
suggest three common themes that could be addressed from a systems engineering 
perspective: evolving threats, changing technology, and budget constraints. These 




systems, and required solutions that could be reached using the tools and techniques 
available to a systems engineer. 
Current systems cannot adapt to changing technology because each component 
acts as a standalone solution. The budget suffers from increased cost because the 
components are standalone systems with independent acquisition strategies and varied 
mission requirements. In addition, lacking a systems of systems approach, the existing 
standalone systems cannot effectively adapt as threats are evolving. 
5. What Viable Solutions Can Be Formulated? 
Viable solutions were formulated using existing weapon systems: Aegis ships, 
THAAD, PAC-3, and AN/TPY2. The systems were used to generate a Baseline and 
develop different EBMD Alternatives that performed at least as well as the Baseline. 
Initial experimentation with the PAC-3 interceptor showed its limited range severely 
restricted its effectiveness in the model to intercept the threat missiles. As a result, the 
cohort included the PAC-3 in modeling the Baseline system, but did not use the PAC-3 
when modeling EBMD Alternatives. Alternative C was the preferred viable solution 
which consisted of one Aegis Ashore and one AN/TPY-2 Radar. 
C. FUTURE WORK 
1. Stakeholder Analysis 
Through this research, the cohort learned that MDA is exempt from traditional 
joint requirements determination although they are required to work closely with 
combatant commands when developing capabilities (GAO 2011, 4). The GAO stated the 
lack of clear guidance from presidential policy to senior DoD officials led BMD 
stakeholders to make different assumptions about desired end states (GAO 2011, 12). The 
cohort made numerous attempts to locate stakeholders with no avail; the analysis was 
based solely on document research. Any future work should include coordination with 





2. Threat Analysis 
While the cohort was able to locate research pertaining to the capabilities of Iran’s 
missile types, it was not able to find a definitive source for the number of missiles Iran 
possesses. Actual numbers of the missiles are not publicly provided by the U.S. 
government (GAO 2011, 21). Scenarios were developed to understand the efficacy of 
EBMD system components and provide a set of EBMD Alternatives for analysis while 
remaining in the public domain. Future work should be performed matching EBMD 
Alternatives against best estimates of Iranian missile quantities with the understanding 
the work would not remain in the public domain. 
3. Functional Analysis 
The cohort learned that existing systems can complete all high level functions 
required to defend Turkey from ballistic missiles originating from Iran. Through M&S, 
the cohort determined several architectures have acceptable performance with the 
assumptions made during this project. However, as presented in Chapter VI, a typical 
battle delay for an interceptor would range between 8–20 seconds. The performance level 
begins to drop after 8 seconds and was not even simulated at 20 seconds because of 
degraded performance. Future work should focus on a deeper understanding of the battle 
delay. The BCN was considered outside the system during this project. In addition, BCN 
and communication with decision makers should be explored in future work. Due to the 
lack of resources and system parameters, the timing aspects could not be modeled in 
COREsim. Once a functional analysis is completed, the M&S should be focused on the 
timing aspects to ensure the required functions can be completed in sufficient time to 
allow successful engagements.  
4. Modeling and Simulation 
The M&S phase showed how the functions behaved and provided the data to 
provide a sound recommendation. Limitations were encountered with the particular 




STK. If funds were available, the cohort could have accessed functions such as the STK 
Analyzer to provide additional probability metrics. 
5. LCC 
The LCC presented an opportunity to look at the cost of the various EBMD 
Alternatives. Future cost analysis should also look at currently immature technology that 
could be mature at the end of 10-years. For example the Aegis ships, Aegis Ashore, and 
THAAD are completely dependent on kinetic effectors (missiles) to be effective, 
however, non-kinetic technology such as lasers or electronic warfare, might yield cost-










APPENDIX A.  PROBLEM SPACE EXPLORATION DATA 
The following tables represent data used during the mission needs analysis 
portion of problem space exploration. 
Table 36 lists known Iranian threat missiles with their basic attributes. Those in an 
operational or near-operational state that pose a threat to Turkey were chosen for M&S. 
Korean missiles are included as well for context and because Iranian missiles are largely 
based on Korean technology. 
 









SRBM 210 500 1 Solid Operational 
Shahab 1 SRBM 330 1000 1 Liquid Operational 
Shahab 2 SRBM 700 989 1 Liquid Operational 
Shahab 3 MRBM 1,280 1158 1 Liquid Operational 
Shahab 3 
Variants 
MRBM 2,500 800 1 Liquid/Solid Development 




MRBM 2,500 1000 2 Solid Development 
Ghadr 110 MRBM 1,800 1000 2 Liquid/ Solid Development 
Ghadr 
110A 
MRBM 2,500 1000 3 Liquid/ Solid Development 
Shahab 4 MRBM 2,896 1000 3 Liquid/Solid Development 
Shahab 5 MRBM / 
ICBM 
4,300 1000 3 Liquid/Solid Development 
Shahab 6 ICBM / 
SLV 












IRBM 5,000 750 3 Liquid/Solid Development 
Taepo 
Dong 2  
ICBM 15,000 1000 3 Liquid Development 
Table 36.   Iranian Ballistic Missile Threat Matrix (From George C. Marshall and 
Claremont Institutes 2013a) 
Table 37 lists characteristics of various threat missiles found through research. 









THRUST (kgf) Speed (km/s) HEIGHT (m) WIDTH 
(m) 
Fateh A-110 500    8.9 0.61 
Shahab 1 985 - 1,000 62 - 64 13,000  10.9 0.88 
Shahab 2 750 - 989  --   10.9 0.88 
Shahab 3 760 - 1,158 110 26,000 2.0–2.4 15.5 1.25a 
Shahab 3 
Variants 
800   2.0–2.4 17.0 1.25a 
Sejjil 
Variants 
650 - 1,000    17.6 1.25 
Ghadr 110 650 - 1,000 107–121   15.9  
Ghadr 110A 650 - 1,000      
Shahab 4 250 - 1,000 293 26,000    
Shahab 5 700 - 1,000 120/110/100 104,000/13,000/UNK    
Shahab 6 500 - 1,000      
Table 37.   Physical Characteristics of Iranian Ballistic Missile Threats 
Table 38 lists the five most-populous cities in Turkey. This table was used to 
determine potential high-value targets for Iran. The two largest cities were used in the 
M&S effort as the likeliest targets. 
 
City Distance from Tabriz (km) Coordinates Range Threat 
Istanbul 1518 41.040871°N, 28.986179°E MRBM 
Ankara 1180 39.866667°N, 32.866667°E MRBM 
Izmir 1676 38.4333° N, 27.1500° E  MRBM 
Bursa 1507 40.1833° N, 29.0500° E  MRBM 
Adana 976 37.0000° N, 35.3167° E SRBM 
Table 38.   Five most-populous cities in Turkey with coordinates and distances from 
Tabriz (From Butler 2009) 
Table 39 lists those locations in Turkey and Europe of military importance. These 
were listed to determine possible targets for Iranian missiles. Kürecik, the location of the 
AN/TPY-2 radar, was chosen as a prime target for Iran as it provides missile detection 
capability for most of western Iran. 
 
Item Country City Distance from Tabriz (km) Coordinates 
U.S. Air Base Turkey Incirlik 470 37.0019° N, 35.4258° E 
U.S. X-band radar Turkey Kürecik 750 38.0667° N, 38.0167° E 
PAC-3, Dutch Turkey Gaziantep 794 37.0667° N, 37.3833° E 
PAC-3, German Turkey Kahramanmaras 850 37.5833° N, 36.9333° E 
PAC-3, U.S. Turkey Adana 976 37.0000° N, 35.3167° E 
U.S. Naval Support Activity Greece Crete (Souda Bay) 1,999 35.2100° N, 24.9100° E 
EUCOM HQ Germany Stuttgart-Vaihingen 3,188 48.7767° N, 9.1775° E 
Ramstein Air Base Germany Remscheid 3,370 49.4375° N, 7.6014° E 
Table 39.   Selected Military Locations within European NATO Countries and Allies 




Cities or other locations in Iran that are known to support missile development or 
launch capabilities are listed in Table 40. These were listed to identify where threat 
missiles were coming from, and is useful for discerning ranges and targets. It was also 
critical for the IFT DAF scenarios to know from where a missile was launched so as to 
determine its targetable range. 
 
Launch Location City Coordinates Missile Type Usage 
Tabriz Missile Base Tabriz 38.0833° N, 46.2833° E Shahab-3 Silo Launcher 
Imam Ali Missile Base Khorramabad 33.4667° N, 48.3500° E Shahab-3 Silo Launcher 
Qom Space Center Qom 34.65000°N 50.90000°E Shahab-3 Space Testing 
Emamshahr Space Center Shahrud 36.42000°N 55.02000°E Shahab-3 Space Testing 
Semnan Missile Complex Semnan 36.00000°N 54.00000°E All Test Range and Production  
Table 40.   Iranian Ballistic Missile Launch Locations (From The Nuclear Threat 











APPENDIX B.  MODELING AND SIMULATION ANALYSIS DATA 
The following tables were used during M&S to construct simulations and 
scenarios. Table 41 and Table 42 show the parameters of various IFT simulations 
performed for 1VM and DAF scenarios, respectively. In each table, each row represents a 
different scenario. 
For the 1VM scenarios in Table 41, the first column represents how many threat 
missiles were modeled. The second through fourth columns represent how many of each 
type of interceptor battery were included. The fifth column represents the range of battle 
delays modeled, where a new simulation was performed for each of the values in the 
range. The sixth column represents the percentage of the threat missiles hit at different 
battle delay values. The seventh and eighth columns contain text entered by the modeler 














Success? Case Notes 
1 2 0 0 8 - 14 100% @ 8s,  
0%@ 9s” 
S1 For all Baselines, only 1 Aegis is engaging 
35.6x32.5 to 36.0x33.8 Lat/Long 
2 2 0 0 8–9 100% @ 8s, 
 0%@ 9s 
S3  
2 2 0 0 8–9 100% @ 8s, 
 0%@ 9s 
S4  
10 2 0 0 8–16 100% @ 4s,  
80 % @ 6s,  
60% @ 8s, 
 40 % @ 10–
16s 
S5 Incirlik missiles intercepted better 
3 1 0 0 8–16 100% @ 8s, 
66% @ 9–
16s, Aegis-Med 
Questionable on why third cannot be hit. 
Aegis in NE Med 
3 1 0 0 16–20 
100% @ 20s 
Aegis-
BlkSea Aegis in SE Black Sea. 
3 0 0 1 8–16 33 % THAAD1 Kürecik. Sejils fly too high for THAAD 




Spread across Turkey’s East border, but got 
no hits. Not even when moving to SRM-350 
interceptor 
3 0 0 1 0–16 0–33% 
THAAD-
East Turkey 
Tried many locations around E. Turkey. Best 
I could do was to shoot down the Shahab. 
Altitude on Sejils too high. I also tried with 
the SRM-350 and was able to shoot down 
one of the Sejils also, bringing me to 66% 




With the DAF scenarios, IFT tries to defend each grid point in a defined footprint, 
and the results are shown in Table 42. The first through third columns represent how 
many of each type of interceptor battery were included. The fourth column represents the 
range of battle delays modeled (with each a new simulation performed for each of the 
values in the range). The fifth column represents the percentage of grid points defended. 
The sixth and seventh columns contain text entered by the modeler to distinguish 











Success?  Notes 
1 0 0 8–14 63.5% DAF-Aegis-Med-Sejil Get the 7 western grid points. Using MRI-
1100 int.  
1 0 0 14 69.8% DAF-Aegis-BlkSea-Sejil Used 1 degree granularity and Sejil2 missile 
2 0 0 8–14 84.1% Combined Aegis-Sejil Calculated by summing the grid points 
covered by each Aegis DAF scenario. 
1 0 0 14 65.8% DAF-Aegis-Med-Shahab Used the SRM3 missile 
1 0 0 14 69.7% DAF-Aegis-BlkSea-Shahab Used the SRM3 missile 
1 0 0 14 72.4% Combined Aegis-Shahab Used the SRM3 missile 
0 0 1 8 23.4% DAF-THAAD-Shahab THAAD interceptor at 39.347 x 41.4 
2 0 1 8–14 88.2% Combined Aegis-Shahab + 
THAAD 
 
2 0 1 14 89.8% All Combined See Sheet 3 for filtering of grid points 
2 0 2 8,14 89.8% DAF-2THAAD-Shahab_[AB] THAAD interceptor A at 40.211x40.0 and B 
at 38.222x40.0 
2 0 2 8,14 96.6% DAF-2THAAD-Shahab_[CD] THAAD interceptor C at 40.211x41.4 and D 
at 38.222x41.4 
2 0 2 8,14 95.5% DAF-2THAAD-Shahab_[EF] THAAD interceptor E at 40.0x41.4 and F at 
37.7x41.4 
2 0 2 8,14 95.5% DAF-2THAAD-Shahab_[GH] THAAD interceptor G at 40.0x42.3 and H at 
37.7x42.3 
2 0 2 8,14 96.6% DAF-2THAAD-Shahab_[IJ] THAAD interceptor I at 39.25x42.4 and J at 
38.0x39.2 
2 0 3 8,14 100.0% DAF-3THAAD-Shahab THAAD interceptor C at 40.211x41.4 and D 
at 38.222x41.4 and E at 37.0x37.9 
1 0 0 10 100.0% DAF-Aegis-Ashore Aegis Ashore at 38.35x41.3, tested 100% 
coverage on both Shahab and Sejil grids. 
Table 42.   Results of Varied IFT DAF Scenarios 
Table 43 is sample IFT data, tabulated and merged from multiple DAF scenarios. 
The first two columns represent targetable grid points by the Sejil and Shahab missiles. 
These are combined, with duplicates removed, in column 3. Column 4 shows the subset 
of points that are defensible and column 5 shows those that are not. Column 5 shows the 





Sejil Shahab Unique 
Combined 
Defended Undefended % Defended 
36.1670 32.9032 36.1670 32.9032 36.1670 32.9032 36.1670 32.9032 36.8640 36.7742 0.897727273 
36.8640 29.0323 36.8640 30.3226 36.8640 29.0323 36.8640 29.0323 36.8640 38.0645  
36.8640 30.3226 36.8640 31.6129 36.8640 30.3226 36.8640 30.3226 36.8640 39.3548  
36.8640 31.6129 36.8640 32.9032 36.8640 31.6129 36.8640 31.6129 37.5611 41.9355  
36.8640 32.9032 36.8640 34.1935 36.8640 32.9032 36.8640 32.9032 37.5611 43.2258  
36.8640 34.1935 36.8640 35.4839 36.8640 34.1935 36.8640 34.1935 38.2581 43.2258  
36.8640 35.4839 36.8640 36.7742 36.8640 35.4839 36.8640 35.4839 38.9552 40.6452  
36.8640 36.7742 36.8640 38.0645 36.8640 36.7742 37.5611 27.7419 40.3493 43.2258  
36.8640 38.0645 36.8640 39.3548 36.8640 38.0645 37.5611 29.0323 41.0464 43.2258  
37.5611 27.7419 37.5611 30.3226 36.8640 39.3548 37.5611 30.3226   
37.5611 29.0323 37.5611 31.6129 37.5611 27.7419 37.5611 31.6129   
37.5611 30.3226 37.5611 32.9032 37.5611 29.0323 37.5611 32.9032   
37.5611 31.6129 37.5611 34.1935 37.5611 30.3226 37.5611 34.1935   
37.5611 32.9032 37.5611 35.4839 37.5611 31.6129 37.5611 35.4839   
37.5611 34.1935 37.5611 36.7742 37.5611 32.9032 37.5611 36.7742   
37.5611 35.4839 37.5611 38.0645 37.5611 34.1935 37.5611 38.0645   
37.5611 36.7742 37.5611 39.3548 37.5611 35.4839 37.5611 39.3548   
37.5611 38.0645 37.5611 40.6452 37.5611 36.7742 37.5611 40.6452   
38.2581 26.4516 37.5611 41.9355 37.5611 38.0645 38.2581 26.4516   
38.2581 27.7419 37.5611 43.2258 37.5611 39.3548 38.2581 27.7419   
38.2581 29.0323 38.2581 30.3226 37.5611 40.6452 38.2581 29.0323   
38.2581 30.3226 38.2581 31.6129 37.5611 41.9355 38.2581 30.3226   
38.2581 31.6129 38.2581 32.9032 37.5611 43.2258 38.2581 31.6129   
38.2581 32.9032 38.2581 34.1935 38.2581 26.4516 38.2581 32.9032   
38.2581 34.1935 38.2581 35.4839 38.2581 27.7419 38.2581 34.1935   
38.2581 35.4839 38.2581 36.7742 38.2581 29.0323 38.2581 35.4839   
38.2581 36.7742 38.2581 38.0645 38.2581 30.3226 38.2581 36.7742   
38.2581 38.0645 38.2581 39.3548 38.2581 31.6129 38.2581 38.0645   
38.9552 27.7419 38.2581 40.6452 38.2581 32.9032 38.2581 39.3548   
38.9552 29.0323 38.2581 41.9355 38.2581 34.1935 38.2581 40.6452   
38.9552 30.3226 38.2581 43.2258 38.2581 35.4839 38.2581 41.9355   
38.9552 31.6129 38.9552 30.3226 38.2581 36.7742 38.9552 27.7419   
38.9552 32.9032 38.9552 31.6129 38.2581 38.0645 38.9552 29.0323   
38.9552 34.1935 38.9552 32.9032 38.2581 39.3548 38.9552 30.3226   
38.9552 35.4839 38.9552 34.1935 38.2581 40.6452 38.9552 31.6129   
38.9552 36.7742 38.9552 35.4839 38.2581 41.9355 38.9552 32.9032   
38.9552 38.0645 38.9552 36.7742 38.2581 43.2258 38.9552 34.1935   
39.6523 26.4516 38.9552 38.0645 38.9552 27.7419 38.9552 35.4839   
39.6523 27.7419 38.9552 39.3548 38.9552 29.0323 38.9552 36.7742   
39.6523 29.0323 38.9552 40.6452 38.9552 30.3226 38.9552 38.0645   
39.6523 30.3226 38.9552 41.9355 38.9552 31.6129 38.9552 39.3548   
39.6523 31.6129 38.9552 43.2258 38.9552 32.9032 38.9552 41.9355   
39.6523 32.9032 39.6523 30.3226 38.9552 34.1935 38.9552 43.2258   
39.6523 34.1935 39.6523 31.6129 38.9552 35.4839 39.6523 26.4516   
39.6523 35.4839 39.6523 32.9032 38.9552 36.7742 39.6523 27.7419   
39.6523 36.7742 39.6523 34.1935 38.9552 38.0645 39.6523 29.0323   
39.6523 38.0645 39.6523 35.4839 38.9552 39.3548 39.6523 30.3226   
40.3493 29.0323 39.6523 36.7742 38.9552 40.6452 39.6523 31.6129   
40.3493 30.3226 39.6523 38.0645 38.9552 41.9355 39.6523 32.9032   
40.3493 31.6129 39.6523 39.3548 38.9552 43.2258 39.6523 34.1935   
40.3493 32.9032 39.6523 40.6452 39.6523 26.4516 39.6523 35.4839   
40.3493 34.1935 39.6523 41.9355 39.6523 27.7419 39.6523 36.7742   
40.3493 35.4839 39.6523 43.2258 39.6523 29.0323 39.6523 38.0645   
40.3493 36.7742 40.3493 30.3226 39.6523 30.3226 39.6523 39.3548   
40.3493 38.0645 40.3493 31.6129 39.6523 31.6129 39.6523 40.6452   
41.0464 30.3226 40.3493 32.9032 39.6523 32.9032 39.6523 41.9355   
41.0464 31.6129 40.3493 34.1935 39.6523 34.1935 39.6523 43.2258   
41.0464 32.9032 40.3493 35.4839 39.6523 35.4839 40.3493 29.0323   
41.0464 34.1935 40.3493 36.7742 39.6523 36.7742 40.3493 30.3226   
41.0464 35.4839 40.3493 38.0645 39.6523 38.0645 40.3493 31.6129   




Sejil Shahab Unique 
Combined 
Defended Undefended % Defended 
41.7434 32.9032 40.3493 40.6452 39.6523 40.6452 40.3493 34.1935   
41.7434 34.1935 40.3493 41.9355 39.6523 41.9355 40.3493 35.4839   
 40.3493 43.2258 39.6523 43.2258 40.3493 36.7742   
 41.0464 30.3226 40.3493 29.0323 40.3493 38.0645   
 41.0464 31.6129 40.3493 30.3226 40.3493 39.3548   
 41.0464 32.9032 40.3493 31.6129 40.3493 40.6452   
 41.0464 34.1935 40.3493 32.9032 40.3493 41.9355   
 41.0464 35.4839 40.3493 34.1935 41.0464 30.3226   
 41.0464 36.7742 40.3493 35.4839 41.0464 31.6129   
 41.0464 39.3548 40.3493 36.7742 41.0464 32.9032   
 41.0464 40.6452 40.3493 38.0645 41.0464 34.1935   
 41.0464 41.9355 40.3493 39.3548 41.0464 35.4839   
 41.0464 43.2258 40.3493 40.6452 41.0464 36.7742   
 41.7434 32.9032 40.3493 41.9355 41.0464 39.3548   
 41.7434 34.1935 40.3493 43.2258 41.0464 40.6452   
  41.0464 30.3226 41.0464 41.9355   
  41.0464 31.6129 41.7434 32.9032   
  41.0464 32.9032 41.7434 34.1935   
  41.0464 34.1935    
  41.0464 35.4839    
  41.0464 36.7742    
  41.0464 39.3548    
  41.0464 40.6452    
  41.0464 41.9355    
  41.0464 43.2258    
  41.7434 32.9032    
  41.7434 34.1935    




APPENDIX C.  MODELING AND SIMULATION SCRIPT DETAILS 
This appendix holds the contents of two BASH scripts used to analyze the IFT 
XML output from DAF scenarios. 
The first file, called compare.sh, takes as arguments two IFT DAF scenario output 
files and determines if any of the missed grid points from the first file are covered in the 
second file. If so, it re-computes the hit percentage, providing the ability to check the 
effectiveness of multiple interceptor batteries. 
#!/bin/bash 
# This script takes as arguments two IFT XML files (those with a .ift 
extension). 
# The script checks to see if the second file covers any grid points missed 
by the 
# first file and if so, it recomputes the hit percentage. 
# Cameron Harr, April 2013 
 




numgrids=$(egrep.exe “^ [0–9]+\..*” $infile| wc -l) 
falsecount=0 
plus=0 
declare -a missarray=0 
index=0 
 
for i in `egrep.exe “^ [0–9]+\..*” $infile|grep false|awk ‘{print $3}’| \ 
          cut -d’G’ -f2`; do 
     gridpoint=$i 
     if [[ “$gridpoint” != ““ ]]; then 
          falsecount=$((falsecount+1)) 
          #echo “gridpoint: $gridpoint” 
          grep $gridpoint $comparefile | grep true | grep -v false 
>/dev/null 
          if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then 
               plus=$((plus + 1)) 
          else 
               templl=““ 
               templl=$(grep $gridpoint $infile|grep false|awk ‘{print $1” 
“$2}’) 
               #echo $templl 
               missarray[$index]=“$templl” 
               index=$((index+1)) 
          fi 
     fi 
done 
count=$((numgrids-falsecount)) 




echo “Orginal hit %: $hit%” 
echo “Added $plus grids” 
count=$((count+plus)) 
hit=$(awk ‘BEGIN { print ‘$count’*100/’$numgrids’ }’) 
echo “Combined hit %: $hit%” 
echo “Missed grid points:” 





The second file, called filtermisses.sh, takes as an argument a regular expression 
that includes all IFT DAF scenario files the user wishes to analyze. The script then 
determines all the unique grid points in the area and determines the percentage of those 
grid points covered and their layers of coverage. This was used to test multiple 
interceptor systems with multiple threat missiles all at the same time. 
#!/bin/bash 
# This script takes as an argument a regular expression (in quotes) to 
include 
# multiple IFT DAF output XML files (those with a .ift extension). The 
script 
# analyzes all the files included and determines all unique grid points. It 
# then determines which of those grid points are defended by interceptors 
and 
# computes the percentage of the area covered. It also outputs how many 
layers 
# of coverage each grid point has to a .csv file. 
# One can use this to analyze IFT scenarios with multiple missile types and 
# multiple interceptors all at once to see how well an entire region is 
covered. 
# Cameron Harr, April 2013 
 
 







didx=0 #dup index 
lidx=0 #line index 
midx=0 #miss index 
declare -a allpoints 
declare -a dups 
declare -a missedpoints 
 
# Set for loop delimiter at newline 
IFS=$(echo -en “\n\b”) 
 




for point in $(egrep.exe -h “^ [0–9]+\..*” $filter | grep true | sort| \ 
               awk ‘{print $1”  “$2}’ | uniq); do 
     allpoints[aidx]=$point 




# Then collect all the misses, sort and filter duplicates 
for point in $(egrep.exe -h “^ [0–9]+\..*” $filter | grep false | sort| \ 
               awk ‘{print $1”  “$2}’ | uniq); do 
     missedpoints[midx]=$point 




# Collect duplicate “hit” grid points 
for point in $(egrep.exe -h “^ [0–9]+\..*” $filter | grep true | sort| \ 
               awk ‘{print $1”  “$2}’ | uniq -D); do 
     dups[dupidx]=$point 
     dupidx=$((dupidx+1)) 
done 
 
echo “Processing layers of coverage...” 
# Blank the duplicate file then write out duplicates 
>$dupfile 
for point in `seq 0 $((dupidx-1))`; do 
     #echo ${dups[point]} 
     if [[ ${dups[point]} == ${dups[point+1]} ]]; then 
          dupcount=$((dupcount+1)) 
          #echo $dupcount 
     else 
          echo -n ${dups[point]} | sed -e ‘s/  /,/g’ >> $dupfile 
          echo ,”$dupcount” >> $dupfile 
          dupcount=1 
     fi 
done 
 
# For each miss, see if there was a hit for it elsewhere 
echo Missed Points: 
for i in `seq 0 $((nummissed-1))`; do 
     #echo “if ! grep \”${missedpoints[$i]}\” *-S*.ift | grep -v false ; 
then” 
     if grep “${missedpoints[$i]}” $filter| grep -v false >/dev/null; then 
          nummissed=$((nummissed-1)); 
     else 
          echo ${missedpoints[$i]} 
     fi 
done 
 
numhit=$((numall - nummissed)) 
phit=$(awk ‘BEGIN { print ‘$numhit’*100/’$numall’ }’) 
 
echo 










APPENDIX D.  LIFE-CYCLE COST ANALYSIS DATA 
The following tables were used to construct the cost models for the EBMD 
Alternatives. Source cost data for Table 44 through Table 71 came from the 2012 Budget 
Report of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense 2012). 
Table 44 was used to derive the R&D costs for the Aegis Ashore component. The 
years were staggered to reflect the length of time for the respective phase of the 
component development to commence, complete, and enter the next development phase, 
keeping in mind that all components saw identical phases and a 10-year life span. 
 
Program Activity Year 1 Year 2 Estimate Totals  Notes 
Government 
System Management $136,771 $142,242 $279,013 1 GS14 (opm.gov) 
Systems Engineering $415,742 $432,372 $848,114 1 GS13, 2 GS12s 
Product Research & Design  $150,000 $156,000 $306,000 2 GS12s 
System T&E $150,000 $156,000 $306,000 2 GS12s 
Contractor 
System Management $140,000 $145,600 $285,600  
Product Research, Planning, and Design $53,230,000 $55,359,200 $108,589,200 1 Aegis Ashore (v3.6.1), 1 SM-3 
BlkIIB, 1 SM-3 BlkIIA 
System Documentation $70,000 $72,800 $142,800 1 Employee @ $70k 
System T&E $140,000 $145,600 $285,600 2 Employees @ $70k (Contractor 
will determine personnel, estimate 
will be adjusted according to 
contractor’s proposal) 
Total R&D Costs $54,432,513 $56,609,814 $111,042,327  
Table 44.   Aegis Ashore R&D Costs 
Table 45 lists the values used to derive the production and construction costs for 
the Aegis Ashore component. These activities were used to estimate the costs to build the 





Program Activity Year Estimate Totals Notes 
2 3 4 
Government 
System  Management $137,771 $143,282 $149,013 $430,066 1 GS14 
Contractor 
System Management $130,000 $135,200 $140,608 $405,808   
Manufacturing  
Recurring $389,623,000 $405,207,920 $421,416,237 $1,216,247,157 Assuming 29 
Interceptors/yr, 3 
SM-3 BlkIB 
Nonrecurring $31,010,000     $31,010,000 1 AegisBMD 
(v3.6.1) 
Quality Control $124,000 $128,960 $134,118 $387,078 1 QA 
Initial Logistical Support 
Supply Support $71,300,000     $71,300,000 Initial Spare = 1 
Operational Aegis, 
1 AegisBMD 




$150,000   $0 $150,000 Shipping and 
Handling 
Technical Data $87,000 $90,480 $94,099 $271,579   
Personnel, Equipment, and 
Training 
$1,020,000 $1,060,800 $103,232 $2,184,032   
Total P&C Costs $493,581,771 $406,766,642 $422,037,308 $1,322,385,720   
Table 45.   Aegis Ashore Production and Construction Costs 
Table 46 lists the values used to derive the O&S costs for the Aegis Ashore 
component. The following activities were used to estimate the costs to operate and 
provide operational support for the Aegis Ashore and what type of work/personnel was 













$137,771 $143,281 $149,013 $154,973 $161,172 $167,619 $174,324 $181,297 $1,269,453 
Operating 
Personnel2 
$905,652 $941,878 $979,553 $1,018,735 $1,059,485 $1,101,864 $1,145,939 $1,191,776 $8,344,882 
Unscheduled 
Maintenance3 
$25,000 $25,000 $26,000 $27,040 $28,122 $29,246 $30,416 $31,633 $222,457 
Maintenance 
Facilities 
$0 $0 $7,000 $7,001 $7,002 $7,003 $7,004 $7,284 $42,294 
Supply 
Support4 








$1,000,000   $1,040,000 $0 $1,081,600 $0 $1,124,864 $1,169,859 $5,416,323 
Transportation 
and Handling 





$441,173,333 $457,989,984 $477,743,140 $496,220,852 $517,884,652 $538,600,038 $2,933,942,581 
Notes 
1 1 GS14 
2 Aegis Cost Estimate as it was used as the template (Sources: 
http://www.dfas.mil/militarymembers/payentilements/militarypaytables.html,http://navysite.de/cg/cg47class.htm, 
http://www.navycs.com/2013-military-pay-chart.html#enlisted-paycharts). 
Costs include 30 E-4s@$24972, and 3 O-2s@$52164 (1/10th the manpower of an Aegis ship). 
3 General PM performed 
4 Assuming 29 Interceptors/yr, SM-3 BlkIB 
5 10 Personnel @ $48k (Personnel work for 10 years) 
Table 46.   Aegis Ashore O&S Costs 
Table 47 lists the values used to derive the disposal costs for the Aegis Ashore 
component. The following activities were used to estimate the costs to dismantle and 
dispose of the Aegis Ashore and what type of work/personnel was included in the 
accounting. 
 
Program Activity Year 11 Estimate Totals Notes 
Government 
Program Engineer $89,846 $89,846 1 GS-12 
Support Personnel  $120,000 $120,000 5 E-4 Personnel @ $24k 
Support Equipment $25,000 $25,000   
Facilities $7,000 $7,000   
Contractor 
Support Personnel $120,000 $120,000 5 E-4 Personnel @ $24k 
Support Equipment   $0   
Technical Data $70,000 $70,000 1 Employee @ $70k 
Transportation and Handling    $0   
Total Disposal Costs $431,846 $431,846  
Table 47.   Aegis Ashore Disposal Costs 
Table 48 was used to derive the R&D costs for the Aegis ship component. The 




component development to commence, complete, and enter the next development phase, 
keeping in mind that all components saw identical phases and a 10-year life span. 
 
Program Activity Year 1 Year 2 Estimate Totals  Notes 
Government 
System Management $136,771 $142,241 $279,012 1 GS14 
Systems Engineering $415,742 $432,372 $848,114 1 GS13, 2 GS12s 
Product Research & Design  $150,000 $156,000 $306,000 2 GS12s 
System T&E $150,000 $156,000 $306,000 2 GS12s 
Contractor 
System Management $140,000 $145,600 $285,600   
Product Research, Planning, and Design $53,230,000 $55,359,200 $108,589,200 1 AegisBMD (v3.6.1), 1 SM-3 
BlkIIB, 1 SM-3 BlkIIA 
System Documentation $70,000 $72,800 $142,800 1 Employee @ $70k 
System T&E $350,000 $364,000 $714,000 2 Employees @ $70k (Contractor 
will determine personnel, estimate 
will be adjusted according to 
contractor’s proposal) 
Total R&D Costs $54,642,513 $56,828,213 $111,470,726  
Table 48.   Aegis R&D Costs 
Table 49 lists the values used to derive the production and construction costs for 
the Aegis ship component. These activities were used to estimate the costs to build the 
Aegis ships and what type of work/personnel was included in the accounting. 
 
Program Activity Year Estimate Totals Notes 
2 3 4 
Government 
System  Management $137,771 $143,281 $149,013 $430,065 1 GS14 
Contractor 
System Management $130,000 $135,200 $140,608 $405,808   
Manufacturing  
Recurring $389,623,000 $405,207,920 $421,416,236 $1,216,247,156 Assuming 29 
Interceptors/yr, 3 
SM-3 BlkIB 
Nonrecurring $31,010,000     $31,010,000 1 AegisBMD 
(v3.6.1) 
Quality Control $124,000 $128,960 $134,118 $387,078 1 QA 
Initial Logistical Support 
Supply Support $71,300,000     $71,300,000 Initial Spare = 1 
Operational Aegis, 
1 AegisBMD 




$150,000 $156,000 $162,240 $468,240 Shipping and 
Handling 
Technical Data $87,000 $90,480 $94,099 $271,579   
Personnel, Equipment, and 
Training 
$1,040,000 $1,081,600 $124,864 $2,246,464   
Total P&C Costs $493,601,771 $406,943,441 $422,221,179 $1,322,766,392   




Table 50 lists the values used to derive the O&S costs for the Aegis ships 
component. These activities were used to estimate the costs to operate and provide 
operational support for the Aegis ships. 
Table 50.   Aegis O&S Costs 
Table 51 lists the values used to derive the disposal costs for the Aegis ships 
component. These activities were used to estimate the costs to dismantle and dispose of 
the Aegis ships and what type of work/personnel was included in the accounting. 
 
Program Activity Year 11 Estimate Totals Notes 
Government 
Program Engineer $89,846 $89,846 1 GS-12 
Support Personnel  $120,000 $120,000 5 E-4s@$24k 
Support Equipment $150,000 $150,000   
Facilities $7,000 $7,000   
Contractor 
Support Personnel $120,000 $120,000 5 E-4s@$24k 
Support Equipment   $0   
Technical Data $70,000 $70,000 1 Employee@$70k 
Transportation and Handling  $150,000 $150,000   
Total Disposal Costs $706,846 $706,846   








$137,771 $143,281 $149,013 $154,973 $161,172 $167,619 $174,324 $181,297 $1,269,453 
Operating 
Personnel2 
$9,056,520 $9,418,781 $9,795,532 $10,187,353 $10,594,847 $11,018,641 $11,459,387 $11,917,762 $83,448,824 
Unscheduled 
Maintenance3 
$25,000 $25,000 $26,000 $27,040 $28,122 $29,246 $30,416 $31,633 $222,457 
Maintenance 
Facilities 
$0 $0 $7,000 $7,001 $7,002 $7,003 $7,004 $7,005 $56,015 
Supply 
Support4 








$1,000,000   $1,040,000 $0 $1,081,600 $0 $1,124,864 $1,169,859 $4,246,464 
Transportation 
and Handling 
                $150,000 
Total O&S 
Costs 
$10,856,291 $10,266,063 $449,989,311 $467,158,602 $487,278,502 $506,137,629 $528,198,101 $548,155,887 $3,008,040,385 
Notes 
1 1 GS14 
2 1 Aegis ship Crew (Sources: http://navysite.de/cg/cg47class.htm, http://www.navycs.com/2013-military-pay-
chart.html#enlisted-paycharts) 
Costs include 300 E-4s@$24972, and 30 O-2s@$52164. 
3 General PM performed 
4 Assuming 29 Interceptors/yr, SM-3 BlkIB 




Table 52 was used to derive the R&D costs for the THAAD component. The 
years were staggered to reflect the length of time for the respective phase of the 
component development to commence, complete, and enter the next development phase, 
keeping in mind that all components saw identical phases and a 10-year life span. 
 




System Management $136,771 $142,241 $279,012 1 GS14 
Systems Engineering $415,742 $432,372 $848,114 1 GS13, 2 GS12s 
Product Research & Design  $150,000 $156,000 $306,000 2 GS12s 
System T&E $150,000 $156,000 $306,000 2 GS12s 
Contractor 
System Management $140,000 $145,600 $285,600   
Product Research, Planning, and Design $14,836,900 $15,430,376 $30,267,276 1 THAAD Battery & Trade 
Techs/($50/hr) 
System Documentation $70,000 $72,800 $142,800 1 Employee @ $70k 
System T&E $350,000 $364,000 $714,000 2 Employees @ $70k 
(Contractor will determine 
personnel, estimate will be 
adjusted according to 
contractor’s proposal) 
Total R&D Costs $16,249,413 $16,899,389 $33,148,802  
Table 52.   THAAD R&D Costs 
Table 53 lists the values used to derive the production and construction costs for 
the THAAD component. 
 
Program Activity Year Estimate Totals Notes 
2 3 4 
Government 
System Management $137,771 $143,281 $149,013 $430,065 1 GS14 
Contractor 
System Management $130,000 $135,200 $140,608 $405,808   
Manufacturing  
Recurring Costs $614,307,000 $638,879,280 $664,434,451 $1,917,620,731 Assuming 48 
interceptors/yr,  
Nonrecurring Costs $15,000,000     $15,000,000 1 THAAD Battery 
Quality Control $124,000 $128,960 $134,118 $387,078 1 QA 
Initial Logistical Support 





$150,000     $150,000 Shipping and 
Handling 
Technical Data $87,000 $90,480 $94,099 $271,579   
Personnel and Training $9,442,000 $9,819,680   $19,261,680   
Total P&C Costs $735,224,771 $748,877,761 $664,952,289 $2,149,054,822  




Table 54 lists the values used to derive the O&S costs for the THAAD 
component. These activities were used to estimate the costs to operate and provide 










$137,771 $143,281 $149,013 $154,973 $161,172 $167,619 $174,324 $181,297 $1,269,453 
Operating 
Personnel2 
$530,640 $551,866 $573,940 $596,898 $620,774 $645,605 $671,429 $698,286 $4,889,437 
Unscheduled 
Maintenance3 
$130,000 $135,200 $140,608 $146,232 $152,081 $158,164 $164,491 $171,071 $1,197,849 
Maintenance 
Facilities 
$25,000 $26,000 $27,040 $28,121 $29,246 $30,416 $31,632 $32,898 $230,355 
Supply 
Support4 








$1,927,000 $2,004,080 $2,084,243 $2,167,612 $2,254,317 $2,344,490 $2,438,269 $2,535,800 $17,755,814 
Transportation 
and Handling 
$150,000               $150,000. 
Total O&S 
Costs 
$12,342,411 $12,680,107 $704,199,141 $732,367,107 $761,661,791 $792,128,263 $823,813,393 $856,765,929 $4,695,958,141 
Notes 
1 1 GS14 
2 1 THAAD Crew (20 personnel) (Sources: http://www.military-today.com/missiles/thaad.htm, 
http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/docops/fm44–100–
2fd/chapter4.htm,http://www.militaryfactory.com/military_pay_scale.asp) 
Costs include 18 E-4s@$24972, 1 E-5@$28980 and 1 O-2@$52164. 
3 General PM performed 
4 Assuming 29 Interceptors/yr, SM-3 BlkIB 
5 10 Personnel @ $45k ea (Personnel work for 10 years) 
Table 54.   THAAD O&S Costs 
Table 55 lists the values used to derive the disposal costs for the THAAD 
component. These activities were used to estimate the costs to dismantle and dispose of 





Program Activity Year 11 Estimate Totals   
Government 
Program Engineer $89,846 $89,846 1 GS-12 
Support Personnel  $120,000 $120,000 5 E-4s@$24k 
Support Equipment $30,000 $30,000   
Facilities $20,000 $20,000   
Contractor 
Support Personnel $120,000 $120,000 5 E-4s@$24k 
Support Equipment   $0.00   
Technical Data $70,000 $70,000 1 Employee @ $70k 
Transportation and Handling  $150,000 $150,000   
Total Disposal Costs $599,846 $599,846   
Table 55.   THAAD Disposal Costs 
Table 56 was used to derive the R&D costs for the AN/TPY-2 component. The 
years were staggered to reflect the length of time for the respective phase of the 
component development to commence, complete, and enter the next development phase, 
keeping in mind that all components saw identical phases and a 10-year life span. 
 




System Management $136,771 $142,241 $279,012 1 GS14 
Systems Engineering $415,742 $432,372 $848,114 1 GS13, 2 GS12s 
Product Research & Design  $150,000 $156,000 $306,000 2 GS12s 
System T&E $150,000 $156,000 $306,000 2 GS12s 
Contractor 
System Management $140,000 $145,600 $285,600   
Product Research, Planning, and Design $347,000,000 $360,880,000 $707,880,000 1 AN/TPY-2/yr 
System Documentation $70,000 $72,800 $142,800 1 Employee@$70k 
System T&E $140,000 $145,600 $285,600 2 Employees@$70k (Contractor 
will determine personnel, estimate 
will be adjusted according to 
contractor’s proposal) 
Total R&D Costs $348,202,513 $362,130,613 $710,333,126  
Table 56.   AN/TPY-2 R&D Costs 
Table 57 lists the values used to derive the production and construction costs for 
the AN/TPY-2 component. These activities were used to estimate the costs to build the 





Program Activity Year Estimate 
Totals 
Notes 
2 3 4 
Government 
System  Management $137,771 $143,281 $149,013 $430,065 1 GS14 
Contractor 
System Management $130,000 $135,200 $140,608 $405,808   
Manufacturing  
Recurring Costs $10,000,000 $10,400,000 $10,816,000 $31,216,000 Assuming 1 spare/yr,  
Nonrecurring Costs $217,244,000     $217,244,000 1 AN/TPY-2 Radar 
Quality Control $124,000 $128,960 $134,118 $387,078 1 QA 
Initial Logistical Support 




Prime Power Units, 
Prime Power Units 
X2/Radar 
Transportation and Handling $150,000 $156,000 $162,240 $468,240 Shipping and Handling 
Technical Data $87,000 $90,480 $94,099 $271,579  
Personnel, Equipment, and 
Training 
$1,040,000     $1,040,000  
Total P&C Costs $302,852,771 $11,053,921 $11,496,078 $325,402,771  
Table 57.   AN/TPY-2 Production and Construction Costs 
Table 58 lists the values used to derive the O&S costs for the AN/TPY-2 
component. These activities were used to estimate the costs to operate and provide 













$137,771 $143,281 $149,013 $154,973 $161,172 $167,619 $174,324 $181,297 $1,269,453 
Operating 
Personnel2 
$1,080,024 $1,123,225 $1,168,154 $1,214,880 $1,263,475 $1,314,014 $1,366,575 $1,421,238 $9,951,586 
Unscheduled 
Maintenance 
$100,000 $104,000 $104,000 $108,160 $108,160 $112,486 $112,486 $116,985 $866,278 
Maintenance 
Facilities3 
$25,000 $26,000 $26,000 $27,040 $27,040 $28,121 $28,121 $29,246 $216,569 
Supply 
Support4 








$1,000,000       $350,000       $1,350,000 
Transport  
and Handling 
$150,000               $150,000 
Total O&S 
Costs 
$2,582,795 $75,430,107 $1,540,767 $1,602,398 $2,007,192 $1,723,480 $1,782,745 $1,854,055 $88,523,538 
Notes: 
1 1 GS14 
2 1 AN/TPY-2 Crew  (Source: http://www.dfas.mil/militarymembers/payentilements/militarypaytables.html 
http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/docops/fm44–100–
2fd/chapter4.htm,http://www.militaryfactory.com/military_pay_scale.asp) 
Costs include 40 E-4s@$24972, 1 E-5@$28980 and 1 O-2@$52164. 
3 General PM performed 
4 The following equipment must be purchased to maintain operational capability through the 10-year life cycle: Cooling 
Equipment Unit, Electronic Equipment Units, Forward-Based Mode Prime Power Units, Prime Power Units X2/Radar. 
This occurs only in year 4 because that is when it contractually obligated to be completely built. According to MDA 
Procurement Budget. 
5 10 Personnel @ $45k ea (Personnel work for 10 years) 
Table 58.   AN/TPY-2 O&S Costs 
Table 59 lists the values used to derive the disposal costs for the AN/TPY-2 
component. These activities were used to estimate the costs to dismantle and dispose of 
the AN/TPY-2 and what type of work/personnel was included in the accounting. 
 
Program Activity Year 11 Estimate Totals Notes 
Government 
Program Engineer $89,846 $89,846 1 GS-12 
Support Personnel  $120,000 $120,000 5 E-4s@$24k 
Support Equipment $150,000 $150,000   
Facilities $25,000 $25,000   
Contractor 
Support Personnel $120,000 $120,000 5 E-4s@$24k 
Support Equipment   $0.00   
Technical Data $70,000 $70,000 1 Employee@$70k 
Transportation and Handling  $150,000 $150,000   
Total Disposal Costs $724,846 $724,846   




Table 60 was used to derive the R&D costs for the PAC-3 component. The years 
were staggered to reflect the length of time for the respective phase of the component 
development to commence, complete, and enter the next development phase, keeping in 
mind that all components saw identical phases and a 10-year life span. 
 
Program Activity Year 1 Year 2 Estimate 
Totals 
Notes 
Government         
System Management $136,771 $142,241 $279,012 1 GS14 
Systems Engineering $415,742 $432,372 $848,114 1 GS13, 2 GS12s 
Product Research & Design  $150,000 $156,000 $306,000 2 GS12s 
System T&E $150,000 $156,000 $306,000 2 GS12s 
Contractor 
System Management $140,000 $145,600 $285,600   
Product Research, Planning, and Design $33,000,000 $34,320,000 $67,320,000 1 PAC-3 Battery & Trade 
Techs/($50/hr) 
System Documentation $70,000 $72,800 $142,800 1 Employee @ $70k 
System T&E $140,000 $145,600 $285,600 2 Employees @ $70k (Contractor will 
determine personnel, estimate will be 
adjusted according to contractor’s 
proposal) 
Total R&D Costs $34,202,513 $35,570,613 $69,773,126   
Table 60.   PAC-3 R&D Costs 
Table 61 lists the values used to derive the production and construction costs for 
the PAC-3 component. These activities were used to estimate the costs to build the PAC-
3 and what type of work/personnel was included in the accounting. 
 
Program Activity Year Estimate 
Totals 
Notes 
2 3 4 
Government 
System Management $137,771 $143,281 $149,013 $430,065 1 GS14 
Contractor 
System Management $130,000 $135,200 $140,608 $405,808   
Manufacturing 
Recurring Costs $323,100,000 $336,024,000 $349,464,960 $1,008,588,960 Assuming 84 interceptors/yr, 
PAC-3  
Nonrecurring Costs $3,000,000     $3,000,000 1 PAC-3 Battery 
Quality Control $124,000 $128,960 $134,118 $387,078 1 QA 
Initial Logistical Support 




$150,000     $150,000 Shipping and Handling 
Technical Data $87,000 $90,480 $94,099 $271,579   
Personnel and Training $9,442,000 $9,819,680   $19,261,680   
Total P&C Costs $338,970,771 $349,253,601 $349,982,798 $1,038,207,171   




Table 62 lists the values used to derive the O&S costs for the PAC-3 component. 
These activities were used to estimate the costs to operate and provide operational 









$137,771 $143,281 $149,013 $154,973 $161,172 $167,619 $174,324 $181,297 $1,269,453 
Operating 
Personnel2 
$2,282,688 $2,373,996 $2,468,955 $2,567,714 $2,670,422 $2,777,239 $2,888,329 3,003,862 $21,033,204 
Unscheduled 
Maintenance3 
$130,000 $135,200 $140,608 $146,232 $152,081 $158,164 $164,491 $171,071 $1,197,849 
Maintenance 
Facilities 
$15,000 $15,600 $16,224 $16,872 $17,547 $18,249 $18,979 $19,738 $138,213 
Supply 
Support4 








$1,927,000 $2,004,080             $3,931,080 
Transportation 
and Handling 
$150,000               $150,000 
Total O&S 
Costs 
$14,084,459 $14,491,837 $376,430,826 $391,488,059 407,147,581 423,433,485 440,370,824 $457,985,657 $2,525,432,729 
Notes 
1 1 GS14 




Costs include 87 E-4s@$24972, 2 E-5s@$28980 and 1 O-2@$52164. 
3 General PM performed 
4 Assuming 84 Interceptors/yr, PAC-3 
5 10 Personnel @ $45k ea (Personnel work for 10 years) 
Table 62.   PAC-3 O&S Costs 
Table 63 lists the values used to derive the disposal costs for the PAC-3 
component. These activities were used to estimate the costs to dismantle and dispose of 





Program Activity Year 11 Estimate Totals Notes 
Government 
Program Engineer $89,846 $89,846 1 GS-12 
Support Personnel  $120,000 $120,000 5 E-4s@$24k 
Support Equipment $30,000 $30,000   
Facilities $20,000 $20,000   
Contractor 
Support Personnel $120,000 $120,000 5 E-4s@$24k 
Support Equipment       
Technical Data $70,000 $70,000 1 Employee@$70k 
Transportation and Handling  $150,000 $150,000   
Total Disposal Costs $599,846 $599,846   
Table 63.   PAC-3 Disposal Costs 
Table 64 lists the year-to-year breakdown of EBMD Alternative costs in billions. 
 
Year EBMD Alternative 
Baseline A B.1 B.2 B.3 C 
1 $0.61 $0.46 $0.47 $0.49 $0.51 $0.40 
2 $3.46 $1.77 $2.52 $3.27 $4.02 $1.22 
3 $2.60 $0.83 $1.59 $2.36 $3.12 $0.42 
4 $2.69 $0.94 $1.61 $2.29 $2.97 $0.51 
5 $2.69 $0.88 $1.59 $2.29 $3.00 $0.44 
6  $2.80 $0.92 $1.65 $2.38 $3.11 $0.46 
7 $2.91 $0.96 $1.72 $2.48 $3.24 $0.48 
8 $3.03 $0.99 $1.79 $2.58 $3.37 $0.50 
9 $3.15 $1.04 $1.86 $2.69 $3.51 $0.52 
10 $3.28 $1.08 $1.93 $2.79 $3.65 $0.54 
Total $27.37 $10.01 $16.87 $23.77 $30.64 $5.49 
Table 64.   EBMD Alternative Year to Year Breakdown Costs in Billions 
Table 65 through Table 70 list the costs per EBMD Alternative, with the EBMD 
Alternatives being broken down into their components. 
 
Program Activity Component 
1 Aegis  AN/TPY-2 6 PAC-3 
Total R&D Costs $111,470,727 $710,333,127 $418,638,759 
Total P&C Costs $1,322,766,392 $325,402,772 $6,229,243,029 
Total O&S Costs $3,008,040,385 $86,523,538 $15,152,596,373 
Total Disposal Costs $1,413,692 $724,846 $3,599,076 
Component Total $4,443,691,196 $1,123,984,282 $21,804,077,238 
Total $27,372,752,716 





Program Activity  Component 
2 Aegis  1 AN/TPY-2 
Total R&D Costs $222,941,453 $710,333,127 
Total P&C Costs $2,645,532,785 $325,402,772 
Total O&S Costs $6,016,080,771 $86,523,538 
Total Disposal Costs $1,413,692 $724,846 
Component Total $8,885,968,701 $1,123,984,282 
Total $10,010,952,982 
Table 66.   Total Cost of Alternative A 
Program Activity Component 
2 Aegis  1 AN/TPY-2 1 THAAD 
Total R&D Costs $222,941,453 $710,333,127 $33,148,803 
Total P&C Costs $2,645,532,785 $325,402,772 $2,149,054,823 
Total O&S Costs $6,016,080,771 $86,523,538 $4,695,958,141 
Total Disposal Costs $1,413,692 $724,846 $599,846 
Component Total $8,885,968,701 $1,123,984,282 $6,878,761,613 
Total $16,889,714,595 
Table 67.   Total Cost of Alternative B.1 
Program Activity Component 
2 Aegis  1 AN/TPY-2 2 THAAD 
Total R&D Costs $222,941,453 $710,333,127 $66,297,605 
Total P&C Costs $2,645,532,785 $325,402,772 $4,298,109,646 
Total O&S Costs $6,016,080,771 $86,523,538 $9,391,916,282 
Total Disposal Costs $1,413,692 $724,846 $1,199,692 
Component Total $8,885,968,701 $1,123,984,282 $13,757,523,225 
Total $23,768,476,208 
Table 68.   Total Cost of Alternative B.2 
Program Activity Component 
2 Aegis  1 AN/TPY-2 3 THAAD 
Total R&D Costs $222,941,453 $710,333,127 $99,446,408 
Total P&C Costs $2,645,532,785 $325,402,772 $6,447,164,468 
Total O&S Costs $6,016,080,771 $86,523,538 $14,087,874,424 
Total Disposal Costs $1,413,692 $724,846 $1,799,538 
Component Total $8,885,968,701 $1,123,984,282 $20,636,284,838 
Total $30,647,237,820 
Table 69.   Total Cost of Alternative B.3 
Program Activity  Component 
1 Aegis Ashore 1 AN/TPY-2 
Total R&D Costs $111,470,727 $710,333,127 
Total P&C Costs $1,322,385,720 $325,402,772 
Total O&S Costs $2,933,942,581 $86,523,538 
Total Disposal Costs $431,846 $724,846 
Component Total $4,368,230,874 $1,123,984,282 
Total $5,493,215,156 




Table 71 lists the year-to-year breakdown of EBMD Alternative costs in billions. 
 
Year EBMD Alternative 
Baseline A B.1 B.2 B.3 C 
1 $0.61 $0.46 $0.47 $0.49 $0.51 $0.40 
2 $3.46 $1.77 $2.52 $3.27 $4.02 $1.22 
3 $2.60 $0.83 $1.59 $2.36 $3.12 $0.42 
4 $2.69 $0.94 $1.61 $2.29 $2.97 $0.51 
5 $2.69 $0.88 $1.59 $2.29 $3.00 $0.44 
6  $2.80 $0.92 $1.65 $2.38 $3.11 $0.46 
7 $2.91 $0.96 $1.72 $2.48 $3.24 $0.48 
8 $3.03 $0.99 $1.79 $2.58 $3.37 $0.50 
9 $3.15 $1.04 $1.86 $2.69 $3.51 $0.52 
10 $3.28 $1.08 $1.93 $2.79 $3.65 $0.54 
Total $27.37 $10.01 $16.87 $23.77 $30.64 $5.49 










APPENDIX E.  ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES DATA 
Table 72 lists the raw and processed data used in support of establishing 





      
C B.3 B.2 B.1 A Baseline 
R&D $821,803,853 $1,032,720,987 $999,572,185 $966,423,382 $933,274,580 $1,240,442,612 
P&C $1,647,788,492 $9,418,100,025 $7,269,045,202 $5,119,990,379 $2,970,935,556 $7,877,412,193 
O&S $3,022,466,119 $20,192,478,732 $15,496,520,591 $10,800,562,450 $6,104,604,309 $18,249,160,296 
Disposal $1,156,692 $3,938,076 $3,338,230 $2,738,384 $2,138,538 $5,030,768 
Total $5,493,215,156 $30,647,237,820 $23,768,476,208 $16,889,714,595 $10,010,952,982 $27,372,045,870 
       
R&D 15% 3% 4% 6% 9% 5% 
P&C 30% 31% 31% 30% 30% 29% 
O&S 55% 66% 65% 64% 61% 67% 
Disposal 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
       
  C B.3 B.2 B.1 A Baseline 
Lower than 
Baseline 
80% -12% 13% 38% 63% 0% 
Percentage 
of Baseline 
20% 112% 87% 62% 37% 100% 
Table 72.   Data Used to Evaluate Life-Cycle Costs in Billions 
Table 73 lists supporting performance and cost data for populating the evaluation 
measure plots and decision evaluation display. 
 
Evaluation Measure EBMD Alternative 
Baseline A B.1 B.2 B.3 C 
Probability of Intercept 0.614 0.676 0.780 0.869 0.905 0.714 
Percent Footprint Defended 70.1% 76.1% 89.8% 96.6% 100% 100% 
Total Cost (Billions) $27.37 $10.01 $16.89 $23.77 $30.65 $5.49 
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